Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1968

Personnel Administration in a Developing Country: a Study of the
Lebanese Bureaucracy.
Edward Bitar
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Bitar, Edward, "Personnel Administration in a Developing Country: a Study of the Lebanese Bureaucracy."
(1968). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 1379.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/1379

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received

68-10,721

BITAR, Edward, 1936PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN A DEVELOPING
COUNTRY: A STUDY OF THE LEBANESE
BUREAUCRACY.
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College, Ph. D ., 1968
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
A STUDY OF THE LEBANESE BUREAUCRACY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Government

by
Edward Bitar
B.Sc., Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 1958
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1962
January, 1968

ACKOWLEDGMENTS

To those I have interviewd and many others with whom I have discussed
problems relevant to this thesis, I extend my sincere gratitude.
I am particularly grateful to my adviser, Dr. Marvin Maurer, who has
so generously given of his time and patience in the preparation of this
thesis.
Special notes of appreciation go to Dr. Rene de Visme Williamson
for his guidance during graduate school, and to my wife Martha for her
encouragement and understanding.
The responsibility for any shortcomings of the thesis or translations
from Arabic and French is mine.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ....................................................

ii

LIST OF T A B L E S ...................................................... viii
LIST OF C H A R T S .................................................... ..
ABST R A C T .......................................................... xi
Chapter
PART I
THE LEBANESE CIVIL SERVANTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................

1

Statement of the P r o b l e m ....................
6
Objective............................................. 7
A Note on Sources..................................... 9
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ................................. 11
The Ottoman P e r i o d .................................. 11
1516-1842...................................... 12
1842-1861...................................... 14
1861-1918........................................ 17
The French M a n d a t e .................................. 19
1918-1926...................................... 20
1926-1943...................................... 22
French Impact onLebanese Administration . . . . 27
The Independence Period..............................30
1943-1952......................................
1952-until thepresent .........................

31
33

Summary Statement.................................... 38
III.

THE SOCIAL S E T T I N G ...................................... 42
Social Structure ..................................

ill

43

Page

Chapter
Religious Sectarianism......................

43

Economic Factor....................................... 71
The Sducational System ............................

75

The Political System ..............................

83

Summary Statement.....................................86

PART II
GOVERNMENTAL SETTING
IV

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT...................................90
The E x e c u t i v e .......................................91
The President.....................................91
The Cabinet.......................................95
The Legislature.

V

....................

101

The Judiciary............

108

Summary Statement..........

109

BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION ..............................

112

Central Administration ............................

112

The M i n i s t e r ....................................113
The Director-General .......................... 115
Council of Directors-General .................. 118
Personal Staff Units .......................... 119
Field Administration................................123
The M u h a f e z .....................................124
Council of the Muhafazah........................127
Local Administration................................128
Summary Statement....................................132

iv

Chapter

VI

Page

GROWTH IN BUREAUCRATIC SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ROLE OF THE S T A T E ...................................134
Under the Mandate.......................................134
During Independence.....................................137
From Scores to Thousands...............................139
Bureaucratic Costs and Expenditures.....................141
New Functions, Trends and Changes.......................143
State Functions, Security & Order, General Services. .

151

Social, Economic & Development Services................ 157
Summary Statement.

...................................172

PART III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
VII

PERSONNEL MACHINERY.........................................173
Need for Administrative R e f o r m .........................174
Functions of the Civil Service Board ................

183

Organization of the Civil Service Board................ 185
The Board...........................................186
Personnel Department ............................
189
Preparation and Training Department................ 190
Evaluation.......................................

191

Recommendations: A Comprehensive Personnel System. . .

201

Summary Statement.......................................204
VIII

POSITION CLASSIFICATION AND COMPENSATION ................

207

The Rational System.....................................207

v

Chapter

Page
The Lebanese System .........................

. . . . .

209

Compensation P l a n .......................................216
Allowances...............................................227
Summary Statement
IX

...

235

EMPLOYMENT PROCESS........................

238

Recruitment.............................................240
Examination.............................................248
Appointment.............................................261
Promotion................................................ 263
Summary Statement ....................................
X

269

TRAINING.................................................... 272
Pre-Entry Training.......................................275
Post-Entry Training ..................................

280

I.N.A.D.................................................. 284
Recommendations

................................ .

Summary Statement ....................................
XI

•

292
294

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE............................. 296
Political Activity.......................................298
Discipline....................................... * • • 307
Summary Statement ....................................

321

PART IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
XII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION..................................... 324

vi

Page
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................

338

APPENDIX A
MAP OF L E B A N O N ............................................... 353
V I T A ............................................................... 354

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Page
Breakdown of Lebanese Population by Communities . . . .

50

Distribution of Religious Communities in Lebanon, 1950
(percentage of population by distrclt) ..............

52

Summary of Political Representation of the Six
Major Religious Communities ..........................

61

Parliamentary Distribution of Seats Among Sects,

1929-1964 .............................................................................................

62

Percentage of Higher Administrative Positions
Among the Communities ................................

68

National Income and Employed Population in Lebanon,
by Sector, 1957 .................................................................................

73

Totals of Private Schools, Students and Teachers,

1955-1962 ..............................................................................................

77

Totals of Government Schools, Students and Teachers,

1955-1962 ..............................................................................................

78

Number of Students in Higher Education, 1956-57 . . . .

80

Number of Students in Higher Education, 1963-64 . . . .

81

Agencies and Independent Services Under the
control of the Civil Service Board ..................

114

The Ministries' Regional Offices in the Muhafazah . . . 126
The Ministries' Regional Offices in the Qadas ........

129

Republic of Lebanon - Budget of the Year 1927 ........

136

Totals of Civil Servants and their Salaries,

1937-1946 .............................................................................................. 138
Totals of Permanent Civil Servants, 1950-1966 .................

viii

140

TABLE

Page

VI-4

Basic Pay of the Permanent Civil Servants,
1950; -54; -59; -64; - 6 6 ...........................143

VI-5

Totals of Basic Salaries and Allowances of the
Permanent and Non-Permanent Civil Servants, 1967 . . .

144

Distribution of the General Budget of 1967
According to Functions ..............................

146

Percentage of Spending According to Functions,
1951-1967 ..........................................

147

VI-8

Gowth of Lebanon's Budgets, 1929-1943

148

VI-9

Government's Income and Expenditures, 1944-1967.

VI-10

Civil Servants' Totals According to State Functions,
1967 ................................................

152

General Administrative Classification and
Salary Schedule..........................

211

VI-6

VI-7

VIII-1

. . .

149

IX-1

Minimum Educational Requirements for Direct Entry
into the Lebanese Civil Service. .
...................244

IX-2

Distribution of Examinations Given in 1960 . . . . . .

252

IX-3

Examinations, Qualifications and Subjects of
Examinations, 1960 ..................................

253

IX-4

Distribution of Examinations , 1961................

IX-5

Examinations, Qualifications ans Subjects of
Examinations, 1961
..........................

254

256

X-l

Results of the Training Session at I.NAD, 1960-61

. . . 289

X-2

Results of the Training Session at INAD, 1962-63

. . .

XI-1

XI-2

290

Number of Civil Servants Investigated by the Central
Inspection Service for Political Activities,
1960-64............................................

303

Cases Decided by the Disciplinary Councils,
1960-64............................................

317

ix

LIST OF CHARTS
CHARTS
V-l

VII-1

VII-2

Page
Typical Structural Model of the Lebanese
Administration ..........................................

116

Structure of the Lebanese Civil Service
Board, 1959..............................................

187

Structure of the Lebanese Civil Service
Board, 1962..
..........................................

188

x

ABSTRACT
This work follows a new and ever-increasing trend in the study
of administrative systems in their ecological, societal context in less
developed countries. It proposes to describe, analyze and evaluate the
practices and techniques employed by, and the rules and regulations
governing the personnel administrative system of Lebanon.
Many "newly independent countries" have administrative heritages
with deeply embedded values and patterns of behavior from the past.
Lebanon inherited significant features of Ottoman administration and
was directly affected by the administration of the French Mandate.
Upon obtaining independence, Lebanon faced fundamental problems
in its public personnel system. The personnel system which served the
needs of the Ottoman and French rulers had to be re-oriented to serve
the needs of an independent country. Thus, the government made several
attempts at reforming the administration, notably in 1952, 1955 and
1958-59. Prior to 1959, Lebanese civil servants had their personnel
matters administered by individual ministries which were quite inade
quate for the task. A remedy was sought through the establishment of
the Civil Service Board, a central agency for personnel administration.
This Board will be the focus of this study.
Two methods will be combined in this study for the purposes of
exploring the dimensions of the personnel problems confronting the
Lebanese government: a sociological approach which focuses on problems
stemming from the value system rooted in Lebanese society, and an orga
nizational approach which examines the defects of the personnel system
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by looking at the administrative structure.
The essential finding of this study is that the personnel
system of Lebanon is suffering from the dominance of the cultural
values of Lebanese society. The absence of effective techniques for
attracting the best qualified candidates is one of ftany basic problems
encountering the Lebanese civil service. Furthermore, the study has
revealed that too many persons are employed; that their services are
not fully realized and their quality and performance are unsatisfac
tory; that there exists a high degree, recently diminishing, of favori
tism, nepotism and sectarianism; that selection is not based on merit
alone; that a lack of confidence in the competence of the civil servants
is apparent which in turn, necessitates ways and means to check their
performance in every detail and at every level; that excessive
centralization and authority exists which results in undue concentra
tion of work and decision-making at the senior levels; that there
is a lack of an adequate, equitable and rational system for rank and pay
scale. Although a basic Personnel Law is maintained for all Lebanese
civil servants, many variations can be observed in its application.
The study found that in practice the civil servants, in many instances,
do not conform with the established rules and regulations. Finally,
the personnel system has also failed to take a positive approach to
discipline.
Some final observations derived from the Lebanese experience
appear to support the folklore of administration. A civil service
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necessarily reflects much of the value system of the society of
which it is a part. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect changes
in bureaucratic behavior when these changes conflict with the values
of the society surrounding the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is intricate
ly a part of a larger political system and will be directly affected
by the operation and conduct of affairs in the other societal insti
tutions .
The key to administrative improvement in Lebanon does not lie
in the structural nature of the various administrative reform move
ments or on the functions of the Civil Service Board but rather on
the change in the social and cultural values of the Lebanese society
itself.

xiii

INTRODUCTION
Geographically) Lebanon is a crossroads between Europe,
Asia and Africa.

Historically, its coastal plains and ports made it a

passageway for conquerors.

Its mountain ranges, because of their advan

tages in defense, had provided refuge for numerous persecuted sects since
the time of Jesus.
The history of Lebanon prior to the French Mandate in 1920
is the history of Mount Lebanon, a much smaller area than the present
state of Lebanon.
When the Ottoman Turks conquered the Middle East in 1516-17
Mount Lebanon technically became part of the Arab region of the Ottoman
Empire, but throughout the four hundred years of Turkish domination of
the Middle East, the Ottomans never acquired direct control of the
Lebanon.

Ottoman suzerainty over the mountains was conceded, however,

for the collection of taxes and for the payment of an annual tribute
to the Sultan in Constantinople.
Lebanon developed from an autonomous Mutassarifiyah (province)
within the Ottoman Empire in 1861 to a separate and distinct country
under French rule after World War I.
restricted to Mount Lebanon.

At the time the province was

France, at the inception of its mandate,

expanded the territory into the much larger area of Greater Lebanon -the Lebanon of today.
In 1920, France proclaimed the existence of the state of
Greater Lebanon and ruled it directly through governors appointed by the
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French High Commissioner until 1926 when a Constitution establishing a
parliamentary republic was promulgated.

Modeled after the French

Basic Laws of 1875, the Constitution called for the Parliament to elect
the President of the Republic, who in turn would choose the Prime Minister
and the other ministers.

The Mandate period established parliaments and

governments, but actual power lay in the French High Commissioner.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the High Commissioner
declared a state of siege in Lebanon, suspended the Constitution and dis
solved Parliament.

However, France allowed free elections in which the

anti-French nationalists won a majority and in November 1943, the newlyelected Parliament ended the Mandate over the country and proclaimed the
independence of Lebanon.
The country's political development as it emerged after the
War strongly reflected French constitutional know-how.

However, with

independence, and the removal of French troops, Lebanon was to falter in
its obligations to its parliamentary democracy.

The novelty of political

independence manifested itself in widespread political disarray and
governmental corruption.
Of all the historical forces that have played a significant
role in Lebanon, the period of the French Mandate stands out as the most
crucial if not the most determining factor in the growth of the adminis
trative system.

Among its more important legacies was a constitutional

parliamentary form of government.
administrative apparatus.

Another contribution was a modernized

France also brought back to Lebanese politics

a religious problem when it added to the Mount Lebanon Mutassarlfiyah
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the surrounding Moslem areas, to form Greater Lebanon.
The most important failure of French rule in Lebanon was
its implementation of a policy of divide and rule.
Conscious that their (French) support lay in the Maronites
of Lebanon, that the other Christian communities were
only lukewarm, and that they were cordially disliked by
the bulk of the Moslems, they decided to ease their task
by an unashamed policy of 'divide-and-rule', by exploit
ing and widening the religious division with which
Lebanon, more than any other Middle Eastern country,
is vexed.*
This policy accentuated and compounded the religious-political
intricacies of the country and implemented a policy of confessionalism,
which even to this day has had a determining influence on Lebanese
political life.
During the early years of independence, the country was
faced with innumerable problems requiring immediate attention which
diverted the efforts of the government from problems of administrative
reform and improvement.

This period was characterized by increasing

inefficiency and corruption leading to the overthrow of President alKhouri in 1952.

Following the election of Camille Chamoun to the Presi

dency in 1952, the first of many attempts at administrative reform was
made.

Thus, the Cabinet was granted special emergency powers to legis

late by decrees for a period of six months and it was charged with the

^George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 163-64.
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reorganization of governmental departments; revision of personnel laws
and administrative reorganization.

A second and third reform movements

brought new and improved personnel to govern the Lebanese civil servants.
The crisis of 1958 reflected the chronic disease which has
beset Lebanon since its inception, that is, the inability of politicians
and governmental leaders to subdue their parochial interests for the sake
of national harmony.
The Lebanese political system has been susceptible to exten
sive constitutional abuse and vulnerable to chronic political dishonesty
at both the higher and lower levels of the bureaucracy.

An important

factor militating against the existence of a truly democratic form of
government, one devoid of widespread corruption and nepotism at the
higher echelons of the political apparatus, is the spirit of tribalism
which permeates the socio-political life of Lebanon.

Although this

tribal spirit has had many consequences, the most significant is the
absence of the concept of state both by governmental authorities and
by the Lebanese people.
There are two important reasons for this enduring configura
tion of tribalism.

Lebanon was endowed with a kinship society.

The

extended family was the primary social unit, and the ties which bound
cousins to one another were strong.
head of the family was the rule.

Respect for and obedience to the

Even in some areas of modern Lebanon,

extended families are grouped in tribes and clans.

Politics, like the

social and economic aspects of life, was a family matter.

Religion, and
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more specifically, religious sectarianism, was a factor contributing to
Lebanese political practices.
Religion is the core of culture in the Middle East and
nowhere is its influence more apparent than in Lebanon whose main charac
teristic is the mosaic-like nature of its population.

It is a country

of religious minorities, each conscious of its separate identity, jealous
of its rights, and somewhat different from the other in outlook and
orientation.

The existence of such a plethora of religious denomina

tions has resulted in political confessionalism.

Although Lebanon is

formally a democracy with a parliamentary system of government, seats in
parliament are allocated to the religious communities in proportion to
their presumed strength in the population and public employment is
governed primarily by confessional considerations and only secondarily
by merit.
Sectarianism has had serious repercussions on the government
and administration.

It has undermined national unity and has prevented

the development of the country into a homogeneous, cohesive political
entity.
In summing up the dominant socio-political phenomena which
are stifling Lebanese attempts to achieve political maturity in the
modern world, Moshe Zeltzer says:
The chief problem for Lebanon lies in a peculiar sociolo
gical phenomena, namely, a community the main distinguishing
feature of which is not ethnic origin but religion, and,
on the other hand, its separateness as a human entity, by
way of "community of blood". More precisely, the problem
is whether, and how, a sense of joint citizenship, of
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Lebanese nationhood, based on common values, can be
created, strong enough to counter-balance the centri
fugal forces in the communities.^
Statement of the Problem
The concept of a government run for the benefit of all its
people (if not by them) has become generally accepted.

The technology

of the last hundred years has permitted most people to abandon resigna
tion to their status in traditional society and to hope for a new and
better life.

The responsibility of restructuring the entire society to

meet these expectations has placed a heavy burden on government.

As

societies become more specialized and complex and as the traditional
social, economic, and political localisms are merged into larger national
units, the role of the government becomes increasingly Important.
Meeting these responsibilities requires a combination of
factors which are barely understood and which have just become the focus
of systematic study.

Nevertheless, in light of this growing importance

of government (particularly in newly independent and developing states)
this study begins with the assumption that administration is an essential
element in the conduct of the modern state and that to understand the
nature and process of government, one must include consideration of the
role played by the civil service.

Since bureaucracy is part of this

governmental system, it follows that administration cannot be fully
understood except as a part of the interrelated system to which it belongs.

2

Moshe Zeltzer, Aspects of Near East Society (New York:
Bookman Associates, 1962), pp. 80-81.
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Consequently, the study of administration must include the relevant
aspects of its environment.
The bureaucracy, being a unit of a much larger system -the social system -- is influenced by and affects the physical, ideolo
gical, economic, political, cultural, and psychological environment of
the country.

An important interplay thus exists between the Lebanese

social system and the administrative system.

The Lebanese civil servants,

who are also members of the larger social system or several of its sub
systems, bring with them certain expectations, interpersonal relations,
values, and attitudes.
cratic behavior.

They cannot lay these wholly aside in their bureau

Public administration in Lebanon is thus affected by

social attitudes and values inherent in the Lebanese culture and society.
Administrative organizations in Lebanon seem to reflect particularly the
Lebanese family pattern, with authority and decision-making processes
heavily concentrated at the top.
Oblective
This study proposes to describe, analyze, and evaluate the
personnel system of Lebanon.

The significance of the study arises parti

cularly from the central role of the civil service in government.

Lebanon

has recently undertaken wide-ranging measures to bring vast changes in
the social and economic sectors of the Lebanese society.

The creation

of the Civil Service Board is one of several important manifestations
of this drive toward modernization.
In order to fulfill the needs for an effective government,
and to respond to the demands of a changing society, the existence of a

8

capable bureaucracy is essential.

The honesty of government employees,

for example, seems to be more important in less developed countries
where social relationships are still personal and there is a government
of men rather than law.

In addition, new functions assumed by the

governments create increasing demand for skilled, trained personnel.

A

publication of the United Nations says: "The quality of public administra
tion is in large measure determined by the devotion, ability and honesty
of the public personnel."'*

In light of these considerations, this study

seeks to analyze the present problems of personnel administration and
to suggest appropriate solutions.
Upon obtaining independence, Lebanon faced fundamental problems
in its public administration personnel system.

The personnel system

which served the needs of the Ottoman and French systems had to be re
oriented to serve the needs of the independent country.
Two methods will be combined in this study for the purposes
of exploring the dimensions of the personnel problems confronting the
Lebanese government: a sociological approach and an organizational
approach.

The first approach focuses on problems stemming from the

value system rooted in Lebanese society.

The second approach examines

the defects of the personnel system by looking at the formal administra
tive structure.

3

United Nations, Standards and Techniques of Public Adminis
tration (New York, 1951), p. 20.
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A Note on Sources
The limitations of this study spring primarily from the state
of the source materials.

Siffin stated the problem well:

In parts of the world - particularly non-Western areas the availability of material which may be dignified by
the term data is pathetically limited. The impediments
to their procurement are gargantuan, including as they do
language barriers, limits and lack of appropriate skills,
and in some cases a downright vexing lack of interest in
objective dissection and intimate analysis on the part of
the societies and governments whose cultural, political
and administrative innards now tentalize us.^
It may be pertinent to mention some of the obstacles that
hindered the investigator.

The first obstacle that faced the author was

the absence of reliable statistics and data.

This problem rendered the

research extremely difficult and in some cases impossible.

It would seem

that explicitness is not yet a common trait in the Arab Middle East, nor
is it considered a virtue and the researcher cannot manufacture data
which do not exist.
In addition to the absence of reliable statistics, there was a
general unwillingness among civil servants in providing information which
is available.

This is inherent in the bureaucratic nature especially in a

newly developing country.

They feel insecure by revealing what is actually

taking place in their departments and it was difficult to secure their
cooperation.

It was often a painstaking task to acquire or request an

^William J. Siffin, (ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of
Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957),
pp. 13-14.
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official document.

To consult or interview a public employee necessitated

several visits and the author found that his attempts at securing legi
timate information for research was looked upon suspiciously.
However, the author was greatly helped in the preparation of
this study by his own observations and familiarity with the language gained
through fourteen years of residence in the country.
Government documents were an invaluable source of information
and at the same time a source of frustration.

The Official Gazette, pub

lished weekly in Arabic, contains all the laws and decrees.

Although the

Gazette has a table of contents, it has no index, and this lack complicated
its use.

A further source of confusion is the ambiguity of expression in

much of the legal language.

These problems made The Official Gazette a

tortuous and frustrating, but a valuable source of information.

Additional

sources were of value, particularly the publications of the Ministries of
Justice and Finance.
To supplement this study, the author made three field trips to
Lebanon in 1965, 1966 and 1967 and conducted interviews with thirty-five
civil servants scattered throughout the agencies of the Lebanese administration.
Considering this situation, i.e., absence of basic data, the
poor state of the official documents and limited financial resources -- a
complete study of the role of the civil service in a complex and politi
cally turbulent country is a time-consuming task and requires a wellfinanced team of experienced researchers.

PART I
THE LEBANESE CIVIL SERVANTS

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The administrative system of a country is an aspect of the
total environment and culture of the people.

In an effort to understand

administration more clearly and completely we must examine the historical,
social and political context in which it operates and the complex cul
tural patterns of the people.

The character of administrative arrange

ments, organizations and processes does not escape the heritage of the
past which exerts a dominant influence in the shaping of these institu
tions.
The Ottoman Period
Lebanon has a long history dating back to the third millenium
B.C. when the Phoenicians established their cities along the Mediterranean
coastline.^

Since that day, the strategic location of the country as a

link between East and West has attracted a variety of invaders, the
Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Arabs, and Turks.

At present, the popula

tion of the country forms a unique variety of ethnic and religious groups
who are either descendants of these various invaders or of other minorities
who have sought refuge in the rugged mountains of Lebanon.

The Moslem

Arabs, who introduced Islam into Lebanon, have left a deep imprint on
the culture of the society, while the Christians, with their Western

Iphilip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: Macmillan Co.,
1957), p. 6.
(11)
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outlook and perspective, have, in their turn, left a distinctive mark
on the same culture.
In 1516, the Ottoman Turks, a Central Asian people who
adopted Islam and Arabic writing, conquered Lebanon and ruled it for
four centuries.

It was during this period that Lebanon began to acquire

some of the administrative and governmental procedures which have con
tinued with some modifications until the present.
From the standpoint of administration, the four hundred
years of Turkish rule, from 1517 to 1918, served as an
era of significant consequences in the Levant. Within
that time taxation procedures were fixed, land titles
and rights were recorded, and principles of local govern
ment and administration took on the respect and permanency
of several centuries' existence. Heavy Turkish influence
remains today in the courtesies, customs, and traditions
of Lebanese government offices, and in the patterns of
local government which a Turkish law of 1857 recognized
and established.^
The period of Turkish rule can be divided for the purpose
of this study into three stages: the feudal era from 1516-1842; the
Double Q a 1immaqamatayn from 1842-1861; and the Mutassariflyah from 1861
until the first World War.
1516-1842
Although Lebanon was ruled directly by the Sultan in Con
stantinople, it enjoyed some measure of local autonomy.

o

The Sultan

George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese
Administration (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1955), p. 3
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relied on local feudal lords who were given a free hand in ruling the
country provided they paid taxes to him.

These local rulers, or Amirs,

as they were called, were appointed by the Sultan; however, some of
them succeeded in establishing their own dynasties and, in certain
cases, almost achieved complete independence from Constantinople.

The

most famous of these are Fakhr el-Dine al-Ma'ani whose rule lasted from
1590 to 1635, and Bashir al-Shihabi who ruled from 1789 to 1840.^
The Amir was the leader and chieftain of all feudal lords
in the country.

He exercised great control acting as the final arbiter

in local disputes, enjoying the prerogatives of leadership, and main
taining responsibility for the security of the area.

In return for

prestige and protection from the Sultan, the local Amir promised loyalty
and performed administrative functions such as the collection of taxes -

4

where the highest bidder was awarded the contract -- the maintenance of
order and the execution of public decrees.
The country at that time, lacked a regular court system and
a code of laws.

Judicial functions were handled by feudal lords and

religious leaders subject to the final judgment of the Amir.

The situa

tion of the era, parallelling the general decline and decadence of the

3
Hitti, op. cit., p. 413.
^Philip Hitti, History of Syria (London: Macmillan Co.,
1951), p. 359.
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Ottoman Empire, was effected by the disorganization and corruption
found in the offices of various governors of the neighboring Vilayets,
whose offices were obtained through sale and bribery and used for quick
personal enrichment.

The chaotic state of affairs which characterized

this period of Ottoman rule is aptly described by Haddad:
The corruption in the financial, judicial, and the
whole administrative system and the indifference of
the central authorities resulted in economic decline,
negligence of public works, and in poverty, ignorance
and demoralization among the subjects of the empire.^
It was under these conditions that the civil servants
worked, with no code except the will and pleasure of the Amir, who at
times may have been a good and efficient ruler and at most other times
hardly so.
1842-1861
This situation continued until the year 1841, when the rule
of Amir Bashir al-Shihabi helped to perpetuate corruption, inefficiency
and serious religious conflicts among the various communities.

The

religious clashes between Maronites and Druzes prompted the Ottomans to
suspend the rule of the Amir and impose a new administrative system on
the country.
The new system divided the country into two administrative
regions: the Northern region, which was predominantly Christian, to be

5
George M. Haddad, Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon
(Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 1950), p. 29.
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ruled by a Christian Qa'immaqam; and the Southern region, predominantly
Druze, to be ruled by a Druze Qa*immaqam.

The two Q a 1immaqams were

responsible to the Walis of Tripoli and Sidon who were their link with
the central government in Constantinople.
The Q a 1immaqam was the supreme governor in his region, and
his powers were defined in ail official document called the "Instructions
of Shekib Effendi," dated October 31, 1845.^

This document provided

for the establishment of a Regional Administrative Council to assist the
Qa1immaqam in the exercise of his functions.

This council was composed

of twelve members chosen from the inhabitants of the region on the basis
of their religious affiliation.

The council enjoyed advisory powers only

and had to help the Q a 1immaqam in both financial and judicial affairs.
It is during this period that the Ottomans gave Lebanon a local govern
ment system whose patterns can still be seen in the modern Lebanese
system.

It is worthy of note that the Ottomans themselves had borrowed

this system from nineteenth century France; and as a result, later French
rule in Lebanon did not completely do away with the procedures introduced
by the Ottomans.^

^Tawfiq Awad, "Al-Wazifah fi Lubnan," (Public Office in
Lebanon) Les Conferences du Cenacle, Vol. Ill, Nos. 5-6 (1949), pp. 120-21.
^Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., p. 3,
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A second document -- derived of the first is the "Decision"
issued by the Christian Qa1immaqam on May 13, 1853.

"This century-old

code constitutes -- in its naive composition and strong spirit -- the first
g

written personnel law" in Lebanon.

Its writing was entrusted to a

3-man Diwan (secretariat) which came out with a simple, short and concise
Dustur (constitution) which was composed of two parts: the first defined
the powers of the ruler over his assistants, and the second the rights
of the latters.^

The ten articles of this "decision" reveal an interest

ing and amusing regulation.

One cannot help but quote

His Excellency the Q a 1immaqam is asked to confer for one
hour at the beginning or end of the day with his aides
and be graceful to their argument and accepting the right
opinion; he is also asked not to give an order through
an alien except in writing or through his aides;...he is
asked to read the letters and complaints in person and
give his appropriate time for this so his conscience may
not be burdened with negligence; he should read his mail
and sign it, or have it read to him without the presence
of an alien, and is asked to be inconvenienced or bored
when the work load increases, for his conscience is under
Heavenly Justice.

3
Awad, op. cit.. p. 121.
^Milad Rizqallah, "Min Tarikh Lubnan al-Mu'asir," (From
Contemporary Lebanese History) Majalat al-Mashriq, Vol. XXXV (1937), pp.
562-63.
^Ibid. , pp. 563-66.
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Civil servants must be faithful, secretive, must give
the right opinion and be far from every human wish, and
they must be careful against inclinations towards their
flesh and blood...They should not decide any matter
unless agreed upon by his Excellency, and they should
be alert and full of vitality and let none be injured
through their negligence, knowing that God shall ask
them for this for they do not deserve their salaries
except if they work for it...They shall not delay in
answering their mail, especially to commissioned offi
cials and representatives of Foreign Powers, and the rest
of the mail accordingly, for its owners are poor and are
injured by negligence...God controls their work and
rewards it...They shall not be bribed nor receive gifts
whether in person or through their households, children,
servants, nor from alien hands, whether internally or
externally, secretly or openly under the penalty of
severe punishment.
God avenges those whose faults are not discovered...
They shall come to work daily starting one and a half
hour after sunrise and ending two hours before sunset
except on Sundays and holidays and on Wednesdays in
weeks that do not have holidays. Whenever there is
important work to be done, they shall work at night
also. There shall always be an official on duty until
sunset, and officials shall change turns.
This period in the history of Lebanon, although marked by
bloody andbrutal sectarian conflicts
credited with

two major achievements.

which impeded progress, can be
First, it weakened the feudal

system which characterized the social system; and secondly, it laid
down the foundation of popular participation in government.^
1861-1918
The growing religious tensions and conflicts finally culminated

^Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 31-32.
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in the savage massacres of 1860, in which thousands of people were
massacred.

Anarchy in Lebanon was intolerable to the European powers for

both strategic and humanitarian reasons.

France landed 7,000 troops to

restore security, and in 1861 the six Great Powers (England, France,
Austria, Russia, Prussia and Turkey) signed the Reglement Organique,
under which Lebanon became an autonomous province in the Ottoman Empire.
According to this organic law, known as the Protocol,
Lebanon was to be governed by a Christian Mutassarlf appointed by the Sultan
after consultation with the foreign powers.

The Mutassarif was to be

assisted by an Administrative Council composed of thirteen members repre
senting the various geographic areas and religious communities.
For purposes of administration, Lebanon was divided into
seven administrative divisions called Qadas, each to be administered by
a Qa'immaqam appointed by the Mutassarif and responsible to him.

Each

of these Qadas was in turn subdivided into smaller districts called
Mudiriyyahs each to be administered by a Mudir appointed by the Qa* immaqam.
This system of local administration is basically French in nature and has
continued with slight modifications during the Mandate period and up to
the present time.

12

The number of mudiriyyahs totalled 43. Bulus Masad, Lubnan
wal-Dustur al-Uthmani (Lebanon and the Ottoman Constitution) (Egypt:
al-Ma'arif Press, 1909), p. 3.
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Another significant contribution of the Protocol was the
establishment of a new judicial system with a hierarchy of courts for
handling civil and criminal cases.

The new system, however, left pro

blems of personal status such as marriage and divorce, to the jurisdic
tion of religious leaders, an arrangement which has contined ever since.
In short, one can say that the Protocol of 1861 succeeded in
establishing the foundations of a relatively modern system of govern
ment and administration giving Lebanon a reasonably stable rule from
1861 until the outbreak of World War I when the Protocol was suspended
and a new phase in Lebanese historical development started.
A final word on the Ottoman legacy is in order:
...the Ottoman Empire was essentially a system of
exploitation, injurious to the social and economic
welfare of the subjects, in that it not only lacked
any guarantee of life and property against the violence,
stupidity, or caprice of the soldiers, but in effect
made agriculture, industry, and commerce their helpless
victims. Legal redress, it was assumed, could not be
looked for from courts whose officers were a byword
for venality and corruption, and whose decrees, moreover,
were illusory, since they depended for enforcement upon
the goodwill of the very administration and soldiery
against whom they were directed.
The French Mandate
With the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, the political
matrix of foreign intrigue, sectarianism, and great notables, which had

13

H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West
(London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 208.
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made politics and administration somewhat erratic, fell to the French.
On September 1, 1920, the French High Commissioner proclaimed the
independence of Greater Lebanon.
1918-1926
France brought to Lebanon a religious problem when it added
to the Mount Lebanon Mutassarifiyah the coastal area between the north
of Palestine and a point north of Tripoli.
tory was added in the Biqa' plain.

In the East, further terri

The most important consequence of

this territorial aggrandisement was that the Maronites, although they
remained the largest single sect, held a precarious lead over the next
larger one, the Sunni Moslems, in contrast to their uncontestable majority
under the autonomous regime.^

This in turn became the dominant feature

of political life in Lebanon.
Administratively, the new state was divided into four
sanjags containing twelve Qadas, while the municipalities of Beirut
and Tripoli has independent status.

In each sanjag the Administrator

was assisted by a French adviser and a number of French personnel in
various departments.
The Decree of September 1, 1920, establishing the new admin
istration of Greater Lebanon also provided (article 6) for a Governor,

14
Edmond Rabbath, L'Evolution Politigue de la Syrie sous
le Mandat (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1928), p. 142.
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appointed by the High Commissioner and vested with executive powers.
The same decree (article 16) established an Administrative Council
composed of fifteen appointed members whose task was to discuss legisla
tion relating to internal problems and to the budget.

All actions and

decisions of the Council were subject to the approval of the High
Commissioner.

1S

In matters of administration, the French could not rely on
well-qualified and trained local officials since they were practically
non-existent.

As a result, and by sheer necessity, the French had to

resort to direct administration by French officials who were appointed
to the various departments.

Final authority in all departments was in

the hands of French advisers who resorted to the French practice of
highly centralized administration.^
In the field of personnel administration, the French, as
early as 1920, had promulgated two arretes which laid the foundation of
a civil service system.

Arrete No. 3021 of March 7, 1925, and No. 3195

of July 6, 1925, attempted to regulate various aspects of personnel
administration such as appointments, promotions, discipline and discharge.^

15Ibid., p. 414.
^Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., p. 4.
17
Lebanon, Ministry of Justice, Collection of Laws (Beirut:
al-Jumhuriyah al-Jadida, 1928-1954).
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With some slight modifications, these two arretes continued until 1953,
when they were replaced by a new personnel law.
The mandate arrangement shaped an administrative hierarchy
that, from the beginning, allowed the lower echelon administrator little
opportunity to make decisions on his own.

Even such question as office-

keeping and record management required consultation with and approval by
higher officials, including the French advisers.
The relationship between the Mandatory and the mandated as
defined in the text of the Mandate was to be one of cooperation in
laying down the basis for constitutional life in Lebanon.

In September

1923, the League of Nations charged France with promulgating a consti
tution within three years.

The First Representative Council came into

existence with a membership of thirty members in 1923.

18

1926-1943
A Constitution for Lebanon was promulgated on May 23, 1926
and the Representative Council became the Chamber of Deputies.

On the

25th, the High Commissioner appointed the members of the Senate, and on
the following day, the two Chambers elected the first President of the
Lebanese Republic.

Within the week, the first Cabinet was formed.

Thus

Lebanon was established as a parliamentary republic.

Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn,
1957), pp. 49-51.
19Ibid, p. 51.
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The creation of this parliamentary facade did not, however,
transfer authority to the Lebanese.

The High Commissioner was still

the supreme authority in the executive and legislative fields.

In two

instances, the High Commissioner by a simple majority suspended the
constitution.

This occurred in 1932 when the legislature was on the

verge of electing a Moslem to the Presidency and in 1939 after the out
break of World War 1 1 . ^
The mandate gave the French complete dominance over all aspects
of Lebanese life -- foreign relations, judiciary system, economy, develop
ment and supervision of education and welfare.

The spirit of the mandate

obligated the French to train the Lebanese in these fields.

They, instead,

"regarded Lebanon as an area of exploitation, where French capital,
French colonial expansion, and French culture should be developed.
interests of the people were a matter of secondary importance."

21

The
This

led to corruption in certain branches of the administration which, though
less widespread than that to which the country had in Turkish times been
accustomed, was a bad advertisement both for France and western methods."

20
Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
^Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 50.
^^Robin Fedden, Syria, An Historical Appreciation (London:
Robert Hale, Ltd., 1955), p. 215.
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Furthermore, a particular grievance against the French -which led to the bankruptcy of their rule -- was their failure to provide
a reasonable standard of administration.

"The French officials were too

often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary; while the Lebanese officials
were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of
responsibility."

23

The indictment against the French also Involved,

besides inefficiency, irresponsibility and corruption, their adoption
of a "harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled," and that they
"...did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated
the country as if it were a French colony."

24

The most important factor limiting the full development
of a Lebanese civil service was the dual structure of the Mandate.

Repre

senting the Mandatory Power, the High Commissioner's functions were
limited in principle to advice and supervision, but in fact represented
the ultimate authority in the administration of Lebanon.

The Commissioner

had his own staff and these officers "in practice exercised an almost
unlimited influence over the local administration and political life."
This dual structure, the High Commissioner's office, superimposed on
top of local administration and government, resulted in cumbersome and

23

Hourani, op. cit., p. 176.

24Ibid.
25Ibid., p. 170.
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slow procedures.
Imagine the roundabout ways and circumvolutions that a
simple project presented by a department head goes through.
His report, already worked out and drafted after inquiries
and studies, is transmitted by the Wall to the delegate
who endorses it after hesitation and examination, then
is retransmitted to the competent Minister who studies
it anew and modifies it to make it conform to his views.
For this project to become law (to be put in force),
for it to acquire legislative form, the signature of the
High Commissioner is indispensable. The project of the
Minister, countersigned by his adviser and the Chief of
State, finally arrives at the competent branch of the
High Commissioner's Office. New inquiries, new studies,
new postponements, delays, opportunities missed, out-ofdate or untimely circumstances, that is when the High
Commissioner published in decree the project presented
and promulgated it modified, transfigured, and changed
around.
Whatever may be history's verdict about the French occupa
tion, it did bring about a number of innovations in politics and govern
ment which laid the institutional groundwork for the independent Republic
of Lebanon.
The Lebanese-born scholar Philip Hitti has suimnarized the
positive side of the French achievement:
France, it should be recalled, found the country at the
lowest ebb in its history, economically, politically,
socially, and also spiritually. It set out to recreate
--literally--administrative and judiciary organs, improve
ports, repair roads, establish means for public education
and departments of public health and public works. It
Introduced modern codes for civil procedures, replaced
(1922) the Ottoman municipal law of 1877 by a modernized
one which enabled about a hundred and twenty towns and

26
Rabbath, op. cit., p. 110.

26

villages to exercise a measure of home rule and tried
to revive sericulture, which had all but been ruined.
Local currency was tied up with the French franc,
already depreciated. Special care was bestowed on
Beirut harbor, neglected since its construction by a
French company in 1889-1894. But on the whole its
energy was spent almost exclusively on devising adminis
trative machinery and political formulas and on main
taining its own position rather than husbanding the
resources of the land and training its leaders for
self rule.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the French High Commissioner
declared a state of siege in the Levant, suspended the constitution,
dissolved parliament, and installed a Lebanese Secretary of State as the
senior administrative officer of the land and liaison between the High
Commissioner and the administration.

28

For a brief period, the Mandatory Government became res
ponsible to the Vichy regime in France.
French troops occupied Lebanon.

In 1941, British and Free

In order to secure the cooperation of

the people and enlist their support for the Allied cause, Lebanon was
promised independence.

In 1943, the French allowed free elections in

Lebanon in which the anti-French nationalists won a majority.

A new

President, Bisharat al-Khouri was elected, and a cabinet was formed by
Riad al-Solh.

In November, 1943, the newly-elected parliament amended

the constitution and ended the Mandate over the country.

27

Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 488-89.
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27

French Impact on the Administrative System
In trying to assess the impact of historical development
on the Lebanese administration, one can single out the French mandate
as the most important single factor which has affected the development
of the governmental and administrative machinery.

The French sought to

implement patterns of government and administration similar to those
operative in France itself.

They superimposed their system on the exist

ing Ottoman structure, which itself was greatly affected by French
continental practices.
It would be impossible to name all the various features of
Lebanese administrative practices.

However, one can point to a few

basic ones which still characterize the administrative system.
One of the basic features of the Lebanese administration is
the high degree of centralization which constitutes one of the most
serious problems of the government.

Aside from organizing the country's

administration on a highly centralized basis as existed in France; the
French had required that all administrative decisions be referred to a
French senior consultant for approval.

Today, one finds many details

being referred up to higher echelons for action, thus diverting their
attention to petty problems Instead of using their time to the considera
tion of major decisions.

For instance, the Accounting Law requires that

many details which could be handled by lower officials must be approved
by the Director-General of a ministry, and in certain cases by the Minister
himself.
This high centralization still persists today and is due,
perhaps to the smallness of the country and the advantage of focusing
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authority in one place.

This is coupled by the thought that is neither

very efficient nor administratively very reassuring to delegate authority.
As such governmental wheels move slowly, heavily and, in many instances
inefficiently.
The centralization of authority in the hands of the
upper administrators creates a particular conception of
affairs among the lower administrators. Those in the
high grades hesitate to confide responsibilities to their
subordinates who in turn are inclined to avoid initiative.
The spirit of bureaucracy exists. The formal administra
tive procedures are very long. The most minor formality
necessitates a series of signatures and sometimes months
of waiting. These procedures while instituted to prevent
malpractices had the effect of applying a brake on
administrative activities. The administration suffers
equally from a lack of coordination among the various
departments. Each one of which acts in a manner that
is absolutely independent.
Another important characteristic of the Lebanese administra
tion which is to a great extent the result of a long-established Ottoman
and French heritage is the existence of a high degree of "legalistic"
orientation, mainly the application of the law in its narrowest sense
with relatively little attention to the long-term objectives of the law
and the social objectives of the ministry or agency.

This legal orien

tation affects the Lebanese administration in two general ways:

It

obliges the administrator to apply the law in its narrowest sense because
of the existence of excessive administrative and financial controls;

29L*Orient (Beirut), July 15, 1955.
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and, it provides for the recruitment to public office of administrators
whose orientation toward public administration is from a legal perspec
tive.

This is why a law degree, (License) or equivalent is considered

to be the prerequisite for practically any administrative position in the
top three grades of the administration.

There is little attention given

to the dynamics of administration and to the actual governmental process
resulting from the interaction between the legal provisions and the
human elements.
Another carry-over from the Mandate period which has seriously
affected the administration is the selection system, which has given the
civil service a special character.

This system was originally introduced

by the French and is based on certain principles and assumptions which
are typically French and which have been applied in France for sometime.
The French approach to the problem of recruiting and selecting personnel
for the civil service stresses the academic and theoretical background
and places a high premium on educational qualifications.

This is in

marked contrast to the American approach where the main stress is on
specialized training in a certain limited field.

The French admiration

for lawyers and for legal training as the best preparation for public
service is manifested in the civil service where a large number of the
civil servants are lawyers and where the law degree is a requirement
for all top positions.

The stress on a legal training during the Man

date period was not only true to French tradition and culture but also
served a very practical purpose; namely, that of staffing the Lebanese
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civil service with French educated and oriented persons since the only
institution in the country providing such training was the French
St. Joseph's University.30

This definite bias in the composition of

the civil service continues today, but is the subject of vehement pro
tests from Moslem groups because of the predominant number of Christians
among the graduates of St. Joseph.
The Independence Period
Independence removed the firm, guiding hand of the French
High Commissioner and necessitated local initiative, while the popula
tion made Increasing demands upon the government.

The first two years

of Lebanon's independence were concerned with extricating the country
from its ties with Syria, also newly independent, and France.

Under

the Mandate Lebanon and Syria had shared the security services, central
administration, and the Interets Communs -- a joint customs administra
tion which handled most of the governments' revenues.

On February 3,

1944, the Lebanese Parliament ratified the Common Interest Agreement
Protocol and on February 9th it approved the Franco-Syrian-Lebanese
Monetary Accord.

In July, Riad al-Solh could proclaim that Lebanon now

controlled its Surete Generale and concessionary companies.

This monopoly on the teaching of
when the Lebanese Academy established a School
incorporated in the Lebanese University. Also
initiated a course leading to a License of Law

Diplomatic

law continued until 1953
of Law which was later
in 1959, the Arab University
Degree.
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relations had been established with all the Arab states in April, 1945.
1943-1952
The Lebanese Republic began its life during an economic
boom.

Too far from actual fighting to suffer, Lebanon enjoyed the eco-

nomic benefits of some 53,000 well-paid, free-spending Allied Troops.

O1
L

Small manufacturing flourished, unemployment disappeared and the major
towns grew.

Owing to the wartime shortage of goods and the burgeoning

money supply, prices and the cost of living increased sharply.
market operations were common.

Black

Inflation and supply were the new

government's primary domestic problems; and although it proved quite
unable to solve it the general prosperity was high enough to dampen any
mass opposition.
With independence, Lebanon faced some fundamental issues
concerning its administrative structure.

The exodus of the French civil

servants had harmful effects on the quality and efficiency of the public
service.
The massive departure of the French administrators
created a vacuum difficult to fill. The new authorities
were forced to engage in hasty recruitment; the quality
and quantity of personnel, especially in higher echelons
suffered. High positions were given to candidates less
on their ability than on their relationship with the
political party in power. The efficiency of the

31Gabriel Menassa, Flan de Reconstruction de l'Economie
Libanaise et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beirut: Edition de la Societe
Libanaise d'Economie Politique, 1948), p. 59.
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administration declined and its relationship with
the public was not very satisfactory. A phenomenon
of corruption could be cited.
During the early years of independence, the country was
faced with numerous problems needing immediate attention and diverting
the efforts of the government from problems of administrative reform
and

improvement.

all

its problems.

It was felt that independence would be a panacea for
However, the country realized that this was but the

beginning of a long and hard road.
It was to be expected that a newly independent country like
Lebanon, faced suddenly with a multitude of problems,

such as consolida

tion of the internal security of the country, should for some time neglect
problems ofimproving the administration.
in

thefunctions and responsibilities

However,

due to the increase

of the state, this neglect could

not endure for long and the need to correct this situation became evident
in the years preceeding 1953, in which the first codification of rules
for the civil service of Lebanon appeared.
During this period of its development, Lebanon's administra
tion was characterized by increasing inefficiency and corruption.

There

was widespread dissatisfaction among the people concerning the deterio
ration of affairs in the government and administration of the country.

32M. Georges Fischer, "Quelque Reflections sur La Fonction
Publique dans les Etats Nouveaux," Revue Action (Juillet, 1959), p. 649.
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This was one of the main causes for the overthrow of the al-Khouri's
regime.

The following paragraph gives an idea as to how the country was

being governed or misgoverned by President al-Khouri.
...He also used money, intimidation, the arts of diver
sion and compromise..all the tools of the resourceful
boss...while his vast prestige made the techniques
effective. The final result was something understand
able to Americans by one simple vernacular phrase Tammany Rule...^
1953 - Until the Present
Following the ouster of al-Khouri, Camille Chamoun was
elected President of the Republic in 1952.

His coming to office marks

the inauguration of a new phase in the administrative history and
development of Lebanon.
President Chamoun made a serious attempt to improve the
administrative machinery which he inherited from his predecessor and
whose corruption and ineffectiveness had aroused so much popular resent
ment and criticism.

Thus in 1952, the Cabinet was given special powers

to legislate by decrees for a period of six months. (These decrees will
be discussed in a later chapter).
A second and third reform movements brought new and improved
personnel laws to govern the Lebanese civil servants.

They are, conse

cutively, Legislative Decree No. 14, dated January 7, 1955 and Legislative
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George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," Middle East
Journal, Vol. VII, Winter, 1953, p. 3.
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Decree No. 112 dated June 12, 1959.

The latter is presently in operation.

Professor Heady describes the situation of personnel adminis
tration in the Middle East, which is perhaps true of Lebanon, thus:
The cost of this pattern of inequities is hard to cal
culate, but it is tragically high. Governments operating
under conditions of basic poverty of resources realize
far less output than could be achieved even under these
limitations. Potentially promising candidates refrain
from entering the civil service, able public officials
often leave and the mediocre and poor ones find it
possible and profitable to stay; lines of hierarchical
supervision and responsibility are blurred; morale and
esprit de corps fall; efficiency of performance is low;
and public regard for the public service drops. However,
ways for coping with this dilemma are not easy to find,
and no Mid-East state has yet succeeded in devising a
satisfactory system for dealing with rank and pay
problems.
The 1959 personnel law came as a result of the third reform
movement.

Its stipulations embodied

many basic changes in the field of

public personnel administration of the country.

Prior to this date, the

Lebanese civil servants had their personnel matters administered by the
individual ministries.

In general, these ministries were not capable

and able to carry on such a task.

A considerable degree of non-uniformity,

of duplication of efforts, and consequent high cost were the lesser evils
of such a departmentalized practice.

The greater evils were that any

ministry was open to be overstaffed with civil servants in response to
political, and, more importantly, sectarian pressures in payment for

■^Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration in the Middle
East," Public Personnel Review. Vol. XX (1959), p. 53.
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electoral and patronage debts.

This was done with no regard to the

ministry's needs and goals, or the ability and competence of those
appointed.

These pressures were applied similarly to other personnel

aspects such as promotion, transfer, rewards and penalties.
Chamoun's regime dwindled from the crest of a sensational
start wherein a sudden, almost natural, national unity had crystallized,
into toward the end of his regime in 1958, internal strife and almost a
"sectarian civil war."

The crisis of 1958 was caused by a multitude of

internal and external factors; nevertheless, Chamoun was responsible for
continuing the legacy of the al-Khouri regime, that of meddling in and
corrupting the administration and interferring in local power (interza'ims) politics.

Chamoun, like al-Khouri, failed to face the reality

of epochal change.
The internal causes of the 1958 crisis can be reduced to
four elements: Moslem dissatisfaction; corruption; personalism and the
attempt of President Chamoun to succeed himself.
The Moslem dissatisfaction arose from the feeling that they
are second class citizens in Lebanon.

Their grievances ranged over the

whole spectrum of political, social and economic life.

First of all, the

best and decisive positions in the government were controlled by the
Christians; the Moslems desired an equitable distribution of governmental
posts or munassafa (half-and-half) in all positions.

Second, the Moslems

complained about the limited educational opportunities open to their
children.

Both elementary and secondary education were still functions
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of private foreign and native institutions - mainly Christians.

For

example, in 1954, of more than one hundred High Schools in the country,
only five belonged to the state.

The Moslems belonged to the lower eco

nomic status and could not afford the tuition of the private denomina
tional schools.
The Chamoun administration in the beginning evinced a
reputation for integrity and fair dealing, at least in comparison with
the former.

Once the new government had established itself, however,

rumors and accusations of "corruption" began to spread and increase.

In

nature and scope they were similar to those levelled against the admin
istration of President al-Khouri.

They ranged from personal enrichment

of the President, his relatives and friends, to creating unnecessary
lucrative government posts for followers and friends, embezzlement of
public funds, bribery, corruption, and miscarriage of justice, and even
protection of prostitution.
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In his bid for power, Chamoun antagonized most of the leaders
of the country and attempted to liquidate them from the political scene.
It was only natural that these leaders would exploit and fan public dis
content to bring about the fall of an administration, whose chief they
regarded as their personal enemy.

35

See Yusuf Hana Akl, Fada’ih 'Ahd Chamoun (Scandals of
Chamoun1s Regime) (Dar el-Kamar, 1960),
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Another major cause was the desire of Chamoun to extend his
presidential term for another six years, contrary to the injunctions of
the constitution which limits the President to one term.
When Chamoun had his supporters spread the report that
he intended to stand for election for a further term of
six years as President by altering the Constitution to
this effect with the help of his parliamentary majority,
demonstrations and strikes took place in the Moslem towns
of Tyre and Sidon and in the Druze areas. After a
journalist (Nasib al-Matni) opposed to the President had
been murdered, a general strike was proclaimed on May 9th,
and large Moslem areas of the country came out in open
revolt.
As a result, General Fuad Chehab, Commander of the Lebanese
Army and a person of integrity and prestige was elected in 1958 as
President of the Republic.

Chehab, a compromise candidate who was

respected by all warring functions (the so-called "revolutionists" and
the "counter-revolutionists"), came to power amidst considerable politi
cal instability and social, economic and administrative disorders.

He

found the country's national unity at the breaking point and the govern
mental machinery at a standstill.

He set out to reestablish security

and order to revitalize the economy which had experienced a considerable
recession.

The need for socio-economic development of the country could

never be felt more urgently that at the time and it was clear that the
country could not survive without certain basic and drastic changes in

36
Arnold Hottinger, The Arabs (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1963), p. 278.
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its political and administrative structures.
It was this situation, together with the fact that the end
of any major crisis may provide a favorable atmosphere for implementing
drastic changes of any kind, which prompted the new regime of President
Chehab to launch the reform attempt of 1958-1959.

Thus, in December of

1958, the newly formed Cabinet was invested by Parliament with wide
emergency powers to legislate by decrees and to overhaul the entire
administrative machinery of the state.
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After the 1958 crisis two distinctive changes occurred in
political life.

There was a dampening of political activity and an

increase in the development and service functions of the government.
The Lebanese economy recovered and reached new heights.

Chehab's expan

sion of public works expenditures was intended to stimulate the economy
during the period of stagnation.

The Lebanese government began to use

its financial resources as an economic instrument, deviating from its
traditional non-interventionist role.
Summary Statement
The Lebanese administrative system has been constructed,
organized and based upon two sources: French and Turkish contributions.
Of the two, French concepts dominate particularly so because the Ottoman

^ S e e Chapter VII,
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Empire had borrowed from French practices.
Turkish contributions are both structural and cultural.
By structural, we refer to the emphasis on centralized administration,
with power and control focused on the Amir.

The government's responsi

bility was on collection of taxes, maintenance of law and order and
execution of public decrees, with no emphasis on social and economic
welfare or development.

Because of this, the function of governmental

responsibility was at a minimum; collection of taxes was sold to the
highest bidder while other offices were for sale.

An atmosphere of

venality and corruption were cultural infusions from an inefficient
administrative structure.
A few improvements were made after religious tensions
exploded in the 1842-1861 period and the pressure of European interests.
Notably, a Regional Administrative Council was installed to advise the
ruler.

In 1853, the first code of personnel law or the Dustur was promul-

gated-specifying areas of power and responsibility for both the ruler
and his attendants.

The feudal system was weakening and the foundations

of popular participation were being laid.
New religious clashes and sectarian violence brought new
approaches during the period 1861-1914.

A new protocol was formulated

and for the first time a judicial system establishing courts for civil
and criminal cases was installed.
In 1920, the French were granted responsibility for seeing
Lebanon through the formal accesion to independence.

The period of the

40

mandate was the most important single factor affecting the development
of governmental and administrative machinery.
Key features of the French approach toward administration
were added to the Turkish legacy; many features introduced by the French
remain until the present time.

The most salient was the high degree

of centralization with approval of all plans by senior officials.

No

delegation of authority was added to develop the Lebanese ability for
governing, little initiative or responsibility for decision-making was
a result that lingers well into the contemporary period.
The French were legalistically oriented and applied the law
in its narrowest sense.

No attention was given to the long-term objec

tives of the law or to the social objectives of the ministry.

As a

result of their orientation, the selection system for civil servants
was based on those with legal training or high educational qualifications.
Both these considerations are still followed in Lebanese administrative
policy at the present time.
The early years of independence cannot be noted as a time
for improvement in the administrative machinery but at least it can be
recorded, that a recognition of the problems was made and attempts to
reform the administration originated in formal decrees of 1953, 1955
and 1959.

The exodus of the French left the civil service understaffed -

as far as qualified and trained personnel and overstaffed with persons
of mediocre talents.

The need to fill these vacated positions led,

however, to the ineffectiveness of the service.

The infusion of new
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personnel, mainly through the process of nepotism, reinforced concepts
of corruption and venality.

The personal policies of al-Khouri and

Chamoun of interference in the administration left the service more
disrupted and disorganized than ever.
The crisis in 1958, another incident of religious tension
sparked a new attempt at reform.

This time more emphasis was given to

socio-economic development and to the proper regulation of civil service
affairs through the creation in June 1959 of a Civil Service Board to
oversee and protect the status of the bureaucrat.
As was seen from a presentation of historical events, that
period of crises seemingly brought about attempts at reforms.

Religious

tensions contributed many a time to the development of a crisis.

Parti

cularly, in the 1958 situation, the Moslem dissatisfaction and unrest
was a chief cause in the overthrow of Chamoun.

One of their main grie

vances was the lack of inclusion within the administrative hierarchy a share of the spoils.

Sectarian tension seems to be an important element

in a discussion of Lebanese politics and administration and the following
chapter will seek to explore its role and influence on the administrative
machinery.

CHAPTER III
THE SOCIAL SETTING
Recent studies in the field of comparative administration
emphasizes the need and desirability of examining administrative systems
in the light of the total environment and culture of a country.

Administra

tion does not operate in a vacuum, and the nature of administrative
organizations and processes is to a great extent the product of physical,
political and social forces which operate in a certain culture.

Professor

Robert A. Dahl drew attention to this problem in 1947 when he noted that
...the study of public administration inevitably must
become a much more broadly based discipline, resting
not on a narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and
processes but, rather extending to the varying histori
cal, sociological, economic and other conditioning
factors that give public administration its peculiar
stamp in each country.^This study will attempt to examine the reciprocal and sensi
tive interplay existing between Lebanese bureaucrats and their social
setting.

Their behavior, informal relations, status, Interaction and

general characteristics as a body resemble to a great extent those of the
Lebanese social base.

The diffusion of human resources into the Lebanese

bureaucracy and its social setting conveys a strong impact on the civil
service.

In fact, the major problems and characteristics of the Lebanese

civil service are those of the Lebanese society itself.

It will attempt

^Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration,"
Public Administration Review, Vol. VII (1947), p.11.
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to identify certain important factors in the environment in which the
Lebanese administration operates and which have had a tangible impact
on administrative attitudes and practices.

This will involve a brief

analysis of Lebanese culture and society which has direct bearing on
administrative behavior.
Social Structure
Lebanon is part of the general "cultural area" of the Arab
Middle East.

Countries thereof--although they cannot be equated or

bracketed socio-politically--could be considered as roughly comparable
on the general basis that they share a common history and tradition.
As such, they possess some common social determinants and characteristics
such as the extended family system; the subordination of the individual
to his family and his participation in larger social groupings on a
family basis; larger social units based on kinship lines and the leadership being concentrated in the upper middle and upper classes.

2

Also, we may observe the dominance of primary organizations,
such as the traditional family system, over secondary ones which is
characteristic of agrarian societies.

In such societies primary groups

tend to perpetuate themselves by maintaining a strong relationship with
those of their members that join secondary organizations.
...the relatively few secondary organizations tend to
resemble primary organizations, somehow wrenched out

^Raphael Fatai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," The
Middle East Journal. Vol. VI, No. 1 (Winter, 1952), pp. 20-21.
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of their natural rural setting. Thus, 'secret societies',
guilds and, most significantly, the government itself,
the bureaucracy, resemble a greatly extended joint family
or clan. Important features of administrative behavior
become comprehensible if we see that members of a bureau
cratic organ behave toward each other in ways appropriate
for the relations of fathers and sons, or of brothers,
to each other.
No corresponding or reciprocal interplay exists, however,
to the extension of the primary groups power into secondary organizations
in the form of sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of its members
towards the public.
accustomed to

It seems that "in the Near East, people are not yet

looking upon others impersonally in any situation.

tendencyto look upon

Their

others as individuals, with families, friends, and

communities behind them, is carried over into realms where recent changes
have established different formal requirements."^
The family is one of the most basic and fundamental institu
tions in Lebanese society and culture.

The primacy of the family manifests

itself in all phases of Lebanese life -- politics, business, religion,
and personal relationships.

In political life it is taken for granted

that political leadership will be assumed by representatives of certain
powerful families.

Family ties tend to override all other ties, and an

3

Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria - Toward a Typology
of Comparative Administration," in William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the
Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1957), p. 41.
Slorroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern EgyptA Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957), p. 118.
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individual's first loyalty is to his family; the individual does not
stand alone but appears and acts as a member of a family group.
family manifests its solidarity in many situations.

The

"Blood can never

turn into water" is proverbially stated in a conflict situation in which
an individual supports his relatives against his own friend.

Such loyalty

is expected from him even by his friend, who would despise him if he did
otherwise.
The individual derives support and security from his family.
In return he gives his services and loyalty to it.

He also finds in

it fulfillment; for kinship is a powerful factor in securing for him
prestige and social status.

There is a proverb that is significant in

this context: "He who has no family backing has no backbone."
The Lebanese family is a patriarchal and very closely knit
one.

Lebanese are born into the family and find it extremely difficult

to leave it.

In fact, they seem to surrender their independence and

individuality and to submit to the rule of the father.

The basic values

of the individual are transmitted and shared by the family into which he
is born.
family.

His personality traits are to a great extent shaped by the
Thus, Diab and Melikian state that
The family is all pervasive and requires the support
and loyalty of its members. In return, it provides its
members with the essential security and support. The family
ascribes clearly defined roles and status to its various
members, especially to the eldest male child who comes next
in importance to the parents. Thus the family constitutes
a very important social unit in the life of an individual,
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and its standing in society, at large, contributes to the
prestige of its individual members.-*
In this same article, the authors note that in Middle Eastern societies
the family still claims first priority in the hierarchy of individual
loyalties and affiliations.

This is even true of university students

who are naturally the most educated and enlightened group in society.^
The consequences of such a situation for government adminis
tration are very significant.

The docile and dependent life which an

individual leads in the family is reflected in the administration.
Employees display little initiative or independent judgment and shy
off from the exercise of responsibility.

They try to evade decision

making and take comfort in submission to their superiors.

According to

Morroe Berger, this attitude of subservience and of avoidance of respon
sibility is typical of the civil servant in the Near East.^

Berger's

study on subservience and initiative in the Egyptian bureaucracy is
very incisive and revealing and is true of the Lebanese situation.
It is no wonder that administrative organization in the
Lebanese public service resembles the family hierarchy with authority
concentrated and decisions made only at the top.

This is one of the

main problems of the Lebanese administration and is largely respon
sible for the notorious delay in the transaction of official business.

^Levon H. Melikian and Lutfi N. Diab, "Group Affiliations of
University Students in the Arab Middle East," The Journal of Social
Psychology, Vol. 49, 1959, p. 146.
6Ibid., p. 156.
^Berger, op. cit., p. 152,
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This attitude of domination on the part of superiors and
the docility and obedience on the part of subordinates is also the result
of the authoritarian nature of the Lebanese society in general.

Not

only the family, but other social institutions in Lebanon are highly
authoritarian.

The Ottoman and French heritage which has exerted a

dominant influence on the country was also an authoritarian one.
If a society is organized on authoritarian lines-i.e. if in family and community life great stress is
ordinarily placed on submission to supervisors-- the
area of acceptance of authority in every organizational
situation will be wider than the area of acceptance in
similar organizational situations in other societies
organized on different lines.8
Family ties and allegiances are so strong in Lebanon as to
result in nepotism and corruption.

A person’s duty and responsibility

according to social customs and values are to his family first.

Public

interest is subordinate to the family interest and, hence, widespread
corruption and favoritism result in the bureaucracy.

Social customs

and values in western countries do not tolerate such practices or
behavior.
Sectarianism in Lebanon is part of the basic political
structure of the country, as will be illustrated below.

The religious

communities are all "warped by old memories and emotions into habitual

g

American Political Science Association, Sub-committee on
Comparative Public Administration, Report by Herbert Kaufman, Annex III,
"A Conceptional Framework for the Study of Comparative Administration,"
Unpublished Report, September, 1953, p. 28.
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non-cooperation.

The division is not merely formalized by law.

It is

Lebanon itself*.'9

Accordingly, a strong tendency exists, perhaps, for a

sect once formed to become a closed community and to maintain a conscious
attitude of being different in its religious beliefs, customs and tradi
tions from the surrounding world.

This is so because a sect is a social

force and, in essence, it is a faction, which is defined by James Madison
as "a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the perma
nent and aggregate interests of the community'.'^
A full discussion of the history of the evolution of sectarian
ism, sectarian conflicts and strife and its various social and political
manifestations is very Important.
Lebanon's political history.^

There are innumerable writings concerning

Some very relevant and general landmarks,

nevertheless, are cited here.
Religious Sectarianism
Sectarianism is the distinguishing feature of Lebanese poli
tics.

No study of government and bureaucracy can be attempted without an

a
George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution, "The Middle East
Journal. Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter, 1953), p. 2.
^James Madison, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic
Factions and Insurrection," in The Federalist (New York: The Modern
Library, 1937,) p. 54.
^ F o r an informative, yet compact, discussion of sectarianism
and its political history see, Clyde G. Hess, Jr. and Herbert L. Bodman,
Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," The Middle
East Journal. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1954), pp. 10-26.
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understanding of the religious factor and its influence on the whole life
and culture of the Lebanese people. Lebanon provides a unique and very
interesting example, especially for the student who is interested in
viewing political and administrative processes in the light of the wider
social environment.
Lebanon has never been inhabited by a religiously homogenous
population.

This small region around Mount Lebanon, from which the

considerably larger modern state of Lebanon derives its name, was a
place where persecuted sects formed semi-autonomous social groups.

Here

they enjoyed a considerable measure of freedom and safety, which was
possible because of the mountainous nature of the country that made access
difficult and thus placed its inhabitants in a strong defensive position.

12

Lebanon has come to be peopled by a mosaic of religious communities, none
of which constitute the majority of a population which is at present half
Christian and half Moslem.
Table III-l, below, provides a breakdown of the population
of Lebanon by religious communities
estimate of the size of each sect.

13

and represents the most recent

This estimate is necessarily a rough

one because such a statistic is so politically sensitive that every attempt

12

Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions PlitiqueB du Liban (Paris:
Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), p. 5.
1^
For a discussion of each of the major sects found in modern
Lebanon, see Albert H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London:
Oxford University Press, 1947),
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TABLE III-l
BREAKDOWN OF LEBANESE POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES

a
Community

1913

b

a

1932

1932

e
1956

Christians
242,308

227,800

351,197

424,000

Greek Orthodox

52,356

77,312

134,343

149,000

Greek Catholics

31,936

46,709

76,336

91,000

67

26,102

28,072

64,000

5,890

6,344

15,000

2,815

14,133

16,498

30,000

329.482

396.746

612.790

773.000

Sunnites

14,529

178,746

195,335

286,000

Shi1a

23,414

155,033

165,945

250,000

Druze

47,290

53,334

62,084

88,000

85.232

386.499

423.364

624.000

86

3,588

4,003

7,000

6,393

7,656

7,000

793.426

1.047.813

1.411.000

Maroni tes

Armenian Orthodox
Armenian Catholics
Others
Total Christians
Moslems

Total Moslems
Jews
Others
GENERAL TOTAL

441.800

For the statistical data of 1913 and 1932, see Pierre Rondot,
Les Institutions Politiques du Liban (Paris: Nationale, 1947), pp. 28-29.
b
Including Emigrants.
c
For the statistical data of 1956, see Jacob Landau, "Elections
in Lebanon," Western Political Quarterly (March, 1961), Part I, p. 121,
based on al-Nahar (Beirut), April 26, 1956.
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to take a census since 1932 has failed for fear of revealing a Moslem
majority.

Table III-2 shows the regional distribution of the sects.

It

will be noticed that each sect is thickly concentrated in a given area:
this is indicative of the important role which the sect plays in all
phases of life.

Even in the urban concentration of Beirut in the nineteen-

sixties , the various sects had Mukhtars (mayors) for different quarters
who carried the influence of the hierarchy into every household.
The history of Lebanon has been characterized by tense and
strained relationships between these different sects, each of which is
suspicious of the other.

Conflict between these religious communities

often resulted in violent and bloody clashes, which finally culminated
in the savage massacres of 1860 between Maronites and Druzes and resulted
in direct foreign intervention.

The following quotation is a fairly

accurate description of the situation at the turn of the twentieth century.
Christians versus Moslems. This is my first notion
of collective human relationships. To my mind at
the age of five or six the world consisted entirely
of Moslems and Christians in antagonism to one
another. By the time I was eight or nine, I had
developed, or rather inherited, a definite outlook
common to all Syrian Christians at that time, a
feeling of aversion toward the Moslems and Druzes
whom I learned to consider as our natural enemies.
Under the rule of the Ottomans the Empire itself was "...
a non-national system of Moslem provinces and dependencies whose non-Moslem

14
Edward Atiyah, An Arab Tells his Story: A Study in Loyalties
(London: Murray, 1946), p. 10.
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TABLE III-2

DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON, 1950
(percentage of population of district)

Sh

D

52

0

0

1

78

0

0

0

0

6

0

0

18

2

0

1

3

0

28

63

0

0

8

4

0

3

0

30

0

6

62

0

Baalbeck

12

2

4

0

12

68

0

Zahle

19

10

23

8

24

10

1

Kesreouan

85

2

1

2

1

8

0

Metn

51

9

5

19

0

0

30

Baabda

48

8

3

1

3

18

18

Aley

29

16

3

0

1

2

46

Chouf

34

0

9

0

22

2

31

Saida

8

0

8

0

62

18

0

Jezzlne

63

0

16

0

3

Rachaya

4

25

2

0

Merjayoun

6

14

5

Tyre

6

0

Beirut

8

11

District

Mar

GO

GC

AO

Akkar

18

2

1

0

Tripoli

5

10

0

Zgharta

90

3

Batroun

76

Koura
Hermel

Source:

S

5-20

1-5

28

0

37

0

13

45

13

6

2

4

80

0

3

4

24

6

1-5

Etienne de Vaumas, "La repartition confessionnelle au Liban,"
Revue de Geographle Alpine. XLIII, (1955), pp. 511-603.
Mar ■ Maronite; GO - Greek Orthodox; GC - Greek Catholic;
AO - Armenian Orthodox; S * Sunnite; Sh - Shiite; D - Druze.
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subjects were organized in religious, not territorial communities."^
The nature of the Ottoman Empire itself provided the sectarian environ
ment and basis of Lebanon.
The Lebanon of the time was ruled by a combination of feuda
lism (the amirs) and sectarianism.

The "Millet System" which prevailed

during the Ottoman rule -- and which continued to prevail, to a lesser
extent, afterwards -- is an embodiment of sectarian semi-autonomy.

The

word "millet" means a sect, and so the system has a theocratic basis.
From the political point of view it was a device by the central govern
ment to ease the relations of the subjects with the Porte . More than
that, "as human cattle, the conquered were to be milked, fleeced, and
allowed to live their own lives as long as they gave no trouble.
In all matters that concerned one of the sects, the govern
ment always referred to the head of that particular sect.

The spiritual

leaders of the sects possessed civil as well as judicial functions.
They administered the property and institutions of their sects and
they handled matters of personal status (which they still do at present).
"Since the Moslem law (the Sharia') was not applicable to the non-Moslem
majority (in the Lebanon), they were left under the juris liction of the

^Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East
(London: R.I.I.A., 1955), p. 16.
^Philip Hitti, History of Syria (London: Macmillan, 1951),
p. 667.
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civil code which had obtained before the Conquest, such jurisdiction
being now placed in the hands of their own religious dignitaries.
This was the origin of the system of self-administering religious
communities or millets ... (which) still survives for the purpose of
civil law in the majority of Middle Eastern countries who have as yet
not undergone a thorough secularization’
.'^

As such the theocratic state

gave the religious minorities freedom to conduct their affairs as their
religion dictated.

So, by virtue of the Millet System all sects were

self-administered so to speak, which situation widened the gap more and
more between the various religious communities.
The Ottoman millet system set up all the religious nonMoslem groups into separate entities having each of them under its own
religious heads.

These heads administered the laws related to divorce,

marriage, inheritance, adoption and other aspects of personal status,
and supervised religious education and religious foundations.

"This

amounted to a provision for a minor government within the larger govern
ment.

It was a formalization of the traditional Moslem practice of

attempting to solve the problem of minorities."

18

The French Mandate "... emphasized the 'confessional1
nature of the 'State', and thus succeeded in creating a diversity of
interests which drove people into enclaves."

19

^George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London:
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 18.
18

Philip Hitti, Lebanon In History (London: Macmillan and Co.
Ltd., 1957), p. 362.
l^Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn Ltd.,
1957), p. 50.
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The traditional jurisdiction of the communal courts
^
were maintained in some matters of personal status,
although a large proportion of such matters were
transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made
in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal
jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree
in which the historic communities were given explicit
legal recognition. Their statutes were given the
force of law, and the application of them placed under
the protection of the law and the control of the public
authorities. They were to possess corporate personality,
and to be represented in their relations with the public
powers by spiritual heads. Members of the communities
would be obliged to conform to the communal statutes
in matters of personal status, and to the civil law
where the statutes of the communities were silent.
Anyone who attained his majority would be at liberty
to leave his community and enter a new one; and
provision was made for individuals who were not members
of any religious community.^0
It was in the 19th century that the principle of confessional
allotment of seats within a given administrative or electoral district
was founded.

In 1841, the Ottomans took the first step in institutionalizing

sectariandifferences by organizing provincial councils' to
and carry on discussions in accordance with the laws.

hear disputes

As was mentioned

earlier, Mount Lebanon was divided into a northern governorate under a
Maronite Qa 1immaqam and a southern governorate under a Druze Qa*immaqam.
Each was assisted by a provincial council composed of twelve persons,
two from each of the major religious sects (Maronites, Druze, Orthodox,
Greek Catholic, Sunnite Moslem, and Shi'ite Moslem).^

A l®°> in 1861,

20Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
71

“ Malcolm Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 18401868; A Contemporary Account by Antun Dahir al-Aqiqi, and Other Documents
(Beirut: Khayat's, 1959), p. 4.
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when Mount Lebanon became a Muttassarrifiyah. headed by a Christian
Mutassarif who was assisted by Administrative Council (Majlis Idara)
in which all the major sects were represented.

The seats on the Council

were distributed in the following manner: Maronites 4, Druze 3, Greek
Orthodox 3, Moslem 2.
of the villages,

22

These members were elected by the mayors (Sheikhs)

and were to examine revenues and expenditures.

The

Mutassarifiyah was divided into seven districts, each of which was
governed by a Qa 1immaqam appointed by the Mutassarif from the dominant
sect in the district.
Later legal changes by the French -- as of the spring, 1920,
when they established the state of Greater Lebanon -- deeply affected
Lebanon’s political development along sectarian lines.

The new state

was enlarged by the addition of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, Baalbeck
and Hasbaya and its area was three times the size of the former Mutassarifiyah of Mount Lebanon.

With this aggrandizement, the demographic picture

of the country changed sharply.

Whereas under the Mutassarifiyah Lebanon

was predominantly Christian (constituting 75 percent of the population),
the enlarging of the state brought with it a large Moslem population.

Bulus Masad, Lubnan wal-Dustur al-Uthmani (Lebanon and
the Ottoman Constitution) (Egypt: al-Ma'arif Press, 1909), p. 12.
23

See Table 1, page 50 for the breakdown of the Lebanese
population by communities in 1913 and 1932.

23
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From an overwhelming majority, the Maronites were reduced to 30 percent
of the population, but still constituted the largest single community;
the next largest community was the Sunnis, followed by the Shi'a, Greek
Orthodox and Druze.
While the 200,000 Maronites, devoted to France had
previously formed a majority in Lebanon, they were
now joined by 135,000 Christians of various denomina
tions, in addition to 30,000 Armenians, and 20,000
foreigners together with 250,000 Sunnites, 105,000
Shi'a and 44,000 Druze.^
The creation of the Lebanese state as separate from Syria
was primarily a sectarian issue in background and essence. The French
authorities conceived of the Maronites as their natural friends and allies
and it was only natural that France would favor them:
The French authorities were believed to be not altogether
impartial in their efforts to hold the balance (between
Christians and Moslems), and to show excessive favor to
the Maronites and other uniates (Catholics). Thus the
other communities became hostile both to France and to
the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the
alliance between the two. ^
France laid some regulations which had primary impact on the
country's political institutions.

Arrete No. 1304 of March 1922, established

a new Representative Council which became the precursor of the Lebanese
Parliament.

Another Arrete No. 1307 established electoral procedures for

2^Carl Brockelman, History of the Islamic People (New York:
Putnam’s Sons, 1947), p. 494.
25

Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 183.
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Lebanon and has exercised its influence on all later Lebanese electoral
laws.

This Arrete provided for the apportionment of seats in each electoral

district on a confessional basis, and helped to incorporate 'feudalism'
into the electoral system by dividing the country into multi-seat constituencies.

26
The Constitution, promulgated on May 23, 1926, stated in its

95th Article (as amended on November 9, 1943) that: "As a provisional
measure and for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall
be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of
the Cabinet, such measure, however, not to cause prejudice to the general
welfare of the State.1,22

This provision effectively weakened, if not

contradicted, the 12th Article of the same Constitution which stated that
"Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference
being made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the
conditions established by law.

A special statute shall guarantee the

rights of officials in the departments to which they belong."

28

At the dawn of independence the question of confessionaliam
and sectarianism received its modern reaffirmation in the form of the

2^Receuil des Actes Adminlstratifs du Haut Conmissariat de
la Republique Francaise en Syrie et au Liban, 1922.
27

The Lebanese Constitution (Beirut: Khayat's, 1960)

26Ibid.
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so-called Al-Mithaq Al-Watanl (The National Pact) of 1943.

This was

an unwritten agreement concluded between the two "heroes of independ
ence" President Bisharah Al-Khuri, representing the Christians, and
Premier Riad Al-Solh, representing the Moslem.

The Pact purported

to serve as a perpetual Entente Cordiale among the various religious
communities of Lebanon.

In essence the Pact consisted of four princi

ples: (1) Lebanon should be completely independent and sovereign.
This meant that the Christians should stop pressing for Western
(especially French) protection, and that the Moslems should not try
to turn Lebanon into an Arabic Islamic state or part of one; (2) Lebanon
should have an Arab "face" and language while remaining culturally
distinct; (3) Lebanon should cooperate with all the Arab states providing
that they recognize her boundaries; (4) Public office should be distrinn

buted equitably among the major confessions.
The National Pact was a formula which all elements in the
country could agree upon, and it laid down the rule for domestic
cooperation and foreign policy necessary to the country's survival.
The Pact, however, was a remedy rather than a cure, and it depended
upon the sectarian ratio of the population remaining constant.
legitimized sect as a basis for representation.

It also

In the nineteen-fifties,

as the sectarian ratio shifted in favor of non-Christians, and as Moslems

29

Bisharat Al-Khuri, Haqa iq Lubnaniya (Lebanese Realities),
Beirut: Awraq Lubnaniya, 1961), II, pp. 289-300.
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began to demand a greater share of power, the Pact itself became a
problem.
Even before the National Pact was given official expression
certain procedures were being developed on the domestic side to carry
it

out.

be

a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem, the Speaker

of

the Chamber a Shiite.The National Pact

an

equitable distribution ofcabinet and bureaucratic positions among the

sects.

One of these is the tradition that the President of the Republic

also implicitly prescribed

Every one of Lebanon's forty-one cabinets between 1943 and 1967

was carefully balanced, 50-50, between Christians and non-Christians and
also among the various sects and regions.

Table III-3, below, gives the

breakdown of the political representation of the six major religious
communities.

Another was the system of representation of the 1929 Parlia

ment and all subsequent Parliaments was fixed by law, in advance, in the
ratio of six Christians to five non-Christians. (See Table III-4).

Voters

in each district had to choose a certain number of deputies from the
major sects in the district.

For instance, a voter in Akkar in the 1964

election had to choose two Sunni Moslems, one Greek Orthodox, and one
Maronite.

Any candidate would have trouble winning without some support

from voters of other sects; but these voters would tend to vote first for
the man in their own sect.

There was therefore a pull toward inter

sectarian cooperation among candidates which resulted in lists.

The most

prestigious men of the dominant sect in the district found themselves in
a strategic position.

They were able to do favor for candidates of other

sects, since their coattails were so strong; and after the election they

TABLE III-3
SUMMARY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SIX MAJOR
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES3

Percentage

Mar

S

Sh

GO

Population

30.0

20.0

18.0

10.0

6.0

6.0

1.430,908

Parliamentary Seats
1943-1966

30.7

20.4

18.4

10.8

6.0

6.5

495

Ministerial Portofolios
1943-1966

21.6

26.2

13.4

14.8

10.9

12.8

439

Cabinet Ministers
1943-1966

25.8

24.7

13.1

12.0

11.3

13.1

285

GC

D

Total

a
Figures from 1943-1961 compiled from Ralph Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the
Lebanese Political System," Journal of Politics. XXIV (August, 1962), p. 519.
Mar ■ Maronite; S = Sunnite; Sh = Shiite; GO = Greek Orthodox; GC * Greek Catholics;
D ■ Druze.

TABLE III-4
PARLIAMENTARY DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS AMONG SECTS
1929-19643

1929 1934

Sects

Christians:
Maronites
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholics
Armenian
Minorities
Sub-total
Moslems:
Sunni
Shi'i
Druze
Sub-total

1937

1943

1947

1951

1953

1957

1960

1964

15
6
3
1

7
3
2
2

20
7
4
2
2

18
6
3
2
1

18
6
3
2
1

23
8
5
4
2

13
5
3
2
1

20
7
4
4
1

30
11
6
5
2

30
11
6
5
2

25

14

35

30

30

42

24

36

54

54

9
8
3

5
4
2

13
11
4

11
10
4

11
10
4

16
14
5

9
8
3

14
12
4

20
19
6

20
19
6

20

11

28

25

25

35

20

30

45

45
-

25c

63d

55

55

77

44

66

99

99

U
□
TOTAL

45

a
Nicola Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, I960," The Middle East Journal , Vol. XIV, No. (Autumn, 1960), pp. 367-369.
b
Thirty elected and 15 appointed
c
Eighteen elected and seven appointed

d
Forty-two elected and twenty-one appointed
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had a powerful voice in Parliament, which in turn reinforced their
prestige.
In the Lebanon of today, with the exception of the family,
the religious group is still the most important influence in determining
an entire way of life for many people.

The basic value of the individual,

and very often his role and status in society, are determined by his
religious affiliation.

According to Daniel Lerner, religion in the

Middle East
...has always claimed priority among the secondary
symbols of identification. A Middle Easterner related
himself to his society by way of his sect, and Muslim
doctrine on the dhimmi as well as the Ottoman Millet
system accorded cultural and legal authority to recognized
sects.30
The importance and role of the religious group in society and
the life of its members is well expressed by Albert Hourani in his oftenquoted phase:
The sect persisted as a social entity even after the
impulse which gave it birth had died away. To leave
one’s sect was to leave one's whole world, and to
live without relatives, the protection of the com
munity, the consciousness of solidarity and the
confort of normality.31
Although some recent studies have revealed that religious
influence and identification is declining somewhat,

32

the situation

30Haniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958),
p. 172.
3^Hourani, op. cit., p. 64.
32e . Terry Prothro and Levon Melikian, "Social Distance and
Social change in the Near East," Sociology and Social Research, XXXVII,
(1952), pp. 3-11.
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described above is basically true today.

Thus, a recent study conducted

among a selected group of Middle Eastern students at the American Univer
sity of Beirut showed that among Moslem students religious affiliation
ranks next to the family only.

Among the Christian students, it ranked

third, after the family and ethnic group.

33

It would be impossible to present a true and clear picture
of the role and influence of religion in Lebanese society, especially
upon government ani administration.

One must live in the country for

some time to obtain a feeling of the mood and atmosphere and to under
stand all the various repercussions of this problem.

An attempt will

nevertheless be made to describe some instances wherein the sectarian
problem had serious and adverse effects, especially on governmental insti
tutions and practices.
By far the most serious repercussion of sectarianism in
Lebanon is that it has undermined national unity and until now has pre
vented the development of the country into a homogeneous, cohesive
political entity.

"Sectarianism, authorized by public law and administra

tive fiat, perpetuates ancient loyalties at the expense of the larger
national identification."

34

Thare is a shocking lack of agreement among the two major
sects on the most basic of all issues; namely, that of the continued

33

Diab and Melikian, op. clt., p. 156.

34L erner, op. clt., p. 172.
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existence of Lebanon as an independent political entity or its incorp
oration into a larger predominantly Moslem Arab state.

This basic

lack of agreement was brought to a climax in the crisis of 1958, which
almost degenerated into a religious war between the two main religious
communities.
In the field of government and administration, sectarianism
had had most serious and grave effects.

To begin with, it has precluded

the developement of a strong government and has fostered political divisive
ness and instability.

It has complicated the task of forming cabinets,

which must represent all the various sects. J

Cabinets are by definition

coalitions of the representatives of the various religious groups of
the country which must not act so as to impair the basic interests of
any of the major communities if they are to continue in office.

All

groups fear a strong government which, if it fell in the hands of one group,
might make possible its dominance over others.

Hence, the role of govern

ment has been restricted to a narrow scope of activities and, in comparison
to other Middle Eastern countries, has played a secondary role.
It is widely held that in Lebanon there can be no strong rule.
After witnessing the series of coups d'etat in the neighboring Arab
countries, many people have concluded that Lebanon was not a fertile

35

See Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a
Confessional Democracy," in Leonard Biner, (ed.), Politics in Lebanon
(New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 192-200.
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ground for such occurrences.

This belief is grounded on sectarianism.

A coup d 1 etat is not likely because sectarian considerations cannot
be disregarded.

A coup d'etat can be attempted only by a group repre

senting the major sects, which is impractical or else the struggle would
become a sectarian one.
The major sects not only must have their say but also their
proportional say in government; thus governing is a joint action of the
sects.

Consequently the governing process is greatly complicated

because of sectarianism.
President
the

There is in Lebanon a dual executive-*the

who is not only nominally but actually the chief executive and

Prime Minister.

These two executives, being therepresentatives

of the two largest communities, must work together.
Some claim that sectarianism has been a blessing in the sense
that it has prevented the rise of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes
and will continue to do so since no religious sect will tolerate such
dominance by another sect.

This may well be true, but the alternative

has been a weak and powerless government.

The Cabinet in Lebanon is

becoming more and more a representative institution where different sects
are represented, and less and less an executive organ which can speedily
reach and implement decisions.

It has become a

miniature Parliament

which debates and discusses issued but rarely reaches agreement on a
decision.
...The government's function has been to act as a
trustee: to preserve, to stand guard, to see to it
that one's clients receive the due measure of privi
leges and benefits to which traditions entitle them.
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...Governments are not made to create public policy,
nor to choose between clear-cut alternatives entailing
the triumph of one set of demands over another, but to
reflect faithfully ani adjust the competing interests
of various groups...In short, it is in the nature of the
executive to avoid decisions that are political in the
full sense. The government's functions might be said
to be judicial: it adjudicates claims...
Politics and sectarianism are inevitably interrelated in
Lebanon, and very often it is not possible to distinguish between the

tsro .

Sectarianism has had very serious effect on the administration in

that it has resulted in a prejudiced, and biased civil service and, thus,
undermined the principle of civil service neutrality.

Sectarian attitudes

and convictions continue after appointment to the public service and, as
a result, some civil servants' loyalties are to their sect and not to
the state.

They view themselves first as servants to their own sect and

its members and secondly as servants to the rest of the public.
The Constitutional provision that the sects shall be repre
sented in the public service has been accepted by the communities as a
guarantee that each shall have a proportional number of pests in government.
Since 1959, the Civil Service Board has been attempting to institute the
principle of munasafa or 50-50 in the distribution if government posts
between Christians and Moslems.
Table III-5, below, shows distribution of the higher administra-

36Ibid., pp. 188-190.

TABLE III-5
DISTRIBUTION OF HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AMONG THE COMMUNITIES

Percentage

Year

Mar.

GC

GO

S

1946a

38.7

3.2

19.3

29.0

3.2

6.4

38

62

1955a

40.0

9.0

11.7

27.0

3.6

7.2

38

60.7

111

26.2

9.5

14.3

34.5

2.3

8.2

45

55.0

84

47

53

87

Posts

Sh

D

Moslems

Chritians

Cases

31

b
1962
1967C

Population in
1956 a

30.0

6.0

10.0 '

20.0

18.0

6.0

1,430,908

a
Ralph Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency," in Leonard Binder,
Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 172.
b
List of government officials, American Embassy, Lebanon.
c
Information from the Civil Service Board.
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tive and diplomatic posts among the religious communities for selected
years.

The three largest Christian communities constituted 467. of the

total population in 1967 but held 55% of the higher administrative and
diplomatic posts, while the three Moslem communities together made up
44% of the population but held only 457. of the same positions.
Shi'a community is particularly slighted.

The

Whereas, this sect constitutes

18% of the population, it occupied 2.3% of the high posts in the govern
ment .
Another aspect of sectarianism in administration is that it
results in weak internal control over civil servants.

A certain super

visor cannot control or discipline his subordinates who belong to different
sects and who have been hired and are still supported by sectarian pressure
and influence.

Many executives hesitate to delegate authority to subor

dinates who do not share their sectarian view, thus obstructing the smooth
and speedy functioning of the administration.
The whole problem of sectarianism was recently well expressed
by a former Prime Minister, who said that for an individual, religion
constitutes a passport, a check, a privilege and a certificate of compe
tence.^®

37^0 figures are available for the confessional distribution of
the civil servants. The author was informed during an interview on January 5,
1967, that only the President of the Republic has access to these figures.
It is very doubtful that the civil service posts are distributed on the basis
of munasafa and in all likelihood the Christian elements still predominate.
38

Saeb Salam, "Lubnan Wahed La Lubnanan" (One Lebanon and
Not Two), Conferences du Cenacle, XV, No. 5 (1961), p. 20.
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It is quite obvious that in the realm of government and
administration, sectarianism contradicts the most elementary principles
of merit.

Its overtones are implicit in practically every act or deci

sion of the government.

The far-reaching implications of the sectarian

problem will become more evident as this study proceeds to an examina
tion of various aspects of the Lebanese civil service.
In spite of the gravity of the sectarian problem and of the
serious obstacles which it creates for the government and administration,
there does not seem to be an easy and near solution to such difficulties.
The sectarian problem cannot be solved by statutory legislation or govern
mental action.

It is deeply rooted in the society and culture, and

solution lies in a gradual, slow social evolution in the country.

There

are indications, at present, that the slowly developing secondary insti
tutions and groups in Lebanese society, especially trade unions and
political parties, are coming to play a part in the loyalty of the citi
zens.

This is true of transitional societies in general, where primary

groups and loyalties of a traditional culture gradually give way to
developing secondary groups and loyalties that normally characterize more
modern industrial societies and culture.

The Lebanese government would

do well to encourage and support, and, if necessary, regulate these emerging
secondary groups, with the ultimate goal and hope that they will replace
sectarian groups and affiliations.

It is important, however, that suffi

cient care be taken so that these growing secondary groups would not
become instruments of sectarian pressure and interference.
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Economic Factor
In studying the social setting of the administrative system
in Lebanon, one cannot overlook the economic aspect which is essential
for understanding some of the basic features of the system.

The follow

ing paragraphs will present brief, general descriptions of the economic
structure and its bearing on the public administration of the country.
Lebanon is a small country with a population of approximately
2,405,000 and an area of 4,015 square miles.

Although poor in natural

resources and essentially underdeveloped, it is prosperous in many
respects, and with the exception of Israel and Kuwait, has the highest
per capita income in the Middle East,

39

termed more agricultural than industrial.

The Lebanese economy can be
Thus

...although Lebanon is primarily a country of trade
and services, when the individual incomes of the
various sectors of the economy are compared, it is,
on the other hand still true that about half the
population derive their income, wholly or partly
from agriculture, and a little more than half of the
people are rural in the sense they live in rural
areas. Rural exodus to urban centers has been
continuous since the second world war, but is rather
slow.^0

~^New York Times, June 11, 1967, Section 3, p. F 1.
per capita income in Lebanon is $450.

The

^ S i m o n G. Siksek, Bashir J. Daouk and Sami E. Baaklini,
Preliminary Assessment of Manpower Resources and Requirements in
Lebanon (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, 1960), p. 18.
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One of the striking features of the Lebanese economy is the
lack of official economic policy in Lebanon which is central, allpervading, or of long duration.

The Lebanese economy "is as close to

the classical 'laissez faire1 model as one can expect in the modern world."^
Table III-6 shows the rat national product by sector.

Lebanon

has been conveniently classified as an agricultural country not unlike
the other countries of the Arab East.

Forty-eight and nine-tenths percent

of the population derive their income from agriculture.

Yet, insofar as

agriculture produces a relatively small proportion of national income
(15.8%), Lebanon is much more similar to the more developed, industrybased economies of the West.

However, industry here contributes only

12.6% of the total national income and employs 12% of the labor force.
But the most distinctive feature of the Lebanese economy
remains the large proportion, 31.27., contributed by the trade sector.
Even this high figure somewhat underestimates the actual share of trade
in the country's income.

For to it must be added the greater part of

income arising from "Transport" (5.37.) and Finance (6.1%).

This raises

the share of the trade sector to over forty percent of the total national
income.

Hence the essentially mercantile nature of the Lebanese economy.
Table 6 exposes the inequality of the distribution of income.

41
1959), p. 1-6.

U.N. - F.A.O., Lebanon - Country Report (Rome: F.A.O.,

TABLE III-6
NATIONAL INCOME AND EMPLOYED POPULATION IN LEBANON
BY SECTOR, 1957a

Sector

National Income
(in L.L. Million)b

Percentage

Persons Employed
(in 1,000)

Percentage

National Income
per Employed Person

Agriculture

238

15.8

220

48.9

1,082

Industry

189

12.6

54

12.0

3,500

Construction

41

2.7

33

7.3

1,242

Transport

80

5.3

24

5.1

3,333

469

31.2

53

11.8

8,849

91

6.1

2

0.4

45,500

Other Services

148

9.8

48

10.7

3,083

Government

108

7.2

16

3.6

6,750

Real Estate

139

9.3

n.a.

n.a.

450

100.00

Trade
Finance

TOTAL

1,503

100.00

a
IRFED Mission, Etude Preliminaire sur les Besoins et les Possibilites du Developpement au
Liban. 1959-1960. Vol. I, p. I-I-33.
b
L.L. = Lebanese Pound; $1.00 = 3.1 L.L.
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It may be taken

as an evidence that such inequality has been, at least,

in part, caused

by the mercantile nature of the economy and the prepon

derance of services production.

The lowest figure recorded for income

produced per head of active population is in agriculture (1,082 L.L.)
and the highest
The
standable.

figure is for finance (45,500 L.L.).
pre-eminence of trade in a country like Lebanon is under

Forming by geographical position a link among three continents,

and having more Lebanese emigrants than the population of the country,
and who were forced to leave because of the lack of natural resources,
Lebanon has developed into a country of middlemen and merchants with
well established connections in the outside world.

Charles Issawi, a

noted Lebanese economist relates:
...Fabulous, yet perfectly authentic, stories are told
of the transfer of gold from Mexico to India and China,
of the shipment of copper from Franco's Spain to Stalin's
Russia, and of the sale of a huge consignment of tooth
brushes from an Italian firm to a neighboring one -all these negotiations directed and financed by some mangy
looking business house in Beirut.^
The country today thrives on a prosperous import and re-export
trade as well as on such service transactions as gold brokerage; transit
fees and entreposage (warehouse) trade.

Beirut's well-developed sea and

airports have contributed in no small degree towards making Lebanon the

^Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Political Libera
lism in Lebanon, in Binder, op. cit., p. 74.,
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center of the Eastern Mediterranean trade; the free zone in Beirut's
seaport has developed into the most important entrepot center in the
Middle East; and the free foreign exchange system adopted since 1948 made
possible various lucrative switch operations.
There is another particular feature of the Lebanese economy
which has far-reaching implications.

Lebanon's balance of visible

trade has reflected consistently a ratio of 5 to 1 and 6 to 1 to the
advantage of imports over exports.

In 1965, thevalue of total imports

amounted to $482 million, while total exports amounted to $85 million
/Q

only.

Yet this deficit is more than fully covered by "invisible"

receipts (emigrants' remittances, tourism, banking,-«tc.).
It is related that in 1952, the Lebanese government had
contracted Paul van Zeeland, to study the economy.

After having looked

carefully at the situation, van Zeeland told the government: "It is a
miracle -- I can't understand it.

But my advice to you, since things

are going so well -- don't ask toomany questions or try
about the situation.

to do anything

Let it go on."

The Educational System
Education in Lebanon owes its rise and development to private
efforts.

Lebanon had developed a powerful tradition which goes back

to centuries of hard work by foreign and local ecclesiastical establish-

43

New York Times, op. clt.
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raente of the various religious communities
Education in Lebanon is characterized by a system in which
the private local and foreign schools representing different traditions
and cultures predominate.

Tables III-7 and III-8, below, present the

total number of private and government elementary and secondary schools
together with the totals of students and teachers between 1955-56 and
1961-62.
The educational system is a diverse and heterogeneous one
consisting of public, parochial and private and the medium of instruction
is either in Arabic, French or English.

This multiplicity of systems

and the lack of a unified educational policy have prevented the emergence
of a unified intelligentsia.
Education in Lebanon is geared to a traditional system
where training is of a generalized, historical, legal type (liberal arts
and law) instead of an emphasis on specialized training for bureaucratic
organizations (the scientific, technical, and the vocational).

Yusif A.

Sayigh illustrated this situation when he wrote that:
...the emphasis has all along been on liberal arts
and law, to the detriment of the scientific, the
technical and the vocational. Largely modeled on
the French "Baccalaureat" system, the curricula

...early contact with modern Europe which gave Lebanon
a lead in the adoption of Western education and led thus to a higher
level of education...than can be found in other parts of the region."
U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., p. 1-2.

TABLE III-7
TOTALS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS, 1955-1962a

SCHOOLS

STUDENTS

Year

Teachers
Elementary

Secondary

Total

Elementary

Secondary

Total

1955-56

731

110

841

113,024

20,911

133,935

3,764

1956-57

911

117

1,028

126,589

23,523

150,114

4,142

1957-58

925

120

1,045

128,847

24,340

153,287

4,397

1958-59

1,031

121

1,152

132,214

24,792

157,006

4,845

1959-60

939

145

1,084

126,589

25,625

152,214

5,545

1960-61

1,078

155

1,233

134,208

25,792

160,000

5,600

1961-62

1,225

172

1,397

152,192

28,051

180,243

8,064

a
Al-Jaryda (Beirut), July 18 and July 27, 1962.

TABLE III-8
TOTALS OF GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS, STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS, 1955-19623

SCHOOLS

STUDENTS
Teachers

Year
Elementary

Secondary

Total

Elementary

Secondary

1955-56

967

60

1,027

80,567

6,494

87,061

3,457

1956-57

975

64

1,039

81,901

6,537

88,438

3,794

1957-58

991

74

1,065

82,530

6,540

89,070

4,045

1958-59

1,033

72

1,105

85,492

8,352

93,844

4,385

1959-60

1,199

91

1,290

92,350

13,572

105,922

5,011

1960-61

1,199

91

1,290

—

—

116,923

5,411

1961-62

1,199

91

1,290

116,295

129,154

6,004

a
Al-Jaryda (Beirut), July 18 and July 27, 1962.

12,859

Total
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stuff the student with factual knowledge but equip him
poorly for individual, independent thinking.^
Tables III-9 and 111-10, below, show an unduly heavy con
centration on law and arts.

In the 1963-64 academic year about 71 percent

of all university students in Lebanon were either studying law or arts,
whereas the comparative figure for engineering and medicine are 5.7
percent and 7.2 percent.

This tendency in higher education reflects

the prevalent pattern throughout all stages of education in the country
where there seems to be a deficiency in orientation towards technical
and other practical pursuits.
The tables support Robert Presthus's conclusion about the
traditional philosophy of this cultural area which
...tends to devalue practical training and this
constitutes a barrier to bureaucratic evolution,
...university training is legal and historical,
sprinkled with a generous dash of philosophy...
field research tends to be concerned with law and
structure rather than with process. The Western
idea of higher learning as a preparation for a
career tends to be pushed aside by viewing the
degree as conclusive evidence that one has arrived.

^

Based on the above, we may assume that, where such a situa
tion prevails, education per se will be looked upon as a factor of
prestige in an administrative situation rather than as a means to enhance

Yusif A. Sayigh, "Lebanon: Special Economic Problems
Arising From a Special S t r u c t u r e Middle East Economic Papers. 1957,
p. 65.
^Robert Presthus, "Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization,"
Social Forces. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (December, 1959), p. 107.
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TABLE III-9
NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1956-57®

Lebanon
Female

Subject

Male

Law

579

43

128

750

84

37

94

215

Engineering

325

2

205

532

Medicine

253

30

160

443

Politics

Foreign

Total

Agriculture

43

—

60

103

Pharmacy

34

18

48

100

Dentistry

23

4

25

52

Sciences

204

37

166

407

Administration & Finance

107

11

Arts

349

353

493

1,195

Theology

67

3

14

84

Nursing & Public Health

23

104

98

225

Fine Arts

125

148

12

285

Others

195

116

444

754

2.410

906

1.947

5,263

TOTAL

—
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a
U.N.-F.A.O., Lebanon - Country Report (Rome: F.A.O., 1959), p. II-9.

TABLE 111-10
NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1963-64a

Lebanese
University

Subject

4,130

Law
Arts

St. Joseph
University^

1,033

American
University0

--

—

791

Arab
University

Centre
d 1Etudes
Superieur

Total

377

—

5,540

320

580

3,382

-

254

652

-

-

299

[1854]

[]

Sciences

398

—

Social Sciences

299

—

Engineering

—

148

531

33

-

712

Medicine

—

465

430

-

-

895

Commerce

—

—

—

283

-

283

Normal School

385

—

—

-

-

385

Oriental Letters

—

173

—

-

-

173

Others

—

50

136

-

-

186

1.869

2,951

TOTAL

6.003

—

1.013

834

12.507

a
Charles Rizk, Le Regime Politique Libanals (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1966), pp. 83-86.

3/4 of the students are Lebanese

1080 students are Lebanese.
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the quality of administrative performance.

For instance, where a society

approximates the agrarian type and where economic opportunities are
lacking, the educated elite tend to look upon their education as a sure
means of a government position or at least a place in society which
recognizes their talents and skills.
Research findings on education in Lebanon^Zndicate that edu
cation ranks high as a major value based on the question "What qualities,
traits, and conditions a person should have as the means necessary to
acquire wealth?"

The result suggests a relative low ranking for education

as a means to acquire wealth.

Such matters as luck and pure chance, hard

work and perseverence were considered more instrumental.

We may conclude

from these limited findings, although not representative of the whole
society, that we are dealing with a traditionally oriented society where
ascribed rather than achieved statuses are the criteria for prestige and
social standing; that education is not highly regarded as a means for
acquiring wealth, but rather contains a prestige element which overshadows
consideration of type and quality of education.
The educational system is not presently well adapted to pro
vide the array of special skills which modernizing goals impose.

An

analytical and problem-solving approach to learning must displace the
habits of memorization and rote learning which inforce the mentality

47

Lincoln Armstrong, "A Socio-Economic Opinion Poll in
Beirut, Lebanon," Public Opinion Quarterly. (Spring, 1959), pp. 18-27.
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with its inflexible attachment to outmoded precedents and procedures.
The Political System
Lebanon's political system is tremendously influenced by
existing social systems to the extent that it could not operate as an
identifiable total system but as highly intermixed "systems" of politics
in a mixed political culture.
Within the country the preservation of the balance
has contributed to the survival not only of the
socio-political role of the religious communities
(Islam draws no sharp distinction between the political
and religious spheres, and the Christians of the Middle
East have been obliged to accept this concept), but
also of the influence of semi-feudal notables and
clans. The party system and parliamentary regime have
taken hold only formally and partially. Public opinion
has not yet outgrown family and cantonal divisions
sufficiently for the man at the top to resist the
temptation, at election times, to pull fatally easy
strings, for which all sorts of justification can be
made, often enough in good faith. Indispensable links
with the West must be preserved because this transit
country lives on them in the crude material sense, as
well as deriving intellectual and cultural sustenance
from them; at the same time the interests of the Arab
world have to be protected because 'Arab Lebanon'
must show solidarity or else it impairs a significant
aspect of its unique nature, not to mention its
commercial contacts with the hinterland."^®
Sayigh summarizes the country's main political problems, together
with their repercussions, thus
The combined implications of political feudalism and
political confessionalism have been to divide the

AO

Rondot, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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community; to push the unqualified men forward if
he of the right sect and has the necessary backing;
to produce inefficiency and superfluity in the civil
service; and to give the lows of the land less
authority and effectiveness--in short, to retard farreaching reform in all aspects of society's life.
Although the public at large is aware of the necessity
of, and is eager for reform, it is generally kept so
busy with its community rivalries that it has left
the field free for narrow vested interests.^
The Lebanese bureaucracy is itself a unit or a member of a
much larger system--the social system.

It most definitely influences

(by its outputs) and is influenced by (through its inputs) the physical,
ideological, social, economic, political and psychological environment
of the country.

As such, an important interactivity exists between the

society as a whole and the Lebanese administration which forms an integral
part of the society.

The Lebanese public officials are also members of

the larger social system and of several of its subsystems -- primary and
reference groups, families, religious sects, political groups, etc.

Thus,

they bring with them into the Lebanese administration a surfeit of roles,
expectations, inter-personal relations, norms beliefs, values and pre
judices.

These they cannot lay aside in their bureaucratic behavior.

It has proved impossible to call upon their services, imagination, and
conceptual abilities without calling into play, simultaneously, the
products of a lifetime of beliefs and expectations which have the tenacity

49

Sayigh, op. cit., p. 64.
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of historic tradition that is still a living force in Lebanon.
Developmental psychologists agree that national
cultures tend to produce typical personality struc
tures. It seems equally clear that personality
structures are not discarded like snake's skins when
one enters the bureaucratic arena; rather the patterns
of bureaucratic authority and deference reflect the
values of institutions through which the bureaucrat
has grown, primarily the family. For example, cul
tural parochialism has obscured the fact that the
nepotism and subjectivity seen in bureaucratic
systems of many less-developed societies are a
manifestation of their pattern of family relations
in which personal loyalties outweigh the demands
of technical supremacy. Without some theory which
relates social values and organizational behavior,
this phenomena is explained only in irrelevant
moral terms. In the West, a similar conflict -bureaucratic needs vs. family and political
loyalty -- exists, but the demands of objectivity
usually persist; in the Middle East, the breakdown
of the extended family which permits this solution
has not yet occurred.'0
It looks as if Presthus's opinion that "social change is
required to provide the basis for objective and rational patterns of
organization"^ holds much truth for the Lebanese situation.

^°Robert Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cul
tures," Public Administration Review. Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1959), p. 27.
^Robert Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organi
zation," op. cit., p. 103.
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Summary Statement
On the assumption that a bureaucracy is part of a larger
interrelated system, some attention muBt be given to the social and
political environment within which it operates.

As part of a social

system, bureaucracy is strongly influenced by the society from which its
members are drawn.
Five aspects of the environment are presented as relevant
factors in the development of the administrative system: the structure
of society; the influence of religion; the economic factor; the educa
tional and political systems.
The basic values of Lebanese society manifested a strong
authoritarian character, which had long been reinforced in the family
structure.

The primary and traditional groups in society carried much

of the burden of government down through the Ottoman period.
The Lebanese family is a patriarchal and very closely .knit
one.

It occupies a focal position where the undisputed head is the

father, where age has a high value standing, and where subordination
of an individual to group values is an accepted social fact.
Administrative organizations in Lebanon resemble the family
hierarchy with authority concentrated and decisions made only at the top.
Family ties and allegiances are very strong in Lebanon and a person's
duty and responsibilities according to the social customs are to his
family first.

Public interest is subordinated to the family's interest

and, hence, widespread corruption and favoritism result in the public
service.

37

Sectarianism has been an intrinsic element in the political
organization of Lebanon and religion has bolstered the place of the
family.
Sectarian divisions were given official encouragement
under the Ottomans by the Millet system which extended some sort of semiautonomous status to the different religious sects.
During the Mandate period, the French did not do much to
ameliorate the situation, but, instead, helped to foster divisiveness
and sectarianism in pursuit of their own interests.
Sectarianism is not only a social and cultural force but
finds official recognition in law and practice and directly interferes
with the governmental and administrative systems.

The most important

manifestations of sectarianism can be found in the constitution, the
electoral laws and the unwritten National Fact of 1943 which sought the
coexistence of confessional religious groupings rather than conflict.
The Lebanon of the Pact was an association of all sects whose political
views were at cross-purposes and who were doomed to live together.

In

essence the National Pact was a formula in pragmatic politics.
Sectarianism has had serious effects in the field of govern
ment and administration.

It has precluded the development of a strong

government and has fostered political divisiveness and instability.

It

has given added support to political interference in the civil service
and has prevented the recruitment of the best qualified staff and has
resulted in weak control over civil servants.
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The Lebanese economy can be called agricultural more so than
industrial despite the fact that the contribution of agriculture to the
national output is lower than that of the other sectors of the economy.
Until recently, there was no official economic policy in
Lebanon and the role of the government was very limited.
picture is changing now.

But this

Rapid, continuous industrialization has

brought with it an increasing need for government interference in various
spheres of the society.
The system of education in Lebanon is many private and public
systems, with foreign mission schools of various

leanings.

It has

produced a relatively high level of literacy but of doubtful value.
Education has been geared to a traditional system where the emphasis
has been on liberal arts and law, to the detriment of the scientific
and technical.

A contributing factor to the lack of scientific training

appears to be modern Arabic literature which is oriented, primarily,
toward the humanities, or that instead of emphasizing objective research
and causal postulates, subjective valuations and ethical preconceptions
occupy a position of pre-eminence.
The growth of strong sectarian groups with legal safeguards
for representation have created serious loyalty conflicts in adminis
tration and have tended to negate what the new civil service regulations
purport to do, namely, to lay down rules for recruitment, selection and
promotion based on competence.
This chapter has attempted to show that the Lebanese institu
tions arise from a social base, and they express Lebanon.

The treatment

89

of the political framework of the administration is the subject of the
following chapter.

PART II
THE GOVERNMENTAL SETTING

CHAPTER IV
THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
The present system of government is embodied in a basic con
stitutional law, in practices having the force of unwritten law, and
in certain laws implementing the basic law.

The Constitution of Lebanon

is predominantly western in character and is modeled partly after the
French Constitution of 1875, strengthening the executive as against the
Legislature.

In accepting from the League of Nations the mandate for

Lebanon, France accepted the responsibility of tutoring the country for
self-government and eventual independence.

But with the view of main

taining its control over Lebanon indefinitely, France sought a way of
keeping absolute control over the government of the country.

It was

easier to control the actions of one man than those of many, and thus
it was that France invested all the important powers in the President.
The French High Commissioner alone was more powerful, directing the
President's actions as he saw fit.

When Lebanon achieved its indepen

dence and abolished all references in the Constitution to its status as
a mandate, the powers of the President remained unchanged.
The present Constitution was promulgated on May 23, 1926 and
has been substantially amended.

In 1927 the Senate was abolished and

the legislative power was given to a single Chamber of Deputies.

The

most important amendments were those of November 9, 1943, which deleted
all mention of the League of Nations and the mandatory power and thereby
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constituted a declaration of Lebanon's independence.*
The Constitution established Lebanon as an independent unitary
republic (Articles 1 and 4), having Arabic as its official language
(Article 11).

The executive power is vested in a president assisted by

ministers; legislative power vested in a Chamber of Deputies and the
judicial powers by independent judges.

2

The Executive
The President
The President of the Republic is elected by the Chamber for
six years and is eligible for reelection but cannot succeed himself
(Article 49).

His powers include the appointment and dismissal of

ministers and the designation of the Prime Minister (Article 53); the
issuance of executive orders in accordance with existing laws (Article 51);
the negotiation and ratification of treaties) subject to approval by the
Chamber of Deputies of financial and commercial treaties (Article 52);
the dissolution, adjournment, or calling of special sessions of the
Chamber (Articles 33, 55 and 59); and initiation of laws and constitu
tional revisions (Articles 18 and 76).

The President can be indicted

by the Chamber for crimes and high treason (Article 60).

An important

constitutional amendment of 1927 empowered the President to issue a
decree, with the approval of the Cabinet, to bring into operation any bill

^Subhi Mahmassani, Al-Dastour wa-Dimokratlah (The Constitution
and Democracy (Beirut: Dar Zlm, 1952,) p. 131.
^The Lebanese Constitution (Beirut: Khayats, 1960).
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which had been submitted to the Chamber as an ’’urgent bill" but on which
the Chamber did not act within forty days of its receipt.

In practice,

this amendment endows the President with the power to execute the budgets
and carry out projects still unapproved by the Chamber (Article 58).
Another constitutional provision gives the President a limited
veto power.

He may request reconsideration of a law and to override

his veto requires an absolute majority of all members of the Chamber.
The burden is here placed upon the Chamber with all the odds in favor
of a President wishing to kill the bill (Article 57).
The office of the President is a very strong one.

The Presi

dent is not a ceremonial or titular head of state but is the real execu
tive authority within the state.

As such, he presides at Cabinet meetings

and determines the climate of its debates.

But it is the Prime Minister

who takes responsibility for the actions of the Government.
The President of the Lebanese Republic has extensive powers
deriving from the Constitution and the operation of the Government, and
reinforced by a tradition of autocratic tendencies on the part of the
chief of state.

Amir Bechir II played off the Maronite and Druze feudal

lords against each other in order to concentrate more power in his own
hands.

The Governors-General of the Mutasarrifyya augmented their vast

executive powers at the expense of the confessionalized and divided
Central Council.

Some of them exercised strong pressure on the voters

to obtain election to the Council of their own partisans.

Some of them

also arbitrarily pursued their political adversaries before the courts
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and pressured the judges into passing judgment against them.-*
Occupying the most prestigious office in the country, the
President of the Republic can similarly, but with greater finesse, use
his vast constitutional and administrative powers to help his friends
and confound his enemies.

In a society where confessional representa

tion and the tenet of a confessional balance of power have revived
feudalism in politics and allowed it to masquerade behind democratic
institutions, the office of the President, endowed with the greatest
privileges, can and has been used as the top feudal stronghold.

During

the French Mandate, the French High Commissioner controlled the presi
dency to execute French policy.

But with the coming of independence,

all the mandatory limits on the freedom of the presidency naturally
disappeared.
During al-Khouri's presidency, (1943-1953), it is reported,
the President allowed his friends and relatives to use the machinery of
the state for personal advantage and enrichment.

There was a great deal

of corruption, traffic in influence, political feudalism, interference
in the courts, and irregular dealings by the administration and friends
of the administration,^
During the crisis of 1958 similar charges of corruption for
personal profit, discrimination against Moslem applicants for public

•*M. Jouplain, La Question du Liban (Paris: Rousseau, 1908),
pp. 475-476, 506-509, 527-528.
^Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn, 1957),
deals briefly but pointedly with corruption in the al-Khouri regime in
Chapter 5.
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employment and against Moslem communities and districts needing public
services were made against the Chamoun regime, and the President was held
responsible.
The President is the supreme figure in the administrative
sphere. Ministers are his own appointees and can be dismissed at his dis
cretion,

Government employees in the higher echelons, although subject

to civil service laws, cannot be appointed without his approval.
motion and advancement depend on the wishes of the President.
is

Pro

Thus, it

no surprise to find that in the executive branch of the Lebanese

government, ministers, as well as civil servants, have their loyalty
first and foremost to the President.
The real role and power of the President of the Republic cannot
be

fully understood without reference to Article 60 of the Constitution

which states: "While performing his functions the President of the
Republic shall not be held responsible except when he violates the con
stitution or in the case of high treason."

This article absolves the

President from the responsibility for any of his acts except in the case
of violation of the constitution or high treason.

In other words, the

chief executive in Lebanon, who is the titular as well as the actual
head of the state and who enjoys extensive constitutional powers enabling
him to play the most important and dominant role in the governmental
process, cannot be held responsible or accountable for any decisions or
acts which he makes in performing his assigned duties.

This is achieved

through the simple device of having all presidential decisions and
decrees -- with the exception of those relating to the appointment and
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dismissals of ministers - countersigned by the Minister or Ministers
concerned.

Through such a device, responsibility is shifted from the

President to the Minister who might be held responsible for decisions
which he has not made.
What complicates the situation is the impossibility of pinning
responsibility for presidential acts and decisions on the Ministers,
who by being required to countersign these acts and decisions supposedly
assume responsibility for them.

The Constitution, in Article 70, pro

vides that Ministers can be impeached by the Chamber for high treason
or for serious neglect of duty by a two-thirds majority of the total
membership of the Chamber.

It further provides that a special law shall

be issued to determine the conditions for the civil responsibility of
the ministers.

No such law has yet been enacted, thus making it impossi

ble to determine accountability for executive acts and decisions.

This

lack leaves a serious flaw in the whole system which should be remedied
as soon as possible.
The Cabinet
Although the President of the Republic is the real executive
in Lebanon, he is assisted in this role by a cabinet of his choice.
Constitutionally, the Cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies.
Yet in nearly forty years (1926-1967), only once, has a Lebanese Cabinet
been dismissed by an adverse vote in the Chamber.-*

^In March, 1930, the Cabinet of Emile Edde fell to an overwhelming
vote of no-confidence. Edde had introduced austerity measures which deprived
deputies and their supporters of the reservoir of favors to which they were
accustomed. See Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 202.
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The President of the Republic appoints the ministers and desig
nates one as Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers).

In

appointing a cabinet, the President is free to elect his ministers either
from the Chamber or from outside it, although the former practice has
been the more prevalent (Article 28).

In a parliament where there is

hardly any real party representation and where there is no one parlia
mentary group or block which enjoys a clear majority,^ the formation of
a cabinet and securing confidence for it will have to depend on satis
fying as many groups and members in the Chamber as possible.

Such

satisfaction is usually achieved by offering ministerial posts to these
groups or members.

The process of forming a cabinet in Lebanon is

further complicated by Article 95 of the Constitution, which specifies
that the religious sects should be equitably represented in the formation
of cabinets and appointments to the public service.

This article in the

constitution has provided an official basis for sectarianism in the
Lebanese political and administrative systems and it has been the main
plague of the system.

It has greatly complicated the task of governing

and almost paralyzed the political system.

Political sectarianism in

Lebanon means that the offices of the state should be distributed among
the various religious sects.

Thus, tradition dictates that the President

of the Republic should belong to the Maronite sect, and the Prime Minister
to the Moslem Sunni sect.

It also means that members of the Cabinet

^There are at least 15 parliamentary blocs or groups in
Parliament and about 40-50 independent members.
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have to represent equitably the various main religious sects of which
there are now six: Maronites, Sunnis, Shi'a, Greek Orthodox, Greek
Catholics, and Druze.Most cabinets in Lebanon have

been composed of

6, 8, 10 or 14 members to take care of the religious communities.
This precarious religious balance, which is scrupulously
observed in the political life, has significantly undermined and weakened
the governmental system.

Any government which has to rule through com

promise among such sharply differing and dissenting groups is bound to
be highly ineffective and incapable of asserting its will.

The lack

of an absolute minimum of unity and consensus in the society has
rendered the task of governing a most difficult one and has encouraged
a high degree of political instability.

The constant change in cabinets?

and the resulting lack of political continuity are typical characteristics
of the political system.

This whole situation greatly contributed to the

crisis of 1958 when the country was plunged into civil strife bordering
on a religious war between the two main religious communities.

The shock

of the crisis and the chaotic political situation raised serious doubts
in the minds of the people about the political viability of the Lebanese
state and revealed a pressing need for basic and drastic reforms in the
entire political system.

There is somewhat of a parallel between the

situation in Lebanon and that in France where sharp political and social
differences and a high degree of political instability paralyzed the

^Lebanon has lived under some forty-nine cabinets in twentynine years of constitutional government from 1926 to 1967, or an average
of less than seven months per cabinet.
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government

and ultimately led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic.
The fact that cabinets are short-lived is mitigated by a

tendency to carry over in membership from one cabinet to the next, and
the stable character of the circle of eligible ministers within parlia
ment.

From 1926 to 1965 a total of 333 ministerial posts were occupied

by only 134 individuals.
than once,

More than half of these men held office more

and eleven individuals alone accounted for 95 of these posts.
The Cabinet, under the supervision and direction of the Presi

dent, is responsible for drawing up the general program of the government,
submitting it to the Chamber and defending it there; Ministers, whether
they are members in the Chamber or not, are allowed access to it, can
address it whenever they wish to do so, and have to answer questions and
Q

defend their policies before the Chamber.

In Lebanon, most of the

legislation is initiated by the Cabinet, subject to the approval of the
President and is referred to the Chamber for approval.
The Ministers are responsible for the direction of the affairs
of the state, each in his respective ministry or ministries.

They are

responsible for the execution of the laws and regulations in their depart
ments; and as mentioned earlier, they countersign any presidential act
or decree relating to the work of their departments.

Ministers are the

main assistants and advisers to the President and work very closely with
him.

They serve at his pleasure and can be dismissed if they lose his

confidence.

^Lebanese Constitution, op. cit., Art. 67.
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In discussing the Cabinet in Lebanon, one should stress the fact that
the role played by this body depends to a great extent on the personality
of the Prime Minister.

Political events in Lebanon have shown that a

stable government is dependent upon a proper balance between the Cabinet
and the President on one hand and the Cabinet and the Chamber on the
other hand.

The Cabinet is in the very awkward position of being the

servant of two different masters.

It will continue in office as long

as it can please

these two masters,who might not always see eye to

eye.

this seems to be a difficult and embarassing situation

In theory,

for any cabinet; but in practice, it is not as bad as it seems since the
President in Lebanon has been able to assert himself as the dominant
power and to make himself the master of both the Cabinet and the Chamber
at the same time.

While this has greatly eased the way for the Cabinet,

it has distorted executive-legislative relationships to an extent of
disrupting proper democratic practices in the country.

These executive-

legislative relationships will be discussed later in this chapter.
The relationships of the Prime Minister and the President is
a very sensitiveissue since it is related to
of sectarianism.

the deeply rooted problem

These two figures represent the two largest religious

communities in the country, the Maronites and the Sunni Moslems; and a
proper balance and relationship between them is a proper balance between
their respective sects.
A distorted balance between them, that is to say a weak Prime
Minister easily dominated by the Chief Executive, is likely to raise
cries of foul play from the concerned sect.
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The first two Presidents had enjoyed a relationship of mutual
trust with their Prime Ministers.

Al-Khouri’s fall in 1952 was heralded

by a breakdown in his relationship with the Prime Minister, Sami al-Solh.
In his resignation, the Prime Minister delivered a blistering attack on
the President, stating that al-Khouri had relegated the Cabinet to a
third-rank position of isolation in the affairs of state.

Every Presi

dent under whom he served relied primarily on the advice not of his Prime
Minister but on an official "sultan":
Every sultan had an entourage and a group of followers,
relatives, in-laws of in-laws, associates, middlemen,
and hangers-on from every fraction and class and every
village and quarter. Whichever of us would come to
power, to the crematorium of Cabinet office, found
himself obliged to pay homage to these sultans and their
followers. It is they who govern and who direct, plan,
and execute policies, while we are only the instruments
which they set up before the eyes of the public to bear
responsibility for their errors and misdeeds.9
The second President, Camille Chamoun, relied on the advice of an unofficial
"sultan" -- the deputy Emile Bustani and the third President, General
Fuad Chehab, or various military officers.
It is believed that some of the causes of the 1958 political
crisis in Lebanon can be traced to the distortion and lack of balance
which characterized the relationships of the President and his Prime
Minister over a long period of time.

^Sami al-Solh, Memoirs (Muthakirat), (Beirut: Maktabat
al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1960), p. 320.
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The Legislature
The Lebanese Constitution vests legislative authority in a
single Chamber of Deputies whose members are elected by universal suffrage
(Article 16).

Membership in the Chamber and the manner of elections are

determined by law.

The most recent law of April 26, 1960, provided for

a Chamber of ninety-nine members elected by simple majority in multi
member electoral districts.

It was mentioned earlier that the distri

bution of seats in the Chamber and the election of members is based on
sectarian affiliation.

Such a practice excludes from the Chamber some

eminently qualified and competent persons who are not allowed to become
candidates in their respective districts because they happen to belong
to a different religious sect from the one which is alloted a seat in
that particular district.
The main function of the Chamber is to legislate and determine
the general policies of the state which are later put into effect by the
executive organ.
A close examination of the legislative role of the Chamber in
Lebanon reveals some serious shortcomings.

It appears that the Chamber

has not lived up to the responsibilities expected from it in this regard.
It has allowed the executive branch to usurp some of its legislative
prerogatives.

As was mentioned earlier, the chief executive has made

frequent use of the constitutional provision which allows him the right
to issue urgent bills as laws if they have not been decided upon by the
Chamber within a period of forty days.

This fact in itself is an indica

tion that the Chamber has not been really determined on fully exercising
its legislative powers or else it would not have allowed so much opportunity

102

for legislative activity

b y

the executive authorities.

A more serious phenomenon, in this respect, is the willing
and deliberate delegation of legislative power by the Chamber to the
Cabinet.

On several occasions,^ the Chamber was persuaded to give to

the Cabinet the right to rule by decrees.

This meant that the Cabinet

could issue decree laws which are as binding as the regular laws passed
by the Chamber.

It is true that normally the power of delegated legis

lation given to the Cabinet is limited to relatively short periods of
time and to certain specified fields; but it is at the same time an
admission by the Chamber that it cannot do the job for which it was
elected and which can be done better by the executive branch of govern
ment.

Although the right to legislate by decree has been granted to the

Cabinet rather occasionally, most of the country's basic policies and
legislation have been issued in this way.^*

A legislature which is so

easily willing to abdicate its rightful duties and prerogatives does
not inspire much confidence.

In France, the Constitution of the Fourth

Republic in an attempt to avoid such irresponsibility on the part of
parliament, specifically prohibited the practice of delegated legisla
tion. ^

10Notably in 1952, 1953, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1966.
^Examples of such decree laws are: decree laws organizing
the Judiciary; electoral law; public accounting law; personnel law; law
organizing the various ministries; press law; law creating the Civil
Service Board, etc.
12Article 13 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic pro
vides that "The National Assembly alone shall adopt the laws. It may not
delegate this right."
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Besides the important function of legislating which has not
been properly discharged by the Chamber, it has another important function
which is normally performed by the legislature in parliamentary democracies;
namely, that of supervising and checking the executive.

The Cabinet is

jointly and individually responsible to the Chamber and can continue in
office as long as it enjoys its confidence.

Ministers can be questioned,

investigated, and called to task if the Chamber chooses to do so.

The

Chamber can force an individual Minister or an entire Cabinet out of office
if it is not satisfied with the way the affairs of state are being handled.
A system such as this presupposes a responsible and vigilant
parliament which takes its work seriously and which, through careful
supervision can make sure that the executive branch is not deviating
from the main policies drawn for it and that the administration is dis
charging its functions properly.
made use of this right.

Unfortunately, the Chamber has not

This is not surprising because a chamber which

views its main responsibility of legislating casually and lightly is
likely to display the same attitude with regard to what it considers a
less important function.

It is worthy of note that during the period

1943-1967, no Cabinet was forced to resign by a parliamentary vote of no
confidence.

All other Cabinets have invariably resigned or been forced

out of office as a result of differences with the chief executive.

It

appears that in Lebanon, the Cabinet has become more of a representative
of the chief executive than that of parliament.
Parliament has also failed in exercising any serious and
important check on the work of various administrative agencies.

It is
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true that frequent debates have taken place on the floor of parliament with
regard to this problem, but they have rarely resulted in any desired
changes.

Parliament has not made any use of its investigative powers in

its attempts to control and check the administration.

In Lebanon,

Cabinet responsibility to parliament, instead of producing some desirable
results as far as the administration is concerned, has, on the contrary,
had some adverse effects.

The parliamentary system in Lebanon has sub

jected the Cabinet and the various ministries to serious political pressure
and interference from the Chamber.

The Minister in a parliamentary form

of government is dependent on the support of his fellow deputies in parlia
ment and cannot afford to ignore their wishes and demands which are often
satisfied at the expense of the general interest of the country.

The

Minister has also to attend to the selfish needs of his own constituents
whose continued support is essential for re-election.

The political

system in Lebanon has helped to promote political interference and
favoritism and has, to a certain extent, undermined the merit system.
Sami al-Solh relates an anecdote which, unfortunately, is only too common
in Lebanon:
It is well known how quickly the balance of government-any government--can be lost. Most often it is some childish
dispute that leads to a cabinet crisis. Thus, in 1952 there
arose a quarrel between Messrs. Maroun Kanaan and the late
Rashad Azar, both deputies from Jezine. The former came
to me repeatedly, insistently demanding the dismissal from
office of the constable of the town of Kafr Huna, whom he
accused of pinching a bottle of wine worth L.L. 8. Azar
meanwhile demanded the head of the town clerk, accusing
him of pinching L.L. 12 from town funds.
Eight plus twelve makes twenty. More than once I offered
to pay the L.L. 20 from my own pocket, to put an end to the
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matter, and perhaps to avert a cabinet crisis; for by
counting the votes of our supporters we saw that two
votes added to the opposition would be enough to turn the
balance to our disadvantage.
But Kanaan and Azar took the affair seriously and
refused my offer to pay the L.L. 20. I considered
dismissing both the constable and the clerk together,
but the two Deputies rejected the solution. The fact
that each of them insisted on the dismissal of his
enemy alone, as a means of exhibiting his own influence.
In the end, I sent both deputies away without having
succeeded in settling their disputes, and thus the
opposition picked up two new members.
Messrs. Kanaan and Azar were not alone in pressing such
disputes as this; indeed, the majority of the Deputies
spent their time in creating difficulties for us on
account of some gendarme or doorkeeper. The atmosphere
of the Chamber was not a healthy on e . ^
It is clear that any contemplated changes in the administration cannot
possibly be realized without some necessary changes in the political
system of the country.
Besides its main functions of legislation and of checking and
supervising the administration, parliament has a variety of other functions;
such as electing the President of the Republic, impeaching him and his
Ministers, and amending the Constitution.

14

These functions are not

important for this discussion; but suffice it to say that in the exercise
of these functions parliament has again shown its docility and weakness
vis-a-vis the executive.

Parliament has never impeached any President or

even a Minister, although there have been cases where such an impeachment

^al-Solh, op. cit., p. 216.
*\,ebanese Constitution, op. cit., Arts. 49, 70, 77.
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was justified.

As far as the amending process is concerned, parliament

has shown a willingness to go along with the wishes of the chief execu
tive.

The amendment of May 22, 1948, was specially passed to allow the

incumbent President to serve another term.

It is interesting to not

that this amendment applied only to that particular President and was
not to become a permanent amendment to the Constitution binding on subse
quent Presidents.
A close examination of executive-legislative relationships in
Lebanon is a revealing one.

To begin with, it is doubtful whether the

system of government established by the 1926 Constitution can be properly
called a parliamentary form of government.

Parliamentary forms of govern

ment presuppose executive responsibility towards parliament.

In Lebanon,

the real executive, the President of the Republic, is not formally
responsible to the Chamber.

The system is a combination of the presidential

and parliamentary forms of government.
More important, the political system in Lebanon has shown a
lack of balance between the executive and legislative branches of govern
ment.

Instead of a proper balance between these two branches, there is

a domination by the executive branch.

The political history of Lebanon

since 1926 reveals a consistent trend of executive ascendancy at the
expense of parliament.

Such domination, as was mentioned earlier, is

manifested in various ways.

It Is manifested in the fact that parliament

upon request has been willing to abdicate its legislative function to the
executive, that the most important laws have been issued by the executive,
that the Chamber has never been able to dismiss a single cabinet or even
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a single minister since 1931, and that parliament has rarely resisted
any presidential wish or request.
On three important occasions, parliament has also discredited
itself and helped perpetuate the idea that it was far from being repre
sentative of popular wishes and needs.

In the 1952 crisis when a general

popular strike forced the President to resign, a few hours before this
resignation, fifty-five members out of sixty-six signed a statement assert
ing their confidence in him and their loyalty and support for his regime.
In the much more serious and bloody crisis of 1958 when the country was
involved in an armed civil strife which lasted for several months, parlia
ment did not even attempt to find a settlement.

It remained silent and

aloof until a settlement was reached through the efforts of various
political figures outside the parliament.

In the summer of 1964, seventy-

nine deputies out of ninety-nine petitioned the President to stand for
re-election but to no avail.

These are examples of parliamentary weak

nesses although the Constitution has formally allowed the Chamber more
powers than it has actually assumed.
This executive domination in Lebanon was, to a certain extent,
deliberately planned by the mandatory power which naturally preferred to
deal with a strong President subject to its control rather than with an
uncooperating Chamber which might be representative of popular feelings.
Some also think that the French believed that a strong executive is
specially suited for a sharply divided country because it would provide
a maximum of needed stability.
Others also believe that a strong executive is more appropriate
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for relatively immature and underdeveloped countries as representative
forms of government presupposes a certain degree of political maturity,
economic development, and an advanced social structure which are not
present in the Lebanon of today.

Moreover, the people in Lebanon have

as a result of Ottoman and French rule become somewhat accustomed to
strong rule and leadership and did not resent the continuation of such
a system during independence.
There is much ground for belief that the absence of political
parties on the political scene has been a determining factor in weakening
the representative institutions of the government.

The member of parlia

ment in Lebanon does not depend for his election on the organized support
of political parties but rather on the support of other groups and
individuals in his constituency whose loyalties and support he cannot
secure and maintain without some help from the government.

There seems

no doubt that a chamber which Is composed of members belonging to organized
political parties can assert itself much more easily and can, whenever
necessary, defy executive authorities.

The rising role of parties as

evidenced in the most recent election of 1964 promises to restore a
certain balance in executive-legislative relationships.
The Judiciary
Lebanon's Judicial system^ is heavily influenced by Ottoman
and French practices.

During the Ottoman rule, Lebanon followed the

Ottoman system of Judicial organization with the exception of the Mutassarifiyah

l5For a detailed review of the Lebanese Judicial system and its
historical development see Subhi Mahmassani, Legal Systems in the Arab StatesPast and Present (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm LilMalayeen, 1962), pp. 246-258.
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of Mount Lebanon which enjoyed a special internal autonomy wherein
foreigners enjoyed special privileges and Consular Courts.^
The Lebanese judicial system is composed of the ordinary
civil courts and of special courts.

The former include the three levels

of First Instance, Appeal and Supreme courts, while the latter comprise
civil status, military, juvenile, labor arbitration and administrative
courts.I?
The Lebanese citizens fall under the Jurisdiction of one
body of laws and one judicial system except in what relates to civil
status affairs.

In these affairs each Christina or Moslem sect follows

its own particular laws and its courts.

The civil status courts include

the 1Rouhiyat1 courts for the Christian religious sects and the 1Shariya1
courts for the Moslem religious sects.

The application of secular

principles and practices to civil status affairs and the bringing of such
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts is a highly desirable
objective but is, however, a very sensitive and inflammatory issue as
regards religious sentiments and the sectarian balance of the country's
political life.
Summary Statement
The 1926 Constitution provides the basic organization of
government.

In basic outline this constitution provided for a parlia

mentary system similar to that of the French Third Republic.

16Ibid., p. 246.
17Ibid,. pp. 250, 252.

However,
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It departed from the French system in several ways.

The President of

the Republic was endowed with significant authority including the power
to initiate legislation, meet with the Cabinet, exercise a suspensory
veto, and issue decrees within the scope of law.
The Cabinet is appointed by the President.

In making his

choice, the President must insure the equitable confessional represen
tation among its members.
to the Chamber.
Sunni Moslem.

They are responsible both to the President and

The chief of the Cabinet-the Prime Minister, must be a
Although the Prime Minister acts as a brake on the tremen

dous power of the President, his authority by comparison is feeble.
Cabinets are by definition coalitions of the representatives
of the various religious groups of the country which must not act as to
impair the basic interests of any of the major communities if they are
to continue in office.
The Constitution vests legislative authority in a single
Chamber of Deputies whose members are elected by universal suffrage and
whose function is to legislate and determine the general policies of the
government.

However, a close look at the record reveals that frequently

Parliament had granted the Cabinet temporary decree powers to deal with
legislation which is in effect an abdication of its legislative functions.
The legislature is ineffective.

Throughout the independence period the

executive was the paramount political institution.
To recapitulate, there appears to be a lack of balance between
the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Instead of a

proper balance between these two branches, there is a strong domination
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by the executive branch.

The administrative structure of the country is

discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V
BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
The general system of administration in Lebanon today is
mostly derived from the French who, during their twenty years of rule
there, helped in shaping the administrative institutions.

Before the

French, Lebanon was subjected to a long period of Ottoman rule which
left its traces on the administrative machinery.

It is during the period

of the French mandate that the administrative and governmental systems
began to crystallize and take shape.
Central Administration
Lebanon is a small unitary state with a system of administra
tion similar to that of France.

The basic unit of organization in the

Lebanese central administration is the Ministry which is the counterpart
of the French "Ministere" from which it was copied.

The Lebanese ministries,

presently sixteen in number, are divided in the following manner: (1) Foreign
Affairs and Emigrants, (2) Justice, (3) Interior, (4) National Defense,
(5) Finance, (6) National Economy, (7) Public Health, (8) Agriculture,
(9) Public Works and Transport, (10) National Education, (11) Labor and
Social Affairs, (12) Post, Telegraph and Telephone, (13) Information,
(14) General Planning, (15) Tourism, and (16) Water and Electric Resources.*
All these organizations are located in Beirut, with the majority of them
having field units in the various sections of the country.

^Legislative Decree No. Ill, June 12, 1959, Art. 1 in Adib Y,
Sader, Collection of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964). Ministries
are established and cancelled by means of a special law.
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Besides the present sixteen ministries there are around a
score of"independent or autonomous services" and semi-autonomous
"offices" which operate outside the ministerial framework but under the
tutelage (financial and administrative control) of some of these ministries.

2

Also, there are three control agencies attached to the Prime

Minister's Office which involve central financial and administrative
control and personneL administration.

These are the Bureau of Accounts,

the Central Inspection Service, and the Civil Service Board.
The Minister
The public organizations are all structured along a similar
pattern.

Each of these ministries is headed by a Minister.^

The minister

is in charge of the administration of his ministry and is entrusted with
the powers of directing and supervising the services of the state which
come under his department.

4

He is the center of power in the administra

tion, and formally speaking, he exercises full and ultimate authority
over his ministry.

As such his judgment and order are final and must

prevai1

2

See Table V-l, below.

In actual practice a Minister may head more than one ministry:
or he may be a minister of state.
*^rhe Lebanese Constitution, Art. 64. This article reads:
"Ministers shall administer the services of the State and the application
of laws and regulations, each within his department and in so far as he
is concerned."
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TABLE V-l

AGENCIES AND INDEPENDENT SERVICES UNDER
THE CONTROL OP THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD*
Muhafazah

Agency or Independent Service

Beirut:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Beirut Power & Transit Service*5
National Litani River Service'3
Beirut Water Service*5
Social Development Service1*
Bureau of Silkc
Lebanese State Railways*5
Bureau of Fruits (Agency)
al-Barouk Water Service*5
al-Matn Water Service*5
Kisriwan and al-Futuh Power & Water Service'3
Ayn al-Dilbi Water Service*5

Mount Lebanon:

8.
9.
10.
11.

North Lebanon:

12. Tripoli Water Service*5
13. Permanent International Fair Service0
14. Tripoli Seaport Service*5

South Lebanon:

15.
16.
17.
18.

Biqa:

19. al-Kasmieh and Ras al-Ayn Irrigation Service*3
20. Zahle Water Service*3
21. Agricultural Research Service0

Sidon Water Service*5
Jezzine Power Service*5
Jabal Amil Water Service
Tyre Water & Power Service*5

a.

Civil Service Board Report, 1961,pp. 533-34.

b.

Under the

control

of

theMinistryofPublic Water&Transport

c.

Under the

control

of

theMinistryofAgriculture

d.

Under the

control

of

theMinistryofLabor & SocialDevelopment
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The basic administrative unit of the ministry is one or more
Directorate-General.

The Directorate-General Includes all other adminis

trative subdivisions and is divided into Directorates or Services;
Directorates and Services into Bureaus; Bureaus into Sections and Sections
into Branches.
Chart I, below present the typical pattern of structural
organization found in the Lebanese bureaucracy.
The Director-General
Each Directorate-General is headed by a career civil servant,
the Director-General, who is the highest administrator and the direct
head of each and every administrative subdivision in the ministry.^

The

Director-General is a very important figure in the Lebanese administra
tion.

He is usually a very experienced person--sometimes a career man

since the days of the French--and with Invaluable knowledge of the ministry
and its administrative problems.

He acts as the chief adviser to the

minister on all matters pertaining to the ministry and its operation.

In

many instances he actually determines courses of action which an inex
perienced or, perhaps, a weak minister would follow.
It would be of immediate concern to look at the functions
given the Director-General by law.

He 1b in charge of administering all

units under him, coordinating their activities, and controlling the proper
execution of their functions as regards the following

^Legislative Decree No. Ill, op. cit., Art. 7, sect, 1.
6Ibid., Art. 7, sect. 2.
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CHART V-l
TYPICAL STRUCTURAL MODEL OF THE LEBANESE ADMINISTRATION

<'bffice of the
Minister

Echelon # 1
Headed by a
Director-General

Directorate
General

Dlwan
(Secretariat)
Directorate

Echelon # 9
Headed by a
Director or a Chief
of Service

Service

Echelon # 3
Bureau

Bureau

Section

Bureau

Bureau

Section

Section

I Headed bY a chie£
of Bureau

Echelon 1# 4
Headed by a Chief
of Section
t
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1. He exercises the authority granted him by law.
2. He takes decisions and signs all transactions and
correspondence pertaining to his work.
3. He coordinates the activities of the various units
under his authority.
4. He executes policy in the manner and time ordained.
5. He submits to the Minister matters involving general
principles or pertaining to the latter*s authority.
6. He prepares instructions regarding work operations, the
budget, the annual program of work and studies which
lead to betterment of operations and raising of adminis
trative standards.
7. He sees to the proper use of materials and furniture in
the units.
8. He is responsible for the execution of laws and regulations
through the civil servants under him.
9. He controls and inspects the units and civil servants
under him; takes necessary measures for punishing wrong
doers, corrects the wrongs and provides against future
mismanagement; carries out an inspection once every
three months in the central units, and once every six
months in regional units.
10. He establishes contact with the "Directorate-General of
Central Inspection" regarding the reports of the latter*s
inspectors and suggestions for better management; he may
ask the Central Inspection to conduct inspection in his
units; in addition to his own inspection.
The Director-General signs all project decrees, arretes and
transactions which must be submitted to the Minister, and he may include
his written opinion and suggestions.

He makes up a report every six

months outlining the program of his department and specifying what things
have been completed and where action is still pending.

This report should

state what difficulties confronted the execution of the department's
programs.

It should also include a statement on the conditions of the

civil servants under him.

Finally, the report must include plans or pro

grams to be executed the following year.

This semi-annual report is

submitted to the Minister with copies to the Civil Service Board and the
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Central Inspection Service.^
The Director-General is possessed of definite powers given
him by law and, hence, cannot be taken away except by law.

He may

delegate some of his powers to the Director or Chief of Service.
g

Council of Directors-General
The Directors-General of all ministries must convene every
three months upon the invitation of the President of the Civil Service
Board and in the presence of the members of the Board and of the
Central Inspection Service.

The purpose of this meeting is to exchange

opinions on the affairs of the Lebanese administration and to suggest
necessary measures for raising its professional level and the better
ment of its functioning.
The Advisory Coordinating Committee
A ministry which is composed of more than a single DirectorateGeneral has an advisory committee for purposes of coordination attached
directly to the minister.

This committee is composed of all the Directors-

General and heads of smaller units if they are directly attached to the
minister and is headed by the most senior among them in rank.

9

The

^Ibid., Art. 7, sects. 3 and 4.
8Ibid., Art. 10.
^Decree No. 2894, January 16, 1959, in Collection of Decree
Laws, op. cit.
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recommendations of this committee are reported directly to the minister;
and the latter assigns to the committee whatever common problems exist
between the ministry's main administrative units.

These problems may

involve matters of internal organization in the ministry, the budget pro
ject and considerations of additional appropriations, purchase^ and
works' programs and the distribution of funds for these activities,
personnel matters which demand a choice such as promotion, specializa
tion and training, and in general, any difficulties that may develop in
the ministerial machinery.^
Personal Staff Units
Every level of the hierarchy is provided a staff unit respon
sible for the personal matters of that level.
At the level of the minister, he may, and does designate one
or two Personal Secretaries from among the civil servants of the ministry
to organize his interviews, communications, private invitations, etc.
The service of the personal secretary remains in existence so long as the
minister's term in office also exists.

On the termination of the letter's

office the former reverts to his original position.

The secretary is

attached to the 'Common Administrative Unit* or the 'Diwan' (secretariat)
of the ministry.^

Actually the minister's secretary is somebody who

is a supporter of the minister, perhaps his 'protege', or somebody who was

^ Ibtd., Arts. 19 and 20.
^Ibid. , Arts. 16 and 17.

Filmed as received
without page(s)

/ X O

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.

«

121

One can easily discern the influence of French administrative
traditions in the Lebanese organizational pattern.

True to French custom,

the system in Lebanon has also provided for a high degree of concentration
of authority.

The Lebanese administration is a highly concentrated, highly

authoritarian one where decisions on minor and routine operations must be
made at the highest level in the administrative hierarchy.

Top adminis

trators, the Minister and Director-General are overburdened with unnecessary
details, distracting them from more important matters of policy and manage
ment .
This over-concentration of authority was instituted by the
French during the Mandate in an attempt to tighten their hold over the
public service and was later continued during the independence period by
successive regimes in pursuit of their own interests.

It should be pointed

out that the lack of properly qualified, trained personnel in the Lebanese
administration has hindered some efforts for delegating authority.
The problem of over-concentration of authority coupled with
exceedingly lengthy and complicated procedures have resulted in what is
probably the most pressing problem of the Lebanese administration--the
delay in the dispatch of official business, paralyzing government opera
tions.

Completion of the most simple and routine transactions is a lamentably

slow operation, normally taking weeks or months, and usually requiring
action by a score or more government officials.
This over-concentration of authority in Lebanon extends into
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the legislative sphere, where Parliament usually includes in its legis
lative statutes much administrative details, which should normally be
lo

left to the discretion of administrative officials.

This practice

limits the freedom of action of administrators and deprives them of
certain powers essential for the proper discharge of their functions.
In addition to this over-concentration of authority, the
Lebanese administration suffers from excessive departmentalization in
its ministries.

Each ministry is, to a great extent, a self-contained

unit acting independently of other ministries.

There is practically a

complete lack of lateral relationships between ministries.

That is to

say, a certain unit in one ministry does not have direct access or
conmunications with a unit of the same hierarchical level in another
ministry.

Any contact between the two must be channeled through the

Director-General of each ministry, thus greatly obstructing the normal
flow of work and seriously undermining coordination between the various
ministries.
In discussing the central administration, special mention
should be made of the Ministry of Finance, which plays a key role in
administrative and financial matters.

This ministry is vested with the

responsibility of preparing the budget in its final form.

Its role, in

this respect, is similar to that of the United States Bureau of the Budget,
although the Council of Ministers in Lebanon can, at any time, override

11

Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the
Government of Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration Improvement,"
unpublished report, Part I, p. 4 (n.d.)
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any decision of the ministry.
Besides budget responsibility, the Ministry of Finance makes
a comprehensive and total pre-audit of all government expenditures.

No

disbursement of money, no matter how small or trivial, can be effected
without the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance.

This means that

any request for the expenditure of funds by any department has to be
submitted to the ministry for approval.

This centralization of financial

control, although it has provided for certain measure of coordination and
uniformity, has been one of the main causes of delay and obstruction
in the public service.

A simple request for the purchase of a small

item is normally a very lengthy procedure and cannot be completed with
out the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Field Administration
14
Lebanon is divided into five Muhafazahs (departments or
provinces) which are in turn subdivided into twenty-three Qadas (arrondissements or districts).^

Each Muhafazah is headed by a Muhafez

who

is the highest authority in the province and whose role corresponds to that
of the Prefect in France.

He is appointed by the Council of Ministers and

is responsible to the Minister of Interior.

^These are Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, South
Lebanon and the Biqa. See Appendix A.
^Legislative Decree No. 11, December 29, 1954, Annex No. 1.
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The Muhafez
The Muhafez is the chief executive officer in his district
and is the representative of the central government having the responsi
bility for overall direction and coordination of all ministries' field
units.
His major duties are those of maintaining peace and order in
the Muhafazah; supervising the offices of the central government with
the exception of the judicial courts, which are independent, and the
army units, which are subject to direct control by the Ministry of
Defense in the capital.

He controls all civil servants in his province

and administers the personnel matters of the latter in accordance with
the Personnel Law.

All correspondence between the regional units and

the central administration must pass through him.

Since he is responsi

ble for the execution of laws and regulations in his district, he is
entrusted to take all necessary measures for the coordination and proper
execution of work of all regional offices under his command.^

In addi

tion to a number of other minor duties, he has a number of powers delegated
to him by the ministries.*^
An important function of the Muhafez is to observe the poli
tical and economic conditions of his region and to convey his observations,
monthly or whenever necessary, to the Minister of Interior.

Similarly, he

is responsible for the maintenance of public security and order, personal
freedom and immunity of private property.

16Ibid., Art. 7.
*^Ibid.. Arts. 8-26.

To do this, he may ask the
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internal security forces, which are placed under his order for such
purposes, to take any measures circumstances may dictate.
The relationships between the field and the central adminis
tration in Lebanon are highly centralized.

The Muhafez depends on the

Minister of Interior for instructions in the performance of his duties.
He does not possess the independence of action and the discretion which
his position demands.

Until 1959, the Muhafez did not possess enough

power to grant a hunting license for citizens in his Muhafazah.

They

had to go to the capitalfor such a simple and routine transaction.
Decree Law No. 150 of June 12, 1959, has resulted in increased
authority for the Muhafezs.

This was done in order to relieve the central

authorities in the capital and to place effective power near the people
themselves.
regional

Thus, the Muhafez was granted the authority to decide many

matters without referring them to the capital.
Table 2 below shows the

ministries' regional offices in the

The Muhafez experiences

seriousrole difficulties.

Muhafazah.

tion occupies a unique role in the

region.

His posi

He is, to a considerable

extent, a "political civil servant" in that he is a political appointee
who is recruited through choice,

18

and not through examinations.

He is

in an unenviable position and has to act verycautiously and diplomatically
if he desires to survive in his position.

18

Ibid., Art. 5.

As the top administrator in his
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TABLE V - 2
THE MINISTRIES' REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE MUHAFAZAH®

MINISTRY

REGIONAL OFFICES

Interior

Police, police courts, police records,
census, technical municipal office

Justice

Court of Appeals

Finance

Finance Administration; Land
Registration Office

Agriculture

Agronomic Administration

Labor and Social Affairs

Administration for the implementation
of social programmes

Public Health

Administration of the implementation
of health programmes and of the enforce
ment of sanitary regulations

Public Works

Regional Directorate, roads, construc
tion, water, electricity and machinery

National Education

Supervision of nationally administered
schools.

National Economy

Protection of the consumer, control of
gold jewelry

Orientation, Information and
Tourism

Tourism; summer and winter resorts

Post, Telegraph and Telephone

Administration of the study, implemen
tation and maintenance of telephone
networks, regional administration for
postal and telegram service.

legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, Annex No. 2
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Muhafazah he has a double duty to perform.

He is under pressure from

the central government--as its representative and agent--to carry out
its orders.

As the 'prime minister' of his area he is subjected to

incessant relentless pressures from local Za 1ims and the parliamentary
deputies of the region.

He cannot very well ignore their demands and

wishes; and such wishes arc not always lawful, admissible and in the
public interest.

Many a Muhafez who had troubled relations with local

politicians found that he could not keep his position too long, and was
transferred.
Council of the M u h a f azh
The Muhafez is assisted in his work by a Muhafazah Council^
over which he presides and which is composed of the Director of Finance
of the Muhafazah, all the Qa*immaqams in the Muhafazah and two represen
tatives from each Qada1 chosen from the various professions for their
interest in public affairs.

They are appointed by a decree of the Council

of Ministers upon the recommendations of the Muhafez.20
This Council is an advisory body and renders advice to the
Muhafe2 on matters pertaining to the improvement of economic, agri
cultural, health, and social welfare conditions of the Muhafazah. It
may be called by the Muhafez to give its opinion concerning any matter
which he thinks is of public concern and benefit.

^Beirut is an exception and has no such council.
70

Legislative Decree No. 116, op. cit., Arts. 47-5G.
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The Qada1 is headed by a Q a 1immaqam (sub-prefect) who is
the chief executive officer of the sub-district and assumes the same
role which the Muhafez assumes in the Muhafazah.

He is directly

responsible to the Muhafez, who is his only link with the central
administration.

Again, the Qa1immaqam is considered somewhat of a

political appointee.

The method of appointment and required qualifica

tions are the same as those specified in the case of the Muhafez.
Table 3, below, presents the regional offices in the Qada1.
The Muhafez and the Q a 1immaqam are considerably overburdened
with their functions.

A look at all the offices which supposedly come

under their control and with the fact that they are entrusted with the
running of scores of municipalities would throw enough light on their
problem.

Since their primary concern is with security and order, their

other administrative tasks suffer to a considerable extent.
to alleviate this situation, Decree No, 15402^*

In order

created the position of

Secretary of the Muhafazah to assist the Muhafez in the performance of
his duties and to act in lieu of the letter's absence.
Local Administration
In the field of local government, Lebanon displays a highly
centralized system where local communities are allowed very little inde
pendence and autonomy in the handling of their own affairs.

Local govern

ment tradition dates back to the days of the Ottomans who introduced a very

^Decree No. 15402, February 13, 1964, in Collection of
Decree Laws, op. cit.
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TABLE V-3
THE MINISTRIES' REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE QADAa

Ministry

Departments

Interior

Police, census and civil register

Justice

Lower court judge

Public Health

District doctor and ambulance service

Finance

District finance, district land
registration

Agriculture

Agronomic section, veterinary section

legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, Annex No. 2.
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rudimentary, limited system of local government to the country.

This

was later modified and developed by the French during the Mandate
period, and local government principles and institutions have been
patterned mostly after those of France.
The French, however, were not always willing to encourage
the independent and full-fledged application of local government practices.
They did not think conditions in Lebanon were yet ripe for the healthy
and proper functioning of such new and somewhat alien devices.

Besides,

Lebanon, at the time, was suffering from sharp political and religious
differences, which still persist today, and which threatened the exist
ence of the country itself.

The encouragement of local autonomy might

further such dissension and lead to highly undesirable results.
The constitution in Lebanon includes no mention of local
government, thus leaving such a matter to be covered by laws.

Decree

Law No. 5, dated December 10, 1954, governs the operation and functioning
of local government units in Lebanon.
Each village in Lebanon, with a population of five hundred or
more, is allowed a municipality.

22

Municipalities are classified into

two categories, large and small, depending on the number of people in
each village, town, or city.

Municipalities can, in certain cases, be

created by a special decision of the Minister of Interior upon the
recommendation of the Muhafez.

22

Decree Law No. 5 of December 10, 1954.
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The form of municipal government is simple and uniform
throughout the whole country.

23

Each municipality is governed by a

municipal council elected for a period of four years by general
suffrage.

The number of councilors in each council is proportionate

to the population in the city.

This council is vested with decision*

making or legislative authority and is presided over by a President
of the Municipal Council, the chief executive officer of the municipality.
Local authorities in Lebanon are subject to strict supervision
and control by the central government through its agent, the Muhafez
who exercises the power of tutelle administrative over the municipalities.
The Muhafez has to approve many of the decisions of municipal councils
before they become binding.

He can also revise the budget by either

refusing or adding certain items.

In certain cases, the Muhafez can

dissolve the municipal council and can personally assume the responsi
bility for municipal affairs himself.

In many instances, and mainly in

the case of large municipalities, the central government imposes certain
conditions which should be observed in recruiting some of the key munici
pal officials; and, in the case of Beirut and Tripoli, the central govern
ment directly appoints some of these key officials.

Finally, all

municipalities in Lebanon are subject to administrative and financial
inspections conducted by the Ministry of Interior and Finance, sometimes
leading to the dissolution of the municipal council.

23
With the exception of Beirut and Tripoli, the two largest
cities.
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Summary Statement
The organization of the Lebanese administrative hierarchy
follows a clear-cut, single and uniform pattern.

The basic adminis

trative unit is the Directorate-General which is systematically divided
into Directorates and Services; the Directorates and Services are
further subdivided into Bureaus, and the Bureaus into £ rtions.
The political overhead of the central administration, which
directs and controls the Lebanese civil service at the level of DirectorGeneral and below, consists of three echelons: The President of the
Republic, the Cabinet and the Minister.
The Minister is entrusted with the supreme powers of direct
ing and supervising the services of the state which come under his
department and is assisted by the Director-General, who is the highest
administrative officer and the direct head of all the administrative
subdivisions in the ministry.

The Director-General is responsible for

the coordination, control and supervision of the units and employees
that are under his jurisdiction.
In the structure of the Lebanese bureaucracy there are
twenty-one independent agencies and public utilities.

These public

organizations are under the tutelage authority of the central govern
ment administration, but they enjoy a certain degree of financial
autonomy.
The Muhafazahs and Qadas are the territorial subdivisons of
the Central Government.

Each Muhafazah is headed by a Muhafez who is

the chief executive officer and the representative of all the ministries'
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field units in the district.

His major duties are the maintenance of

peace and order; the supervision of the offices of the central govern
ment; and acting as liaison between the government and the people of
the Muhafazah.
The Qa'immagam is in charge of the same responsibilities
entrusted to the Muhafez but applied only to the jurisdiction of the
Qada.
It is evident from the above discussion that centralization
of authority Is a hallmark in Lebanese bureaucracy.

This is a by

product of political and administrative systems imposed on Lebanon as
well as due to a favorable social climate prevalent in Lebanese society.
The growth of the bureaucracy and the development of the
size of the state will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI

GROWTH IN BUREAUCRATIC SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE
Under the Mandate
Prior to World War II the restrained role of the state and
its elementary interference in the social and economic spheres did not
make for a big and complex machinery.

The administration was character

istic of a liberal and laissez faire state wherein little importance
was given to socio-economic services.
In 1926, the first administration consisted of seven minis
tries and the Office of the Prime Minister.

These were: Justice,

Interior, Finance, Public Works, Education and Fine Arts, Agriculture
and Health.*The nature of administrative functions and the relative
importance of each activity (number of personnel and their salaries)
of the time can be deduced from the 1927 budget.
Table VI-1, below.

This is presented in

This budget shows that the essential and most important

ministries were those of Finance, Interior, Public Works and Justice.
These ministries along with the others "...became the core of Lebanese
administration."

2

■^George Grassmack and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese
Administration (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1955), p. 6.
2Ibid., p. 8.
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TABLE VI-1
REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1927a

Personnel to be
Employed

Title

Presidency of the Republic
Parliament
Presidency, Council of Ministers
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Public Works
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Public Health
Continengy Reserve
TOTAL

3

Credit opened
(in L.L.S)*

----

5,601
28,551
6,035
59,605
234,833
589,633
126,735
51,953
9,594
40,604
66,126

3.749

LS 1.219.270

-

25
598
1,802
765
67
385
34
70

*Lebano-Syrian Pounds

a
As In Ibid., "The Ministry of Interior maintained a gendarmerie
of 1,382, over one-third of the entire government’s personnel, and a police
force of 347 members." p. 7.

136

In 1933, a serious depression year, the budget provided for
3,600 positions, 1,600 of which were for the police.

In this year

"...Personnel was pared to what the mandatory power considered a minimum and from this base it began to expand."

3

In 1937, the Lebanese administration had a total of 3,659
civil servants.

This figure is divided into one-third for the economic

and social service and two-thirds for the administrative departments including the functions of internal security.^
Ministries concerned with economic and social functions were
very small due to the fact that the government did not have any economic
or agricultural policies.

Private initiative was left to its own

devices and the policy was to give total liberty to the activities of the
private sector.
With the outbreak of World War II, the French High Commissioner
tightened his control over administrative operations.

Lebanon, in the

first few years of the war, experienced "administrative confusion to
match the political derangement which the country experienced."3

3Ibid.
^Gabriel Menassa, Plan de Reconstruction de L'Economic
Libanaise et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beyrouth: La Societe Libanaise
d'Economie Politique, 1948), p. 180.
3Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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On January 1, 1944, the control of the administration was
transferred to the Lebanese authorities.

6

During Independence
By 1946 the Lebanese bureaucracy had been supplied with a
complete and large administrative set-up; each ministry found itself in
possession of nearly all the administrative machinery required for its
operations^

The number of civil servants manning this set-up burgeoned

from 3,674 in 1937 to 7,810 in 1946 - an increase amounting to 130
.

per cent.

8
The increase in the number and salaries of civil servants

from 1937 to 1946 is illustrated in Table VI-2, below.
Economic difficulties, corruption, general government mis
management, and disorganized administration characterized the early
1950's in Lebanon.

Corruption and malfeasance in office, whether in

the government or administrative circles, developed into unmanageable pro
portions and added to the economic difficulties already existing.

£

°Eugenie E. Abouchdid, Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria
(1917-1947) (Beirut: The Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 1948), p. 204.
^Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit,. p. 14.
®Menassa, op. cit., pp. 380-90.
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TABLE VI-2
TOTALS OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR SALARIES
1937-19463

Year

No. of Civil
Servants

1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946

3,674
3,902
4,005
4,145
4,239
4,992
5,696
6,892
7,279
7,810 +
3,520^ (army)

Salaries Totals
(in million LLS)

2,446,620
2,843,726
3,062,783
3,071,700
3,932,606
7,149,947
9,125,044
16,137,935
17,693,021
29,322,001

Percent of
Budget

43
46
42
48
48
50
42
47
50
50

a
Gabriel Menassa, Plan de Reconstruction de l'Economie Libanaise
et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beyrouth: La Societe d'Economie Politique, 1948),
p. 389.
b
In 1945, the Lebanese Government assumed control of the military
after the departure of the French.
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Social needs necessitated the creation of the Ministry of
Information in 1949; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in 1951.
The need to organize and control developmental activities in the country
plus the coordination of the works, projects, and socio-economic planning
and development effort of all the other ministries and agencies necessi
tated the creation of the Ministry of General Planning in 1954.
Civil Service Board was created in 1959

9

The

and was entrusted with the

conduct and control of public personnel administration in the country.
From Scores to Thousands
The Lebanese civil service has experienced considerable growth
since the inception of its nucleus in the feudal era of the Amirs, prior
to 1840, in the form of their Diwan (Secretariat),

From a score or so

civil servants in this era, this number doubled in the period of the
Qa1immaqamiyattan; in the period of the Mutassarifiyah it became 226
civil servants (and 989 gens d'armes); 3,023 in 1926; 5,996 in 1943; and
8,808 in 1949, including the gendarmerie and the police, and excluding
the common services personnel and the army.^
Table VI-3 presents the totals of the civil servants' posi
tions every other year from 1950 to 1966 with their breakdown on the
basis of ministries.

The totals presented were taken from the budget

^Decree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959.
l^Tawfiq Awad, "Al-Wazifah fi Lubnan" (Public Office in
Lebanon) Les Conferences du Cenacle, Vol. Ill, Nos. 5-6 (1949), p. 127.

TABLE VI-3
TOTAL OF PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1950-1966a

Name of Ministry or Unit

Presidency of the Republic
Chamber of Deputies
Prime Minister's Office
Foreign Affairs & Emigrants
National Defense
Interior
Justice
Post, Telegraph & Telephone
Finance
Information & Tourism
National Education
Public Health
Labor & Social Affairs
National Economy
Public Works & Transport
Agriculture
General Planning

TOTAL

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

13
27
30
178
13
169
599
605
743
41
2,324
491

14
29
47
182
17
177
637
700
844
62
3,759
625
94
93
932
331

10
39
68
154
42
256
677
1,634
1,070
60
4,056
574
97
167
971
529
—

10
35
84
155
42
253
752
2,373
1,327
59
4,936
556
94
189
1,004
551
58

10
35
85
169?
51
258
896
2,399
1,353
60
5,379
626
94
196
1,088
577
57

13
38
69
182
60
295
924
2,263
1,194
56
6,103
607
85
185
886
373
19

11
54
302
222
54
300
1,028
2,171
1,277
229
8,254
604
77
165
935
524
93

20
92
566
248
55
442
1,012
3,005
2,265
478
10,129
1,093
141
193
1,765
602
188

14
107
560
245
69
449
1,046
3,596
2,238
362
12,398
875
97
179
1,637
574
126

-

137
438
330
“

6.138

w

8,519

10.364

12.422

13.728

13.352

16.239

22.084

24.572

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1950; 1952; 1954; 1956; 1958; 1960; 1962; 1964;
and 1966.
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allotments of the said years.

The figures presented account for all

permanent positions of the "cadres", except those performing military
and police functions, the temporary, the daily paid and the contractuelles.
The teachers under the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts were
included, following the French example, which explains the ministry's
large total.
The totals of the permanent civil servants presented in
the 1962 budget and thereafter are based on the 1961 Organizational
Decree which fixed the administrative cadres of the various ministries.
These decrees were issued to amend the previous cadres set in 1959, and
were based on a study of all ministries during 1961.

Plans were laid

to start a process of gradual filling of the empty positions in the
cadres which were set by the 1961 decrees.

The Civil Service Board

stated in a report issued in 1964 that as of April 16, 1963, there were
2500 vacant positions.

Out of this total 292 were in the Third Category,

1,556 in the Fourth, 600 in the Fifth.^
Bureaucratic Cost and Expenditures
Lebanon is being increasingly subjected to the impact of
change and all the side effects that goes with it.

The Lebanese state

has evolved in the last twenty years from the traditional, quiescent
role which is permissive to a more dynamic role concerned with the active

^ Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board,
1964, (Beirut: Sader Press, 1965), pp. 12-13.
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direction of increased varieties of functions together with enterprises
all hitherto in private hands; and the satisfaction of social and econo
mic needs through major projects and schemes.

These goalb necessitated

the expansion, revitalization and reorganization of the Lebanese bureau
cracy .
The totals of basic salaries of the permanent civil servants
may reveal the trend, general and individual, of the growth of adminis
trative size and expenses.
below.

These totals are presented in Table VI-4,

The years dealt with have 5-year intervals in between in order

to allow a realizable difference to emerge.

The total salary expendi

tures for 1950 were LL 7,719,342; for 1954, LL 29,193,475; for 1959,
LL 50,020,226; for 1964, 113,516,806 and for 1967, LL 137,295,900.

The

percentage increase of the 1954 total over that of 1950 is 278.26
percent; the percentage increase of the 1959 total over that of 1954
is 71.34 percent; that of 1964 over that of 1959 is 131.13 percent and
the 1967 total over that of 1959 is 174,45 percent.
Totals of basic salaries or pay, together with allowances
of the permanent and non-permanent civil and military servants in the 1967
budget are presented in Table VI-5 below.

The total of the salaries of

civil servants excluding the armed forces is LL 193,894,600; including
them, LL 263,722,800.
Salaries and pay of public authorities' officials and of
public servants reached the percentages of 42.58 percent in 1962,
39.42 percent in 1964 and 40.58 percent in 1966.

General administrative

expenses were 11.10 percent in 1960, 11.23 percent in 1962, 11.98 per
cent in 1964 and 9.63 percent in 1966.

TABLE VI-4

BASIC PAY TOTALS OF PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1950; -54; -59; 64; -66a

1966

Name of Ministry or Unit

1950

Presidency of the Republic
Chamber of Deputies
Prime Minister's Office
Justice
Foreign Affairs & Emigrants
Interior
Finance
National Education
Public Health
Labor & Social Affairs
Orientation, Information &
Tourism
Public Works & Transport
Agriculture
National Economy
Post, Telephone & Telegraph
General Planning
National Defense

18,540
29,700
39,690
863,700
477,900
232,080
688,140
254,880
355,884
--25,620

49,920
128,885
354,400
2,070,860
958,380
959,380
3,859,980
8,859,980
1,191,340
269,580
177,840

62,520
187,560
551,460
4,934,456
1,408,860
1,208,140
6,246,120
18,077,490
1,865,390
399,300
258,480

162,700
516,020
2,858,620
7,564,620
2,018,580
27,535,620
12,249,520
34,039,820
4,294,320
702,120
2,569,720

128,600
664,320
2,979,300
7,767,420
2,349,020
32,356,780
12,713,820
50,069,120
4,019,320
600,000
2,239,420

492,624
264,354
156,660
2,797,820
--21,750

2,888,880
1,364,250
621,780
4,427,130
--147,240

4,414,260
1,914,420
853,860
7,677,300
95,520
213,980

10,506,520
3,287,920
1,020,020
5,407,220
838,420
378,334

9,564,480
3,179,620
1,023,120
5,600,000
669,520
443,820

7.719.342

29.193.475

50.020.226

113.516.806

137.295.900

TOTAL

1954

1959

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1950; -54; -59; -64; -66.
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TABLE VI-5

TOTALS OF BASIC SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES OF THE PERMANENT
AND NON-PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1967®

Name of Ministry or Unit

In Lebanese Pounds

308,400

Presidency of the Republic
Chamber of Deputies

3,321,700

Prime Minister's Office

6,009,400

Foreign Affairs & Emigrants

9,706,000

National Defense

69,828,200

Interior

38,404,500

Justice

9,634,200

Post, Telephone & Telegraph

7,987,400
18,006,500

Finance
Information

2,781,200
67,986,000

National Education
Public Health

6,566,300

Labor & Social Affairs

1,208,900

National Economy

1,247,800

Public Works

&

Transport

13,051,200

Agriculture

4,160,100

General Planning

1,486,700

Tourism

1,253,000

Water

&

1,774,300

Electric Resources
TOTAL

263.722.800

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1967.
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Table VI-6 presents the distribution and percentage of the
1967 budget appropriations of the various ministries and units according
to the functions of the state.

Of the total budget of LL 613 million,

9.23 percent is for state function, 29.94 percent for security and order,
8,53 percent for general services, 21.17 percent for public debt and
4.03 percent for contingent reserves.

Table VI-7 presents the distri

bution of the budget appropriations according to various functions from
1951 to 1967.
The Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Andre
Tweini, stated in February, 1960 to a newspaper that the budget has
many inadequacies among which is that most of it is for administrative
expenses.

He gave the example of the 1960 budget.

Out of about LL 220

million, LL 112 million were allocated for the salaries and indemnities
of the civil servants.

12

The growth in the size and scope of the Lebanese bureau
cracy may also be seen in the growth of the annual budgets' totals.
Table VI-8 presents these totals for the years 1929-1943 and Table VI-9
shows the government's income and expenditures for the years 1944-67 and
the co-efficient of increase taking the year 1944 as a base.
New Functions, Trends and Changes
A description of the present bureaucratic size and the

12

Al-Jaryda (Beirut), February 26, 1960.
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TABLE VI-6

DISTRIBUTION OF THE GENERAL BUDGET OF 1967
ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONS3

Functions

State Functions:

-Presidency of the Republic
-Chamber of Deputies
-Prime Minister's Office
-Foreign Affairs & Emigrants

Sub-total
Security & Order:

58.386.800
-National Defense
-Interior
-Justice

-Post, Telephone & Telegraph
-Finance
-Orientation
-Tourism

Social Services:

-National Education
-Public Health
-Labor & Social Affairs

Sub-total
Economic & Develop
-National Economy
ment Services
-Public Works & Transport
-Agriculture
-General Planning
-Water & Electric Resources

29.94

11.173.200
22,474,300
6,095,200
14.059.800
53.802.500

Sub-total

9.23%

128,396,700
49.909.900
10.805.200
189.211.800

Sub-total
General Services:

850,000
3,997,800
26,415,600
27.123.400

8.53

97.297.400
24,555,000
11.864.900
133.717.300

21.17

2,347,800
72.922.200
16.675.200
2,489,700
46,461,500
140.896.400

22.29

Public Debt

30.299.500

4.80

Contingency Reserves

25.466.700

4.03

631.781.000

100.00

Sub-total

TOTAL

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1967.

TABLE VI-7

PERCENTAGE OF SPENDING ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONS
1951-1967®

1965

1966

6.09

7.24

6.87

9.23

32.71

26.65

27.30

28.88

29.94

9.90

8.86

8.32

8.15

7.64

8.53

21.51

20.24

19.17

18.38

21.42

22.12

21.17

22.31

20.33

20.46

18.61

34.43

27.75

26.30

22.29

17.18

14.20

12.01

12.26

17.40

6.13

8.14

8.19

8.83

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

1960

1961

1.01

2.14

3.25

34.15

35.68

35.00

11.20

9.04

10.46

15.93

16.98

19.11

Economic & Develop
ment Services

23.18

17.09

Public Debt &
Contingent Reserve

14.44

100.00

Functions

1951

1954

1957

State Functions

1.86

1.53

1.19

Security & Order

36.85

36.20

General Services

7.74

Social Services

TOTAL

1959

1963

1967

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1951: 1954; 1957; 1959; 1960; 1961; 1963: 1965; 1966
and 1967.
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TABLE VI-8
GROWTH OF LEBANON'S BUDGETS, 1929-1943*

b
Year

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943

Expenditures (LLS)

6,370,945
5,097,000
5,114,000
5,109,000
4,513,500
4,533,200
4,622,200
4,351,200
4,904,000
5,406,000
6,369,000
6,510,000
6,636,000
12,504,500
21,420,000

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finances, Budgets of 1929-1943.
b
LLS ■ Libano-Syrian Pounds.
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TABLE VI-9

GOVERNMENT'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURES,
1944 - 1967 (In Leb. Pounds)3

Year

Income
Expenditures
Coefficient
__________________________________________ of Increase

1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

37,741,188
55,151,950
73,915,827
85,988,438
78,754,612
87,367,107
83,317,342
105,307,020
124,927,346
141,231,969
157,444,486
178,863,174
191,979,903
209,941,644
225,473,582
250,902,433
316,556,158
313,446,378
360,100,000
412,700,000
445,000,000
457,021,421
505,000,000
560,000,000

27,666,573
35,920,893
51,993,915
60,722,427
70,067,517
83,401,986
84,521,928
90,051,121
88,509,851
96,327,423
111,181,970
132,376,966
161,348,024
142,466,137
181,622,338
198,571,297
243,087,753
269,260,306
415,300,000
430,300,000
474,400,000
514,790,000
590,735,000
631,681,000

100%
130
187
219
253
301
305
325
319
348
401
478
576
515
656
715
880
910
1,480
1,550
1,710
1,850
2,140
2,283

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1944-1967.
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present socio-economic situation will throw some light on the problems
and prospects involved in the present and future role of the Lebanese
state toward its various basic functions and towards the process of
socio-economic development.
Regarding socio-economic development in Lebanon it is clear
that it is the function of the state to create development opportunities
and facilitate access to them.

An effective choice of the open possi

bilities in these opportunities, or in any appropriate combination of
them, must be made and developed based on the endownments -- natural,
human, and others -- Lebanon has.

This approach envisages state action

on a far greater scale than its previous passive or negligible role
and means an increased burden on the public bureaucracy -- as well as
the political machinery -- of the country.

The Lebanese state has

important functions to perform like any other state. "The maintenance
of law and order, national defense, the control and issue of fiduciary
money, and the provision of minimum education and health services are
leading examples... In fact, the adequate performance of these minimum
tasks is of vital importance for economic growth and generally a
necessary condition for such growth.

13

Factors that influence the state and its role were discussed
earlier.

These include the socio-political factors of political

13
P. T. Bauer and B. S. YttMy, The Economics of Underdeveloped
Countries (Cambridge: James Nisbet & Co., 1960), p. 163.
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sectarianism and feudalism which produce internal strains and conflicts
affecting the state's institutions and hampering radical reform in laws
concerning the public bureaucracy or even, paralyzing their execution
to the point of rendering their effect to naught.

In this section, a

review will be made of the total of the civil servants in the various
ministries and other central administrative units and linking these
totals to the new functions as ordained by the requirements of the new
house-keeping and socio-economic situations.
Looking at the individual totals of the various administra
tive units we find that, in almost all of them, trends and changes are
identifiable.

The most noticeable of these changes are those which took

place after 1959.

Table VI-3 and VI-4, above, present the detailed

totals which shall be mentioned hereafter.
Table VI-10 presents the totals of civil servants in 1967
distributed according to the various functions of the state, together
with the percentages of such totals out of the grand total.

Reference

to such totals and percentages will be made during the following dis
cussion.
State Functions. Security and Order, and General Services
Administrative machineries concerned with state functions
involve three central units and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Emigrants.

These have a total of 1,068 civil servants and form 3.68% out

of the total number of civil servants in the whole administration.
The personnel of the Presidency of the Republic and the Chamber
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TABLE VI-10

CIVIL SERVANTS' TOTALS ACCORDING TO STATE FUNCTIONS
1967a

Function

Ministry or Unit

State Functions:

Total of
Civil Servant

-Presidency of the Republic
-Chamber of Deputies
-Prime Minister's Office
-Foreign Affairs & Emigrants

Security & Order:

1.685
-Post, Telegraph & Telephone
-Finance
-Orientation
-Tourism

Sub-total
Social Services

-National Education
-Public Health
-Labor & Social Affairs

27.66

14,034
1,155
145
15.334

-National Economy
-Public Works & Transport
-Agriculture
-General Planning
-Water & Electric Resources

5.83

4,343
2,982
444
218
7.987

Sub-total
Economic & Development
Services

3.68

66
518
l.lOli.

-National Defense
-Interior
-Justice

Sub-total
General Services:

16
120
659
268
1.068

Sub-total

Percentage

53.13

196
1,625
620
171
188

Sub-total

2.800

9.70

TOTAL

28.869

1 0 0 .0 0

a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance,

Budget of 1967.
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of Deputies were practically constant between 1950 and 1960.

In 1967

the former had 16 and the latter 120 civil servants including 40 policemen.
The personnel total of the Directorate General of the Prime Minister's
office was also practically constant between 1950 and 1960; it was 13
in 1960 and it now has 38 civil servants including 5 non-permanent
employees.
Also, the Central Inspectorate -- which was known, until
the reform movement of 1958-1959, as the "State Inspection Board" -have played, until that time, a dormant role.

It maintained the total

of 15 civil servants for 7 consecutive years (1953-59) as if no vital
and dynamic inspection work had to be done or, at least, no widening of
this important function, to cope with the growth of the administration,
effected.

The reasons behind this situation can be limited to two

points: the presence of separate inspection units in each ministry
before the centralization of this control function in 1959; and the use
of the central and ministerial inspection units as a dumping ground
for those who fall out of favor; and the paralyzing of this function during
the previous corrupt regimes.

Today the Central Inspectorate has 213

civil servants.
The Bureau of Accounts, created in 1 9 5 1 ^ to examine both
proposed and completed expenditures by all branches of Lebanese adminis-

l^Although article 87 of the Constitution of October 17, 1927,
ordained the establishment of the Bureau of Accounts, the Bureau was
created more than a score of years later. In the 1951 law the Bureau
could control the completed expenditures (post-audit). Later laws,
notably legislative Decree No. 118 of June 12, 1959, gave it a pre-audit
function.
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tration, started with 24 permanent civil servants in 1952 and had 61 in
1962; it now has 79 civil servants.

The Bureai's work expands annually

with the budget's increase.
The Civil Service Board, created in 1959 to control all
aspects of personnel administration in the civil service, had 113
permanent civil servants in 1962 and 145 in 1967 -- including 40 students
in the National Institute of Administration and Development considered
as civil servants.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants performs, in
addition to the central units and agencies, a very important state
function.

It is in charge of foreign policy affairs, generally speak

ing, and of the protection of the interests of the Lebanese citizens in
other countries.

It is also entrusted with strengthening the relations

-- social, economic and other -- of the homeland with about 1.5 million
Lebanese emigrants all across the continents.

The ministry had 169

permanent civil servants in 1958, 222 in 1962 and 268 in 1967.

The

ministry also maintains local personnel in its diplomatic missions abroad
whose total is not specified in the budget.
Ministries involved in performing functions related to security
and order are those of National Defense, Interior, and Justice.

These

ministries have a total of 1685 civil servants with a percentage of 5.83
percent out of the general total of 1967.
The Ministry of National Defense has 66 civil servants; it
had 51 in 1958.

The military personnel are not revealed in terms of

numbers although the total amount of pay given them are cited in the
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budget.

The military has considerably outgrown their little shell of

the 'Troupes Speciales' of 5000 or so back in 1945; however, any count
of them is understandably withheld.

The size of the armed forces was

enhanced by the turbulent state of affairs in the Middle East and the
Palestine War. The ministry does not implement a policy of general
military service.

It, nevertheless, sponsors training programs on a

restricted basis for the male students of the top two classes in all
secondary schools and the first class in universities.
The Ministry of Interior has 518 civil servants.

It had

the total of 258 permanent civil servants in 1958 and 300 in 1962.

The

internal and the general security forces totals are not given; however,
the budget cites their pay totals.

The question of internal status quo,

peace and order are of primary concern to the Lebanese government.
Internal political stability holds precious advantages in view of the
political life of the country and its social and economic development.
The Ministry of Justice has 1101 civil servants, with almost
half this amount representing the judges of the various civil, religious
and other courts.

This ministry had 896 civil servants in 1958 and

1012 in 1964.
Ministries Involved in performing functions of general adminis
trative services are those of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Finance,
Information and Tourism.

These ministries have a total of 7,987 civil

servants constituting 27.66 percent out of the general total of 1967.
The Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone had 2399 civil
servants in 1958, and 2,171 in 1962.

The total number of civil servants

156

for 1967 reached 4,343 including 761 non-permanent civil servants.
The ministry was involved throughout the last few years,
and still is Increasingly so, in the consistent widening of the postal
service and its branches; spreading the automatic telephone system to
cover the

whole country; the establishment of

more telecommunication

lines with other countries; and in general toInstall better methods
and means

to conduct itsoperation in view of more efficiency.
The Ministry

of Finance is the central agency within the

government responsible for all types of fiscal and monetary operations.
It is concerned with collecting, keeping, and disbursing government funds.
It also prepares the government's annual budget, and supervises its exe
cution.
The Ministry of Finance is one of the largest ministries, and
the one with the most control within the Lebanese government.

Its

significant role is copied from the similar role played by the Finance
Ministry in France.
This ministry had 1353 permanent civil servants in 1958 and
1,277 in 1962.

It has 2,982 civil servants in 1967 including 748 non

permanent employees.
The increase in the annual budgets, Table VI-9 above, reveal
the continuous enlargement of the burden of the ministry as regards the
above mentioned tasks.

The increase in the annual budget is caused,

from the point of view of expenditures, by the rise in the administra
tive expenses, including the salaries of the civil servants and the
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pensions of the retired; and from the point of view of income, by the
rise in the amount of taxes -- especially import duties which amount
from 35 to 40 percent of the annual income.^
The Ministry of Information and Tourism held a consistent
total of around 60 between 1C52 and 1960, and a total of 229 in 1962 and
444 in 1967.

In 1966, a separate Ministry of Tourism was created which

now has 218 civil servants.
Social, Economic and Development Services
Ministries involved in performing social services are those
of National Education, Public Health, and Labor and Social Affairs.
These ministries have a total of 15,334 civil servants which constitute
53.13 percent out of the general total of 1967.
The Ministry of National Education has the overwhelming
majority of this total, namely 14,034 civil servants most of which are
teachers.

The ministry had 5,379 permanent civil servants in 1958

and 8,254 in 1962.

Considering education, Lebanon has developed a

tradition which goes back to centuries of hard work by foreign and

Khattar Shibli, Al-Ulum Al-Maliyat - Al-Muazanah (the
Sciences of Finance - The Budget) (Beirut: Dar al-Funun Press, 1962),
p. 189. This is due to the increase of trade and transit activities,
which increases the burden and, consequently the size of the DirectorateGeneral of Customs in the Ministry.
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local ecclesiastical establishments of the various religious denomina
tions.*^

Educational facilities, as well as the number of students

and teachers, have experienced considerable growth.

The number of

students, for instance, enrolled in primary and pre-school education
in the period between 1951 and 1956 rose from about 184,000 to about
223,000.17
Statistics showing the degree of literacy in Lebanon are
not accurate, however, estimates range from 80 to 50 percent.

The

UNESCO's estimates for 1957 gives the ratio of between 50 and 55 percent
adult illiterates in the country.

Regarding schools, statistics for

1955-56 show that there are almost an equal number of private as opposed
to government schools, the respective figures being 1,028 private and
1,107 public.

The excess of public schools as regards private schools

lies only in the field of primary education.

For the same year there

were 57 more private secondary schools then public schools.

Also, there

^"Lebanon's greatest economic advantage lies not in its
natural but in its human resources. The inhabitants of this coastal
range of mountains have been traditional sailors from ancient times,
and through their migrations have kept contact with growing civiliza
tions. The outgoing disposition made easy, during the last century,
an early contact with modern Europe which gave Lebanon a lead in the
adoption of Western education and led thus to a higher level of educa
tion, greater skill and more versatility among the population than can
be found in other parts of the region." U.N. - F.A.O., Lebanon Country Report (Rome: F. A. 0., 1959), p. 1-2.
17Ibid., p. II-7.
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were more teachers and more students in the private schools; the figures
being 5,555 to 3,472 and 150,114 to 102,738 consecutively.^
In 1961-62 there were 1,290 government schools with 6,044
teachers and 129,154 students.

For the same year there were 1,397 pri

vate schools with 8,064 teachers and 180,243 students.

On the whole it

is well acknowledged that private schools' educational standards are higher
than those of the public schools.

University-level education has been

present for quite a time with the presence of the private Universite de
St. Joseph (1875) and the American University of Beirut (1866) and the
recently established government Lebanese University (1953); and university
enrollment has been increasing considerably in the last few years, from
3,558 in 1950-51, to 5,263 in 1956-57,19 and about 13,000 in 1964-64.20
Vocational education is provided for an elementary and
secondary basis in a government institute in Beirut which has branches
in the various administrative districts of the country and by private
schools.

However, this type of education is not yet considerable and

effective in providing high-level and sound mechanical and industrial
technology, agricultural training and research.

18
Al-Jaryda (Beirut), July 27, 1962
^9U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., p. II-8.
2QA1-Ahrar (Beirut),

February 10, 1965.
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Lebanon -- true to its traditional role as a center of
ture and

cul

education for Arab and some non-Arab Afro-Asian countries --

has offered in the last few years university scholarships to countries
such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, and some African countries
and Cyprus.

21

The Ministry of Public Health had 626 permanent civil ser
vants

in 1958 and 604 in 1962.

The total number of civil servants for

1967 reached 1155 including 298 non-permanent civil servants.

Concerning

public health in Lebanon, the researcher is handicapped by lack of
accurate statistics conducive to sound inferences on the state of public
health in the country.

However,

...it is generally recognized by testimony and obser
vation of persons in the field that much progress was
achieved during the post war period in the field of
public health in Lebanon. Government expenditures
on health services more than doubled and in the few
years following the end of the war, rising from L.L.
2 million in 1945 to L.L. 4.8 million in 1950. It
continued to increase reaching 6,7 million in 1956 and
over 7 million in 1957.^ Physicians, hospitals’ beds
and other medical facilities, already fairly adequate,
increased considerably in the post war period. There
were 816 physicians in 1948; by 1955 the number had gone
up to 1,204. This means there is one physician for every
1,200 inhabitants, a ratio which is not matched in Asia
and Africa and which is better than corresponding ratios
in several European countries...Medical personnel and

21A1-Safa (Beirut), March 10, 1963.
22

The budget of the Ministry for 1960 was about L.L. 8.8
million, for 1964 about L.L. 15.2 million, and for 1967 about 24.5 million.
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facilities...exist in abundance compared to other
Middle East countries. The striking difference between
Lebanon and its neighbors from the standpoint of the
supply of medical personnel and facilities is explained
by the fact that these facilities service many clients
from outside, particularly from other Asiatic Arab
countries. With its two medical faculties, Beirut is
looked upon by the neighboring region as a medical
center enjoying high professional standards.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which was created
in 1951, had 94 permanent civil servants in 1958 and 77 in 1962.

The

total number of civil servants in it for 1967 was 145, including ten non
permanent civil servants.

This ministry has important functions to

perform concerning the guidance of the social affairs and the utiliza
tion of the labor force in the country.

It is entrusted with preparatory,

coordinative and executory functions regarding social and labor legisla
tion.

It is also entrusted by law with the tasks of the protection

against unemployment, the betterment of labor conditions and the estab
lishment of social security.

It also looks after the protection of the

family, youth rehabilitation, the organization of housing and cooperative
and rural development.

It aims, in general, at the promotion of every

measure pertaining to social development in the country.
The Social Development Service is entrusted by law

0/

to lay

down long-range programs concerning social development in the country,
and to control their execution; to execute social projects carried by

- F.A.O., op. cit., p. 11-11.
^Legislative Decree No. 155, June 12, 1959, art. 1.
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the State; to give its opinion and suggestions concerning the conduct
of such projects and appropriations therefor; to supply in full or in
part financial aid and loans destined for establishing new social projects
or the strengthening of existing ones; to guide the Lebanese youth
towards vocational and professional training needed by the country and
the guiding of existing schools in the field.

Both the said Ministry

and the Service face an enormous task in view of their role concerning
labor and social affairs in the country.

They both must face and

stop, for example, the considerable dislocation in the agricultural
population's move away from their areas and towards the Metropolis,
chiefly Beirut, and abroad.

This situation was described by the Director

General of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as a "...near
hemorrhage from the veins of the countryside in a most strange March
by the people of the Village towards the City or beyond it across the

25
land or over the seas"

Also, both set-ups -- in collaboration with

the Ministry of Public Health in the points concerning it -- are involved
in executing the half-hearted and restricted social security project.
Ministries involved in performing functions relating to the
economy and development of the country are those of National Economy,
Public Works and Transport, Agriculture, General Planning, and Water and
Electric Resources.

These ministries have a total of 2,800 civil servants

constituting 9.70 percent out of the general total of 1967.

^ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), March 21, 1962.
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The Ministry of National Economy had 196 permanent civil
servants in 1958 and 165 in 1962.

The total number of civil servants

in it for 1967 was 196 including 23 non-permanent civil servants.

This

ministry is not, generally speaking, under heavy strain to undertake the
execution of a highly programmed economic policy because the government
exercises minimum interference with economic activity.

There is no

written or declared official economic policy in Lebanon which is central
or long-range.

Clear trends, however, can be identified and construed

from the State's policy.
From occasional official declarations, from the
pattern of government expenditures on development
projects executed, from fiscal and monetary measures,
and from a number of legislative and other indicators,
it could be argued that Lebanese economic policy
is one which most favored a commercial and services
economy. It is characterized principally by a
minimum of government interference in, or control
of, economic activity. The Lebanese economy is
as close to the classical "laissez faire" as
one can expect in the modern world.
The structure of the Lebanese economy and the economic
activity under its framework reveal, thus, a free enterprise system.
Basically the Lebanese economy is predominantly one of trade and services.
The proportion of the total national product which
arises in the goods producing sectors, namely,
agriculture, industry and construction, does not,
as a rule, exceed 35 percent. Almost two thirds

26

U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., pp. 1-5 and 1-6.
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of the national product, therefore, arises in the
form of services, with trade accounting for about
half the value of all the services or about 30 percent
of the total national income. Perhaps there is no other
country in the world where the ratio of services to
goods is as high as it is in Lebanon.
The Lebanese economy suffers from three main weaknesses.
First, the precariousness of the chief source of national income, i.e.,
trade and services.

A high export of services is vitally needed to

offset the large annual deficit in the country's balance of trade.
Second, the narrowness of the domestic market due chiefly to the small
size of population which imposes serious restrictions on industrial
expansion and absorption of the surplus from agriculture labor;
the high degree of rigidity of the export market.

28

and

Third, the inequit

able distribution of income and the presence of the two extremes of
wealth and poverty despite the existence of a very strong and large
middle class.

This situation leads to social instability and it is

^Lebanon's natural endowments -- such as its geographical
location, its pleasant climate, and its variety of altitudes within
a compact area -- are extremely conducive to the promotion of services.
The exploitation of these endowments is apparent in the development
of the country and its capital Beirut into an intercontinental trade
and communication center which is equipped with an excellent seaport;
an international airport; adequate storage facilities; transit roads;
transport system; banking, insurance and other financial facilities; a
vigorous tourist industry and estivation activity; and almost a mono
poly, in the Near East, of cultivating a wide variety of fruits.
Ibid., p. 1-1.
28
Which surplus account for the high rate of emigration -lately dropping considerably -- from the country. Al-Jaryda (Beirut),
November 12, 1962.
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being aggravated, instead of being rectified, by the government's
fiscal and other policies.

29

Heavy burdens await the government in encouraging and direct
ing the process of industrializing the country, and more important,
to create agricultural industries if Lebanon would like to be freed
from a precarious, although temporarily booming, dependence on a ser
vices economy.

The country's continuous trade deficit is covered by

earnings from services, remittances from Lebanese emigrants, and sometimes, official donations.

30

^U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., pp. 1-8 and 1-9.
30
Lebanon's trade deficit was about $185 million in 1957, the
index of such deficit having fallen to 96 in 1958 (1957-100) and risen
to 133 in 1960 and to 264 in 1965. The export index remained almost
constant in 1958 -- probably as a result of the political disturbances
in that year -- but rose sharply to 219 (1957-100) in 1960.
According to the available information, net invisible earnings
(services) covered an annual average of 56 percent of the trade gap
between 1957 and 1960 and net private donations (emigrants' remittances),
a further 19 percent. The rest was covered by official donations and
private inflow (Official donations reached a peak of about $26 million
in 1958 -- when Lebanon received special United States assistance of
$12.5 million and grain under Public Law 480 -- but dropped sharply to
$6 million in 1959. These donations are likely to have declined further
in 1960 as the United States reduced its aid programme in Lebanon).
Good indications of the strength of Lebanon's balance of payments are the
accumulation of official gold and foreign exchange reserves -- from
$99 million in 1957 to $139 million in 1961 -- and the depreciation of
the Lebanese pound in the free market from L. . 3.6 per dollar in 1957
to L. . 3.02 in 1961. U.N. Economic Developments in the Middle East.
1959-61 (Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1961) (New York: U.N.,
1962), p. 79.
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The Ministry of Public Works and Transport had 1,088 permanent
civil servants in 1958 and 1,765 in 1964,

The total number of civil

servants in it for 1967 was 1675 Including 169 non-permanent civil
servants.

The Ministry has certainly experienced a considerable

transformation from its previous meager size of 1937, mentioned above,
and from its 1944-46 conditions in which it was "...poorly organized,
inexperienced and incapable of directing large works alone." 31

It may

not, at present, be a paragon of efficiency or be innocent of con
siderable disorganization in some of its parts; however, it has turned
out to be, together with the Board for the Execution of Projects, the
most important tool for the execution of the country's projects and
development schemes.
The Ministry of Agriculture had 577 permanent civil servants
in 1958 and 524 in 1962.

The total number of civil servants in it for

1967 was 620 including 67 non-permanent civil servants.
The 1959 reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture could
be considered -- like the reorganization in other ministries -- as a very
important measure in strengthening and providing administrative unity

Arthur Edward Mills, "Economic Change in Lebanon," Middle
East Economic Papers (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, American
University of Beirut, 1956), p. 93.
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among the various technical agricultural services.
not the dominant source of livelihood in the country;

Agriculture is
33

national income

generated in the agricultural sector form about one fifth of the aggre
gate national income.
principal export items.

Agricultural commodities, however, constitute the
Also, employment in agriculture accounts for

about 40 percent of the total employment, although quite a few of those
persons engaged in agriculture have supplementary sources of income.
"The interesting feature of Lebanese agriculture is the predominance of
fruit and vegetable cultivation (51 percent of the total value) and
relative unimportance of cereals and industrial crops."

3A The establish

ment of the Office of Fruits in 1959 as an independent public agency

32

Legislative Decree No. 2881 dated December 16, 1959
established a Directorate General which includes the following units:
the Diwan; Agricultural Resources Service; Forests and Natural Resources
Service; Animal Resources Service; Common Technical Affairs Se^^ce,
which includes the Departments of Rural Engineering and Agr ..Itural
Industries, Agricultural Education and Orientation, and Cooperatives and
ricultural Economy.
33

"Economically, Lebanon is not primarily an agricultural
country, but socially it is and will remain so. Its sociological
tissues, even the urban ones, have deep rural roots and its future
equilibrium requires that this symbiosis between itself and its terri
tory be affirmed and consolidated."
34

U.N. - F. A. 0., op. cit., p. 11-16.
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entrusted with the task of organizing, controlling and developing the
production, exportation and marketing of fruits in the country was an
important measure in encouraging and vitalizing of the more predominant
type of agricultural production in the country.

35

Comprehensive planning was not important in Lebanese govern
ment until 1959, but it began with the establishment of a planning
council in 1953 and the Ministry of General Planning in 1954.

36

Planning

enjoyed ministerial status but it remained a small-scale operation until
1962.

The budget for its first year amounted to only L.L. 236,000.

This rose to L.L. 367,000 in 1958, and to L.L. 2,633,100 in 1966.
The Chehab regime did not rely exclusively upon its feeble
planning Ministry to lay the groundwork for reform of the state.

In

March 1959 General Chehab had met with Pere Lebret, then director of the
French Centre National de Recherche Scientifique and head of the Insti
tute pour Recherche en vue de Developpement (IRFED) and on October 23,
1959 the Ministry of General Planning contracted IRFED to conduct an
extensive study of the Lebanese socio-economic structure with reference
to the administrative areas of the country and its needs and possibilities
for development.

The IRFED mission, consisting of ten French experts

Legislative Decree No. 41, March 25, 1959.
36

The Ministry was established by Legislative Decree No.
6393 of September 16, 1954 and organized by Legislative Decree No. 2
of November 30, 1954.

(
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and twenty Lebanese technicians, came to Lebanon prepared with a plan
for its own activities, embodying a philosophy of administration which
called for rational and comprehensive programs.

37

The first phase of

IRFED*s operations was a systematic inventory of the needs and resources
of the country.

It was accomplished with the submission of its "Etude

Preliminaire sur les Besoins et les Possibilites de Developpement Au
Liban," (1959-1960, 8 vols.).

The mission was subsequently contracted

again on June 26, 1961, to collaborate with the State, in an advisory
manner, in the preparation of a long-term plan (le plan perspectif) and
a middle range four-to-six year plan.

The directors of IRFED then sub

divided their subject chronologically and functionally.

They argued

that there are four phases of rational planning: the phase of elabora
tion, in which the necessary plans and subplans are elaborated and the
necessary specialists engaged; the phase of decision, in which the
numerous projects and subplans are reduced and choices are made between
various alternatives for chosen ends; the phase of execution, in which
the ministries and regional authorities put into effect the plans selected
in Phase Two; and finally the phase of successive adjustments, in which
the execution of plans is adjusted to unforseen changes and unforseable
situations.

Functionally, the IRFED group began to make sub-plans which

The Institute is backed by a very strong Dominican order
which believes, to a large extent, in social reform.
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would eventually harmonize with one another in conformity with the plan
perspectif, in the following areas: hydraulic engineering, roads, trans
port, ports, airports, energy, agriculture, industrial and handicraft
orientation, education, applied research, and tourism.

These plans in

turn would be sub-optimized regionally in the provinces and municipali
ties, and generally through integrated financing, zoning, and adminis
tration at the national level.
The IRFED mission's report emphasized the present lack
of necessary equilibrium between the administrative and the technical
cadres and proposed the necessity of modifying the structure and personnel distribution, "organigramme," of the ministry.

38

The Ministry of General Planning had 57 permanent civil
servants in 1958 and 93 in 1962.

The total number of civil servants in

it for 1967 was 171 including 42 non-permanent civil servants.
The Ministry of General Planning is entrusted with the pre
paration of a general comprehensive plan for the social and economic
development of the country.

It must design a unified and harmonized

fiscal, social and economic policy in step with this general development
plan.

It prepares, also, individual programs, under the general plan,

comprising one or more developmental projects and can ask other minis-

38
Mission IRFED-Liban, DAR/209, C2-3
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tries to do the same.

The Ministry controls the steps and operations

of executing the long and middle range development projects whether
economic or technical.

It participates in the formation of financial

establishments concerned with development; supplies private establish
ments with necessary information for purposes of their participation in
the development effort; and contacts foreign and international institu
tions concerning technical and economic aid.

The Ministry drafts project

laws related to the economic, social and fiscal life of the country;
and finally, it collects, analyzes and publishes statistical information
related to the state's various social and economic effort and coordinates
the work of the various statistical administrative units.
The role of the Ministry of General Planning as regards the
elaboration of a general development plan for Lebanon does not merely
involve the problem of economic programming but, to be successful, it
must

also relate to the more serious problem of the necessary change in

the total

values of the country.

Hoselitz's following words illustrate,

perhaps, this very important and basic factor:
in practice, i.e., in a situation requiring the elabora
tion of a development plan for a given country or region,
this problem requires for its solution that the plan
embrace not only prescriptions for economic adjustments
but also for the channeling of associated cultural and
social change.

QQ

J7Bert P. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth
(Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 26.
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Summary Statement:
The concept and actual role of the state in Lebanon has
been one of laissez-faire.

For centuries the Lebanese have been a

trading people with commercial interests far beyond their borders.
Limited participation of government has been reinforced by the sectarian
composition of the society.
Since 1943 there has been a growth in the size and scope
of the Lebanese government.

Some of this growth was the result of their

taking over functions formerly exercised by the Mandatory Power.

The

number of government employees has increased from 6,892 in 1944 to
28,869 in 1967.

Simultaneously, there has come an increased awareness

on the part of the public of the responsibilities of government and
hence increased demands and expectations.
Some perspective on this growth can be gained from an
examination of the level of expenditures which increased twenty-three
fold between 1944 and 1967.

Another perspective of the growth of

administration is the expansion of administrative responsibility and
the creation of new central agencies, such as the Civil Service Board,
the Central Inspection Service and the Bureau of Accounts.

PART III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER VII

PERSONNEL MACHINERY
One of the characteristics of the Lebanese administrative system
is the gap existing between certain laws and their actual application. In
Lebanon, this is evident in the field of personnel administration where
the legislature has attempted to establish a merit system through a rela
tively adequate personnel law but where poor and improper application of
this law has resulted in a defeat of its main goals and purposes.
Until 1959, Lebanon had a departmentalized personnel system. The
personnel law did not provide for a central agency which could administer
personnel matters on a government-wide basis but, instead, entrusted this
function to individual ministries which were often not properly equipped
for such a task. The inevitable results of such a set-up, in addition to
its high cost, were an intolerable lack of uniformity and a duplication
of effort. A more serious result of such an arrangement was that it invited
political interference in personnel matters. The ministries were open to
overstaffing with civil servants in response to political and sectarian
pressures without regard to the ministry's needs or the ability and
competence of those appointed.
Such a system, which subjects administration to political encroach
ment and Interference, is bad enough in any country; but it is far worse
in Lebanon because of the significant role which sectarianism plays in
society and government. Sectarian pressures and influences have had
equally or possibly more adverse effects on the administration of the
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personnel function than has the political factor. Thus, despite the exis
tence of a personnel law in the country, the achievement of a merit
system is practically impossible under such circumstances.
The government began to realize the harmful effects of such a
departmentalized personnel system and the need for a central personnel
agency which would overcome the flaws and weaknesses of the existing prac
tices. The earliest attempt to establish such an agency dates back to
February 18, 1942, when a Directorate of Personnel was established by the
French and attached to the Presidency.'*'

Unfortunately, this Directorate

was not taken seriously and did not really come into existence except
on paper.
At the dawn of independence, the Lebanese administration could
be characterized by:
... lack of administrative machine and lack in human
elements. Most of the employees are not well trained
and are not sufficiently paid. That is why most of
them do not know how to work, or work faithfully. The
reasons for this are: (1) appointment to the job is
affected by sectarian and party considerations;
(2) in-service training is non-existent; (3) the
number of employees is more than what is needed which
results in delay and complication of transactions; ^
(4) low salaries lead employees to accept bribery...
Need for Administrative Reform
The post-war economic dislocation, public dissatisfaction with
government administrative procedures, the widespread corruption in

1
Decree No. 240 of February 18, 1942.
2
The Lebanese Council for Planning and Development, A Five Years
Plan for Economic Development in Lebanon (Beirut, 1958), pp. 339-341.
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office, nepotism and the misuse of public funda —

all led eventually to

a demand for administrative reform. The reform spirit had dominated poli
tics since 1943. Riad Solh's first two cabinets had fallen because of
Internal problems; the cabinet chaos of 1946 was generated by adminis
trative failures and the corrupt election of 1947 was fought over domestic
reform. Yet it was not until Bisharat al-Khouri's downfall in 1952 that
the reformists had an opportunity to try their hand at governing.
In 1949, the Government called on the help of Professor William
A. Robson to study the Social Security System. Mr. Robson dealt in his
report with some of the maladies plaguing the civil service and made a
series of recommendations concerning the recruitment and training of
civil servants. His recommendations were not immediately put into effect
3
and had to wait until 1959.
The year 1951 marked the first real attempt for administrative
reform. A Bureau of Accounts (Diwan al-Muhassabat) was created to deal
with administrative irregularities. This agency sought to scrutinize
every financial transaction and its major function was to carry out
pre-and post auditing.
The Bureau, did not function well at the beginning, not
knowing what offices and agencies existed, and what their
functions and duties might be. But later on, with growing
Improvement in Lebanese administration, the Bureau of
Accounts began to function properly.^

3
Ralph Crow and Adnan Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in Lebanon,
1958-59," International Review of Administrative Sciences. No. 3 (1961), p. 295.
4
Interview with an official of the Bureau of Accounts, January 5, 1967.
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Following the ouster of al-Khouri in 1952, Camille Chamoun was
elected President of the Republic. In his Inaugural address to Parliament,
he stated:
The people ask for a simple, competent and straight
internal administration that can serve them sincerely,
quickly, and without favoritism. So the administration
is in need of somebody who can clean it and organize it
well, and who can define the rights and duties and
Immunities of the employees so that they may perform
their duties with self-confidence and security.
And I long for the time when Lebanon will have a modern
administrative system that remains a reliable tool that
can be used for the actualization of the public welfare only.
On October 15, 1952, the cabinet of Khaled Chehab was granted
emergency legislative decree powers for a period of six months. In its
grant Parliament specified thirteen major areas in which governmental
action was expected. There were five areas dealing with administrative
reform:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Reorganization of governmental cadres and departments.
Revision of personnel laws.
Administrative organization on the basis of decentralization.
Reorganization of the accounting law and the Bureau of
Accounts.
6
e. Establishment of a planning and economic development board.

As a result of these legislative powers, the Cabinet issued a
total of 90 legislative decrees establishing new governmental departments,
reorganizing existing ones and specifying the cadres for all ministries
and providing other reforms such as a revision of the judicial system and

5
Chamber of Deputies, 7th. Legislative Session, September 23, 1952,
Lebanon, p. 2519.
10
Compilation of Legislative Decrees (October 15. 1952-April 15. 1953)
(Beirut: Sader Press, 1955), p. 1.
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7
and the accounting and auditing procedures.
The next phase of the administrative reform movement under the
Chamoun's regime was carried out by the cabinet of Sami el-Solh during
the periodof October 15, 1954 to

January 15, 1955. The reforms then

were simply intended to introduce minor changes to the previous

provi

sions introduced by the cabinet of Khaled Chehab in order to insure a
smooth operation of the administration. In his request to be granted
similar powers to legislate by decree for a period of three months,
Premier el-Solh stated in Parliament on October 15, 1954:
The cabinet in 1952 was granted legislative decree
powers in various areas for a period of six months,
During that period the government issued about 100
legislative decrees that dealth with the organiza
tion of governmental departments, the adoption of
a new personnel law, and the'issuance of accounting
procedures. These decrees constituted a comprehensive
law upon which the present Lebanese administrative
is built. But during the past two years we have
experienced that some of the legislative decrees in
force are not applicable and should be amended in
order to promote efficiency and to assure better
coordination in governmental functions.8
No special machinery was set up for the program of administrative
reform. The Dlrectors-General of each Ministry were asked to submit to
the Cabinet drafted revisions of the legislative decrees that were specified
by the legislative mandate to the Cabinet. New legislative decrees were

7
Crow and Iskandar, op. clt.. p. 296.

8
Republic of Lebanon, Official Gazette. (1954), p. 1550.
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issued replacing those of 1952-53. These decrees "introduced minor changes
9
and in some cases more extensive alterations were made."
At the same time, the Council of Economic Planning and Development
made a study about the needs of the country and recommended the following:
To call on the help of a public administration expert
to study the present administrative system and to present
his suggestions and recommendations for reforming it.
The creation of an independent civil service board to
be responsible for all recruitment and personnel.
The establishment of a national public administration
institute to train and prepare employees for the public
service.^
On the basis of this report, Mr. Sami el-Solh asked Mr. Robert
Culbertson of the Ford Foundation to study the suggestions of the Council.
Among his recommendations^^, Mr. Culbertson suggested the creation of a
permanent civil service council. In May 1955 the Council of Ministers
issued a decree establishing such a council.

12

It was headed by the

Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and had as members all
other Directors-General. It had advisory power regarding recruitment
and organization. To assist this permanent Civil Service Council in its
work, the government contracted the services of two Dutch experts, one
for six months and the other for two years. Since it had no power to

9
Crow and Iskandar, op. cit.. p. 296.

10
Ibid.
11

Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the Government
of Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration Improvement," (unpublished
report,) Part II, p. 23.
12

Decree No. 9393 of May 30, 1955.

179

approve or Implement recommendations without the authority of the Council
of Ministers many of the recommendations presented by these two experts
13
were not carried out.
On October 24, 1958, against a backdrop of business recession
and civic deterioration, the cabinet requested a grant of full decree
powers to intiate vast administrative reforms. For a third time in a
decade the government was attempting a drastic overhaul on short notice
and on December 12, 1958, Parliament granted that power for a period of
six months.
These powers authorized the government to overhaul the entire
administrative system, to establish new cadres and to revise all person
nel laws and regulations.
Having received this delegated authority, the Cabinet started
to create the machinery which would carry out the intended reform. Thus,
it issued two legislative decrees, the first creating the Central Committee
14
for Administrative Reform (CCAR) and the second one appointing the persons
15
to man the committee.
The CCAR was attached to the office of the Prime Minister and
was composed of twenty-four members, ten of whom were senior government
officials with the remainder drawn from among prominent persons in the
various professions.

13
Crow and Iskandar, op. cit.. p. 296.
14
Decree No. 193 of December 6, 1958.
15
Decree No. 206 of December 6, 1958.
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The CCAR was to be responsible for "giving suggestions in all fields
under the jurisdiction of the decree powers" and had the power "to reorganize
all the civil service for raising its standards and for making it an efficient
16
tool for accomplishing its duties."
In the realm of administrative reform, this Committee was invested
with wide powers in all fields. It was supposed to work a position-classificatlon and salary scale for all employees in the civil service; to remove
conflicts and overlapping among different units; to introduce work simpli
fication; to insure that geographical delegation of authority Is realized;
to free the civil service from political interference and corruption; to
create an independent body called the "Civil Service Board" for tackling
problems relating to the civil servants and for seeing that the personnel
laws are properly and fairly applied. In addition, this decree provided
the CCAR with the needed authority to establish a system of control and
inspection. The immunities of the civil servants in the tdp two categories
of the Lebanese administration were temporarily waived to enable the new
17
regime to escape the limitations of the existing rules and regulations.
The CCAR was divided into seven preparatory Committees. Each was
concerned with a number of organizations and laws and was assisted by task
forces which were established in each ministry to gather data and conduct
the necessary research.

16
Decree No. 193, op. cit.. Art. 2.
17
Ibid., Art. 3.
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The studies conducted by some of the reform committees revealed
and pln-polnted many personnel problems which needed Immediate attention.
18
In statements which were labelled "The Talks of Administrative Reform"
19
and released to the press these weaknesses were as follows:
In general, the Lebanese administration has three
ills— political interference, disorganization, and
inefficiency of the civil servants; more particularly
the reform studies revealed specific findings below.
Some of the ministries or idaras (sing. DirectorateGeneral) therein were overstaffed while others were
considerably understaffed. The former did not know
what to do with the useless surplus, the latter were
busily trying to fill its ranks.
A strange and ridiculous mixture of types of positions
existed; permanent, temporary, and daily-paid. An
illogical and unecessary shortage in one type or
surplus in another created much uncertainty and
consequent corruption in all the types and throughout
the service.
Employing and dismissing civil servants was in many
instances done arbitrarily, thus placing them under
the aegis of political and sectarian influence with
resultant serious depression in their morale and
consequent effects on the public.
The salary scale was seriously inadequate. Also some
permanent positions received only their basic salaries
whereas civil servants in the same or other types of
positions received additional phenomenal supplements
and allowances amounting to many times their basic
salaries. This created grudges, envy and chagrin in
the hearts of the civil servants and produced most
serious and regrettable effects on their morale, conduct
and production. Also, this situation burdened the treasu
ry with wasteful administrative expenses which the tax
payers could benefit from in other vital services in a
country which is underdeveloped.

18
As reported by the Civil Service Board in a statement published
in al-Jaryda (Beirut), September 16, 1961.
19
As adapted by the author.
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Examinations for recruitment to the service were
not competitive and their standards, even for the
same job differed in the various ministries and
sometimes in the various units within the same
ministry. The top names of those who passed were
not necessarily appointed. Choice was allowed from
all the list of those who passed in order to
accomodate sectarian and political distribution
of positions. The best of these candidates used to
be appointed to secondary positions, and those of
limited abilitities used to fill important super
visory positions. As to appointment in Category II
positions (chiefs of services) no examinations were
conducted or required and considering the circumstan
ces, the able and qualified inside the service were
disillusioned and those outside it were disheartened
and barred from entering government service. As such,
with passing days, the service was stacked with
worhtless elements far from those needed in a chan
ging and developing country and an administration
with added responsibilities and spheres of operation.
Training facilities or programs were non-existent
for the civil servants. Some of them, taken from
one ministry or the other, were sent abroad, some
times to be trained all in''a single field or in
areas where other employees have already been
trained. Upon their return they were dumped in
unimportant positions totally unrelated to their
training. Some civil servants were adequately
trained and requested consideration that their
training be taken into account in the reform move
ment of 1958. Also, despite the obvious need, no
in-service training existed to raise the performance
standard of these civil servants.
Administrative procedures and activities were
disorganized, and there were no set and standardi
zed regulationsspecifying or properly distributing
duties and responsibilities among the various
positions of any idara. Furthermore, no proper
routing of administrative operations and transactions
existed inside the ministry or across ministerial
lines. This was coupled, in many instances, by a
lack on the part of the civil servants of authority
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commensurate with their responsibilities, of proper
knowledge concerning their duties and responsibili
ties, and of satisfactory management of work and
routine procedures.
Personnel files and records were either completely
lost or non-existent. In cases where they were
available, pertinent information was incomplete
and inadequate. The personnel history of the
civil servant as such could not be known, i.e.,
his past deeds or misdeeds, training, abilities,
etc. Since promotion, transfer, rewards and
penalties were not based on the past record of
achievement of the person, keeping of records
was useless.
Working feverishly, the preparatory committees submitted their
data and findings to the Central Committee, and by the expiration date
of the mandate, 162 decrees had been drafted, approved by the Cabinet,
and promulgated as law. These decrees related to all aspects of govern
mental policy and organization and which, in some instances, brought
about some basic changes in the administrative pattern. The most important
of these changes were the reorganization of all ministries, the establish
ment of the Civil Service Board and of a new inspection service, a National
Institute of Public Administration, the strengthening of the Bureau of
Accounts, and a host of other administrative changes throughout the
public service.
Functions of the Civil Service Board
The plan concerning the establishment of the Civil Service Board
was embodied in Decree Law No. 114 of June 12, 1959, provided for the
creation of such a board and granting it extensive powers over all aspects
of personnel administration in the Lebanese civil service. The jurisdi
ction of this Board extends to all governmental departments and public
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agencies with the exception of the Army, the Judiciary, and the Security
Forces.

20
The functions of the Civil Service Board are as follows:
(1) To determine the number of personnel in the various departments;
(2) To determine conditions of employment; to admlnfa ter exami
nations and select employees;
(3) To supervise and approve alltransfers and promotions in
the public service;
(4) To abolish all illegal appointments to the public service;
(5) To supervise the performance of all civil servants and to
dismiss those whose performance does not meet the established
standards;
(6) To refer to the Disciplinary Councils any civil servant who
commits a violation of existing laws and regulations;
(7) To maintain personnel files and records on all government
employees;
(8) To train all government employees;
(9) To adopt personnel policies in accordance with the needs
of the public service.
It is evident from the list of responsibilities that the Civil
Service Board was intended to play the dominant role in all matters relating
to personnel administration. It was conceived as the guardian of the
Personnel Law and the final arbiter and authority on personnel matters
throughout the civil service. The Civil Service B6ard was considered
as one of

the main pillars of the 1959 reform movements and high hopes

wereattached

to

its creation. It was thought the Civil Service Board

20
Decree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader, Collection
of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964), Vol. I, Art. 1.
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would help to eliminate, or at least reduce, political interference and
meddling In the civil service by removing the personnel function from
the jurisdiction of individual ministries and entrusting it to an inde
pendent, expert agency which could be free from all these pressures.
Personnel administration under the previous system was handled in an
amateurish, casual way by various ministries which did not have the
properly qualified staff to deal with such problems. The creation of
a Civil Service Board with the necessary authority and an expert staff
would bring reason and order to the personnel operations of the govern
ment .
It should be mentioned, in this connection, that the Central
Committee of Administrative Reform, which submitted

the plan for the

creation of the Civil Service Board, had envisaged even a more important
role for it. The original plan submitted to the Council of Ministers
included, among other functions of the Civil Service Board, those of
inspection and research and guidance. However, this plan was not approved
by the Council of Ministers and a separate agency was established and
21

entrusted with both inspection functions and research and guidance work.
Such an arrangement enabled the government to satisfy the two major reli
gious communities by appointing a Maronite as President of the Civil Service
Board and a Sunni Moslem as head of the Central Inspection Service.
Organization of the Civil Service Board (CSB)
The basic organizational structure of the Lebanese Civil Service
is defined by Decree Law No. 112 of June 12, 1959, and Decree Law No. 2459

21

Decree No. 2968 of December 26, 1959.
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of November 11, 1959 and reorganized In accordance with Decree No. 8337
of December 30, 1961 as shown in Charts I and II, below.
The Civil Service Board is composed of the following units:
The Board
The Board of the Civil Service is the highest administrative
unit within the civil service and consists of three members, the President,
the Head of the Preaparation and Training Department and the Head of the
Personnel Department.
The President of the Board is the chief executive officer
invested, within his own agency, with the same administrative and finan
cial powers whcih are normally vested in a Minister, with the exception
22
of the constitutional powers.
The President and the two members of the Board are appointed
by a decree approved by the President of the Republic for an indefinite
period. However, they can dismissed from the service on the recommenda
tions of the Prime Minister and the approval of a special committee
composed of the President of the Court of Appeals, the President of the
Council of State, the President of the Bureau of Accounts, the President
of the Central Inspection Service and a Director-General with the longest
23
years of service.
This is intended to give the Board members adequate
protection against arbitrary dismissal and political interference.

22
Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader, Collection
of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964), Art. 6.
23
Ibid., Arts. 6 and 7.

CHART VIII-1
STRUCTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD, 1959
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Source: Decree No. 2459, November 9, 1959, Official Gazette. No. 61.

CHART VIII-2

STRCUCTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD, 1962
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The Board Is the sole body entrusted with the responsibility
of administering the Personnel Law. Thus, all administrative units, public
agencies and municipalities are under the supervision of the CSB and are
required to receive the advice and consent of the Board regarding permanent,
temporary, wage and contractual employees. The Board Is at the same time
the only organ having the responsibility of interpreting the rules and
24
regulations pertaining to the Civil Service.
The President of the Board has the right to attend meetings
of the Cabinet, of parliamentary committees, of public agencies and
municipalities when matters pertaining to personnel are discussed. He
must also present to the Cabinet an annual report about the functions and
achievements of the CSB.
There are two main departments under the Board, The Personnel
Department and the Preparation and Training Department.
Personnel Department
The Personnel Department is headed by a Director-General who
is a member of the CSB assisted by two members, the Head of the Supervision
and Studies and the Head of the Examinations and Personnel Service. The
three form a Board for the Personnel Department.
25
The responsibilities of the Personnel Department are:
(a) To define and provide standards to organize and maintain
the personnel files of all civil servants;
(bj> To give its opinion on legality of appointments;
(c) To observe the conduct of employees on and outside the job;
(d) To study the reports of the Central Inspection Service
pertaining to the civil servants;
(e) To study and give its opinion on matters of raises and
promotion, and
(f) To administer the recruitment process

24
Decree No. 241, December 15, 1961.
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This Department is made up of two services: The Supervision
26
and Studies Service and the Examination and File Service.
The Supervision and Studies Service is responsible for studying
and supervising all matters related to the Personnel Law. It studies
draft rules pertaining to all civil servants and it estimates the number
of employees needed by each department and is responsible for determining
the conditions of employment to the lowest two categories. It also defines
the conditions under which benefits and pensions are distributed to
employees.
The Examination Bureau prepares the general examination system
and specifies the qualifications for each vacancy^ prepares and administers
the examination and furnished the list of the succesful candidates.
The Personnel Records Bureau prepares an up-to-date file on each
civil servant. This file contains all pertinent information such as educa
tion, qualifications, experience, promotion, etc. This Bureau acts as the
statistical unit of the CSB.
The Preparation and Training Department
Its general aim is the training and development of the human
element in the Lebanese administration. It is entrusted with the following
functions:
(a) To train prospective civil servants in areas of administion and development;
(b) To provide in-service training sessions;
(c) To assess the needs for new employees, and
(d) To conduct research on administration and development.

26
Ibid.. Art. 13.
27
Decree No. 4800, July 25, 1960.
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This Department is also called the Institut National d'Administration et de Developpement (National Institute of Administration and
Development) and a detailed analysis of the functions of the Insitute
will be discussed in a later chapter.
Evaluation
It is still too early to evaluate the work of the Lebanese Civil
Service Board as it has been in operation for a relatively short period
of time and has not had enough time to develop into a full fledged central
personnel agency. A careful study of its work up to the present is revea
ling and will shed some light not only on its achievements but also on
the many problems which it faced and the obstacles which have hindered
its smooth and effective functioning.
The first period of operation was a period of trial and error.
The Board had to work in a suspicious atmosphere. The line administrators
were resentful of the extensive powers granted to the Board; the politi
cians were afraid that it would endanger their political status and the
civil servants were worried that they might be dismissed for incompetence.
The country had just passed through a major crisis and the wounds had not
yet been healed. In this atmosphere of fear, distrust and instability, the
CSB had to launch its activities. It had to gain the recognition from those
it had to control, direct and supervise; it had to dissipate the fear and
suspicion of those who viewed it as endangering their powers and had to
win the support of the politicians.
On the positive side, the Board could count on the unqualified
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support of the President of the Republic who viewed its creation as one
of the most important achievements of his regime; this support offset
the pressures of the politicians. It also received the endorsement of the
press which succeeded in creating

a favorable public opinion, and finally,

it had the honesty, sincerity and courage of its members.
During the first years of its existence, the Board acted as a
policing agency whose main task was to see that all personnel rules and
regulations were observed throughout the public service. It was more
concerned with the negative rather than the positive role and functions
28
which were envisaged for it.
Aside from the greater uniformity and adherence to established
regulations which have been fostered by the Board, one can also point to
some other achievements which are more positive in nature and which consti
tute a somewhat more significant contribution to personnel administration
in the Lebanese Civil Service. The most important achievement in this
respect is the in-service training program initiated by INAD under the
supervision and guidance of the Board.
Another aspect of Personnel Administration which received the
serious attention of the Board is that of examinations. The examinations
which had hitherto been administered by Various departments of the civil
service were far from satisfactory. Examination questions were hurriedly
prepared by amateurs who were not sufficiently versed in the subject matter

28
In 1960, the CSB decided on some 2,328 transactions regarding
all aspects of personnel; in 1961, the number of decisions was 2,245 and
in 1963, some 8,000 cases such as promotion, transfer and retirement were
decided by the Board.
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of the examination.

The results were often unreliable and invalid

tests which could not possibly discover and properly measure the
abilities of the candidates.

29

The Civil Service Board, with the help of various standing
examination committees set up in different ministries and properly
staffed by expert personnel, was able to improve significantly such
examinations through more careful, serious study and planning.

One of

the notable improvements in this respect was the introduction of the
interview as a supplement to the written and practical tests.
For the first time in its history, Lebanon now has a special
Department in the Civil Service Board which is undertaking continuous
research in the field of testing and the principles of testing.

This

is a specialized, technical field where scientific research and study
are of utmost importance.

It is hoped that the seriousness with which

the Board views this whole matter and the attention it has given it
will result, over the years, with a definite improvement in the quality
of public employees.
Another field in which the Board has made commendable head
way is that of personnel records.

Until recently, personnel records

in the Lebanese Civil Service were practically non-existent.

9Q

The most

Interview with an official of the Civil Service Board,
January 6, 1967.
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basic and essential data for making day-to-day personnel decisions
and for preparing reports was sadly lacking.

Planning for future

operations was impossible under such a situation.
The Civil Service Board was aware of this distressing fact
and gave priority to this problem.

It has established central personnel

files for all government employees and has devised new forms which will
record all essential data and information about every employee.

It is

obvious that such a task cannot be accomplished overnight but requires
persistence and hard work over a long period of time.
Finally, one significant activity of the Board is worthy of
mention, although it has been exercised on a very limited scale.

The

Personnel Law in Lebanon, in its Article 71, gave the Civil Service
Board the authority to check the performance of civil servants in order
to determine whether or not it is satisfactory.

In cases where on the

job performance was judged as unsatisfactory, the employee could be
dismissed.
This was an innovation in the Lebanese Personnel Law.

For

until 1959, a civil servant in Lebanon could be dismissed through dis
ciplinary action for a variety of causes; but there was no provision
for dismissal of employees whose performance was below a minimum
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satisfactory level.

The Civil Service was stuck with them and could

do nothing about it.
In accordance with this new provision in the Personnel Law,
the Civil Service Board handled a limited number of cases where the
performance of the employees was being questioned.

The Board conducted

its own investigations and in two of these cases decided to terminate
the services of the employees.

11

The Civil Service Board has been

somewhat extremely cautious in exercising this new, and for Lebanon,
unprecedented function.

The cases referred to above were investi

gated upon the request of the Departments concerned.

Many departments

expressed their apprehensions about this function of the CSB, which
could easily be abused.

This is certainly true; but on the other hand,

one can hardly imagine an organization which cannot get rid of its
inefficient personnel.

The two cases of dismissal handled by the CSB

have served a purpose by giving a badly needed warning to public employees
that, at last, the government can and intends to do something about
those who are not carrying out their duties in a satisfactory manner.
In evaluating the Civil Service Board and its work one must
be careful not to give a hasty and premature judgment regarding a newly
created body.

The old civil service structure is not something that

31
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board,
I960, p. 254.
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can be cut away from the society in one day; and a new, modern efficient
civil service is not something that can be created, established, and
organized the day after.

New policy, methods, and procedures must be

introduced and intelligently applied.

This takes a certain amount of

time and only the future will tell whether the CSB is a success or a
failure.
The following questions
able to apply the "merit system"?;

may be raised: Has the

CSB been

Has it succeeded in eliminating the

surplus employees?; Has it succeeded in eliminating appointments due
to political and sectarian pressures? and how efficient was the Board
in its attempts to tackle some of the diseases of the civil service and
what factors limited it in solving these problems?
All of the above questions cannot be satisfactorily answered
at the present time, although one can have educated guesses based on
informal discussions with decision-makers.

By necessity, their names

must be withheld.
In attempting to answer
of thedefects of modern

the above questions, a brief summary

civil service in general, and of the Lebanese

civil service in particular, is in order.
The Lebanese administration is plagued by the defects of
other bureaucratic organizations.

A bureaucracy is:

...a vast body of officials wielding great power,
imbued with so definite and particular a view
of their calling that it separates them from and
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makes their ways and thought and behavior strange
and alien to the rest of the society.3^
These defects increased in the absence of outside controls.
The bureaucratic aloofness from the rest of the community took the
form:
...of apparent superciliousness, the faulty handling
of the general public proceeds unchecked to the callous
subordination of its interest, to the needs of the
bureaucratic routine, delays tend to multiply with
the growing centralization of powers and with the
refusal of officials to jeopardize their official
existence for the sake of obliging the public.33
In Lebanon, the bureaucracy suffered from such defects as
absence of initiative and imagination, ineffective organization and
waste of manpower, delay and refusal to take responsibility or to
make decisions, isolation from the rest of the society, over-devotion
to tradition and a low standard of honesty and integrity.
The general administrative situation was described by the
President of the Civil Service Board as:
...unnecessary increase in the number of employees, low
standard of performance, appointment without evaluating
knowledge or qualifications, patronage, unnecessary
spending of public funds, routine and the absence of law. 34

•^Herman Finer, "The British Civil Service," cited by Eric
Strauss, The Ruling Servants (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961),
p. 86.
33Ibld., p. 89.
^Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, 1960,
p. 321
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Concerning the first question as to whether the CSB has
succeeded in developing a merit system, that is a system of:
...civil service recruitment and tenure based upon
competitive entrance examinations, relative security
from partisan removal, and political neutrality and
non-partisanship in public office.
The answer to this question is in the negative.

The CSB

has failed to establish a uniform standard for tests and this lack has
seriously undermined the achievement of a "merit system."

It is

suspected that competitive examinations were tailored in such a way
as to give the testing authorities the opportunity to choose the person
they wanted.

The absence of a position-classification plan combined

with sectarian influence renders any claims, on the part of the Civil
Service Board that it is working on the dictates of the "merit system,"
completely false.

A further limiting factor is the over-emphasis on

the legal approach which prevented competent persons not possessing a
legal background from joining the public service.
Instead of reducing red tape and procrastination the CSB has
intensified this trend.

In its stress on achieving control it has

spent far more time than it has saved.

It has been argued that the

'.'..disease of making no errors at all costs, involved
the American government during the last war in dispro
portionate expenses through the detailed checking

~^Paul Vanriper, History of the United States Civil Service
(New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958), p. 309.

199

of comparatively trivial travelling expenses of huge
numbers of officials, with the result that the total
money disallowed is much less than the salaries of the
auditors."36
The same thing can be argued about the detailed rules and regulations
by the CSB which were intended to achieve control but resulted in
crippling the Lebanese administration.
Some might argue that these detailed rules and regulations
are needed in order to pinpoint responsibility on the part of the
civil servants.

However, "the essence of responsibility is psychologi

cal rather than mechanical."

True responsibility "is to be sought in

an identity of aim and point of view."

37

For instead of occupying its time in the preparation of rules
and regulations which were usually cast aside, the CSB should have
stressed the goals that the government is trying to achieve.
The Civil Service Board in Lebanon must realize that its
role is not that of an administrative court, rather it is to cope with
a dynamic and changing administration.

Its emphasis should be on

achievement and not on the legality of transactions.

An administration

that moves, works and errs can be tolerated, whereas, one that is
crippled with red tape and legality which prevent it from achieving any positive goals cannot.

36Ibid., p. 48.
3^J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow
Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), p. 282.
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Despite all this, the Civil Service Board has some achieve
ments to its credit.

There has been greater uniformity and adherence

to established regulations; there has also been an improvement in the
quality of examinations, the interview has been used as a supplement
to the written and practical tests; the in-service training program
started in earnest around 1963 and could prove of immeasurable benefit
in the long-run.
Until recently, personnel records were almost non-existent
and the Civil Service Board has devoted its energy in devising forms
which record all essential data and information about each employee.
With the help of the Ford Foundation, the CSB is hard at
work devising a comprehensive classification position plan and on
December 8, 1965, it entered in agreement with the Foundation by which
the latter agreed to support the training of selected Lebanese civil
servants overseas.

As a result eight employees from the CSB were

assigned to a six-months training course with the United States Civil
Service Commission in Washington.

38

One may conclude that the Civil Service Board has performed
creditably under existing and often trying circumstances and it has
developed in the few years of its existence into a respectable agency.

38

Interview with Dr. Roy Jumper, Ford Foundation Representa
tive in Lebanon, January 9, 1967.
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Its continued development will depend on the support it receives from
the public and on its ability to provide needed services.
The following proposals are derived from the material pre
sented in this study.

They are directed toward the improvement of the

Lebanese administration.
A Comprehensive Personnel System
The diversity of work and the complex interrelationships
among different features of personnel administration, such as salary
system, recruitment, promotion, reasonable proportion between the number
of employees and the work load, and the multiplicity of objectives in
carrying out a personnel reform plan - these require a comprehensive,
detailed, statistic-supported picture of the structure of the current
personnel system.

\

The statistical d^ita on salaries, grades, education, and
the ages of government employees are very important sources of research.
1
To analyze the education, professional and vocational ability, and
experience of the applicants for government employment helps to formu
late the recruitment policy more wisely.

Obtaining general information

about the number and qualifications of public employees in all ministries
provide a basis for analyzing how some political, social and economic
development increase or lessen outside pressure for government employ
ment.

Distributing a questionnaire containing questions about the

personal background of the employee--his education, experience, and
technical ability-- and the characteristics of the position he occupies,
has multiple usefulness for a personnel survey.
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Unfortunately, government employees, underpaid and afraid of
their situations, do not always furnish truthful or, at any rate, ade
quate answers.

Many of them merely state that they are busy all the

time and accomplish a great deal.

Their answers concerning their

experience and other qualifications can always be interpreted in different
ways.

Some actually may have no jobs to write about, but think it is

to their advantage to write something.

The approval of their state

ments by their supervisors does not mean much; the supervisors pretend
their subordinates are necessary to their jobs, thinking that the number
of subordinates employees is a matter of administrative and personal
prestige.
The demonstration of these problems, in gathering useful
information through questionnaires, shows the general difficulties
existing in all fact-finding programs based on statements of individuals.
It remains that the facts obtained by questionnaires must be rectified
and supplemented by other means of research.

To determine the range

of salary range and set up regulations concerning salary increases,
varied information on salary levels in private enterprise, the demand
and supply for governmental jobs, and changes in the price index during
recent years, is required.

Although the collection of basic social data

in the form of statistics and censuses has usually become a function
of governments everywhere, university research institutions, such as
the American University of Beirut's Economic Research Institute, could
help the reform organ to take its survey.

There is urgent need for

personnel and manpower planning to forecast requirements over a long
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period of time and provide the resources needed to train skilled
administrators and technicians.

Lebanon has no reliable data on the

number of persons on the public payrolls,

39

no records of turnover,

output, productivity or unit costs of repetitive operations by depart
ments, projects, or sections of work and has no long-term projections
of manpower needs as a basis for recruitment and training.
We may generalize that the administrative reform attempts
affected mainly the structural aspects and the formal processes of the
Lebanese bureaucracy.

At present the country's administration enjoys

a high standard of modernization in its formal institutions and tech
niques.

It has modern laws and regulations as well as a sound organi

zation.

Yet these reform attempts did nothing serious regarding the

informal aspects of the bureaucracy.

The main problem at present seems

to center around the effectuating of the new changes which were wrought
into the formal structure of Lebanon's bureaucracy; and at conciliating
adjustments that need to be made between the formal and informal in it;
in other words, closing the gap which exists between the formal organi
zation and its actual operation.

In any case one point remains essential,

"...that changes in power and in structure do not mean that the basic
class governing behavior in a given situation have changed.

Generally .

39
There is a discrepancy in the total number of civil servants
in Lebanon. The Civil Service Board, the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of General Planning list different totals, with a variation of
about 3,000 employees.
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speaking, changes in cultural habits and values come very slowly'.*^0
Summary Statement
Until 1959, the personnel administration system in Lebanon
was a departmentalized one.

Each ministry was a self-contained unit

handling its own personnel matters.

Such an arrangement resulted in

duplication of effort, lack of uniformity and overstaffing.
Realizing the harmful effects of such a departmentalized
personnel system and the need for a central agency to correct the
flaws and weaknesses of the existing practices, the government was
granted emergency decree powers on three separate occasions to initiate
vast administrative reforms.

The first two attempts were not serious

ones since no special machinery was set up to handle this program and
the results were minor changes.

The third attempt culminated in the

establishment of a Central Committee for Administrative Reform which
was invested with wide powers in all fields.

By the expiration date of

the emergency powers, the CCAR had drafted 162 decrees which were pro
mulgated as law.

These decrees related to all aspects of governmental

policy and organization and brought about basic changes in the adminis
trative pattern.

The most important of these changes was the creation

of the central Civil Service Board and the National Institute of Public
Administration.

^ J o h n M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative
Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 252.
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The Civil Service Board was considered as one of the main
pillars of the 1959 reform and it was thought that by removing the
personnel function from the jurisdiction of individual ministries and
entrusting it to an independent agency, political interference in the
civil service would be eliminated, or at least reduced.
The Board administers all personnel laws and is composed
of two main departments: (1) The Personnel Department which supervises
all matters related to personnel laws and prepares and administers the
examination system; and (2) The Preparation and Training Department
which trains prospective civil servants and conducts in-service train
ing sessions.
It is still too early to evaluate the work, of the Board,
however, one can have educated guesses based on informal discussions
with members of the Board.

Its achievements include the following:

greater uniformity and adherence to established regulations; an improve
ment in the quality of examinations; the beginning of in-service training
sessions and a central personnel file of all essential data and informa
tion about each employee.
Its drawbacks include its failure to establish a uniform
standard for tests; it has intensified red tape and procrastination; and
has emphasized legality of transactions instead of achievement.
To sum up: the CSB has performed creditably under existing
conditions and its continued development will depend on the support it
received from the public and on its ability to provide needed services.

206

Personnel reform could be aided by a comprehensive, detailed,
statistic-supported picture of the structure of the current personnel
system.

Such an outline of the system could be gained through the

collection and analysis of data.

Statistical and census information are

required for manpower planning and forecasts for the future.
in this area have been lacking.

Surveys

It was recommended that in fulfilling

this vital requirement the private research organizations could be enlisted
to aid in this task.
It is generally recognized that position classification is
the cornerstone of modern personnel administration and the systematic
treatment of this topic will be the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER VIII
POSITION CLASSIFICATION AND COMPENSATION
The Rational System
The objectives of a rational system of position classifica
tion is to provide the means for effective performance which are necessary
for the attainment of desired organizational goals.

This requires the

presence of a differential ranking system of classes or layers of
positions with each layer having roughly a similar rank; the concept of
the "position" used must imply an aggregate of harmonious and related
duties and responsibilities; each role content must contain certain aspects
which may be emphasized more than others; the ranking must be based, con
sequently, on the relative merit of quality and performance; the total
scale must be grouped into categories reflecting the levels of difficulty;
and finally, salaries should be adequate and based on the classification
used.

Thus, a sound classification plan is essential to the establish

ment and operation of a comprehensive personnel program.
A position classification plan is useful for the following
reasons: (1) It permits the development of a standard title and a common
language in personnel action and budgeting, (2) it helps recruitment
through furnishing the personnel officer with advanced knowledge of the
duties and responsibilities of the positions classified and of the
educational and experience requirements demanded by various classes of
positions, (3) it provides a firm basis for pay policy, (4) it encourages
the keeping of meaningful records, (5) it helps the training officer in
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providing training and educational programs, (6) it aids in raising
employee morale, (7) it provides a basis for the solution of organizational
problems through finding gaps or conflicts in authority and duplication
of work, (8) it presents a picture of the various jobs as they exist
within the organization, and (9) it enables management to estimate
1
budget needs accurately on the basis of a common denominator.
The ultimate concern of public personnel administration is
to contribute towards the most efficient performance of the work required
to accomplish the purposes of government.

This is the direct or indirect

purpose of all activities encompassed by public personnel administration.
In personnel administration, therefore, individuals are always being
considered in relation to the work assigned, or to be assigned to them.
Since the raison d'etre of personnel in any organization is that there
is work to be performed, the information relating to the work to be
performed by individuals is of primary significance.

This information

is gathered and considered in public personnel administration in terms
of "positions".

Those attributes of work which are considered signifi

cant for the purposes of personnel administration form the basis of the
classification of positions.

Fritz Morstein Marx, Elements of Public Administration
(New York; Prentice Hall, 1946), p. 552; Felix A. Nigro, Public Personnel
Administration (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959), p. 83; Leonard D.
White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1939), p. 326; W. Brooke Grave, Public Administration
in a Democratic Society (Boston; Heath & Co., 1950), p. 126.
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The Lebanese System
The prevailing system in Lebanon is a rank system which
differs from position classification in that in the former the "rank
or title of an individual gives him a right to the pay, prestige and
prerequisites of the rank or title; and he carries with him the title
and its rights whatever role in the organization he may play at a
particular time," while in the latter the stress is laid upon the
"particular job performed at the time rather than the rank or title of
the performer.

Actually the position is thought of as a structure of

duties and responsibilities that exists regardless of the existence of
2

the performer."
The classification system operating in Lebanon is basically
regulated by the "Law of May 7, 1957" - which is the third amendment of
Legislative Decree No. 13 of December 7, 1953.

3

Later decrees issued in

1959 and 1961 added some positions to the present categories and amended
the pay scale.
The general cadre classification and salary schedule involve
what is termed the "administrative positions," i.e., the non-technical
and special positions.

Every ministry or government agency has its

own "technical or special cadre" which involve technical and special

2

Dwight Waldo, Ideas and Issues in Public Administration
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1953), pp. 254-255.
^The system of 1953 was established by Legislative Decree
No. 13 of December 7, 1953, that of 1955, by Legislative Decree No. 14
of January 7, 1955.
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positions in line with its functional specialty and nature.

Nevertheless,

the administrative cadre comprise the majority of the civil service
leaving the technical and special cadres a comparatively small number of
positions.
Table 1 presents the general administrative classification
and salary schedule as set by the 1957 law plus later additions and
amendments.
The present classification system is a simple and almost
rigid plan comprising five categories with the first as the highest one
and the fifth as the lowest.

Each category (Fia1) contains few specified

job titles, some categories have two or three ranks (Retba) and all
follow pay steps numbering from 5 steps (Daraja) in Category I to 8
steps in the lowest category.

Each category has a salary range and the

law sets down rigid educational requirements for entrance to each cate
gory and for promotion from one category to another.
It can be seen that a position classification plan is non
existent in Lebanon.

The present broad groupings of positions into

categories and classes is an arbitrary one and has not been applied on
the basis of any systematic study of the duties and responsibilities
of each position.

As a result, the existing classification plan in

Lebanon suffers from certain basic deficiencies which are detrimental
to the personnel program and the proper functioning of the administration
as a whole.
The first and most important weakness of the present plan
is that it provides a poor and inadequate basis for determining salaries.

TABLE VIII-1

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM AND SALARY SCHEDULE a

Category

I

Rank

1

2

II

III

IV

1

Positions

Monthly Salary (Leb. Pounds)

No. of Steps

-President, Civil Service Board
-President, Central Inspection

1555; 1655; 1755; 1855; 1955

5

-Director-General
-Muhafez
-Inspector General

1080; 1180; 1280; 1380; 1480; 1580

6

-Director
-Chief of Service
-Inspector

730; 800; 870; 940; 1010; 1080

-Qa'immaqam0
-Chief of Department
-Chief of Section
-Controller
.
-Assistant Inspector
-Chief of Common Administrative
Service; or Chief of Divan4*

505; 550; 595; 640; 685; 730

-Muha'rer (Senior Clerk)
-Stenographer-Typist

342.50; 375; 407.50; 440; 472.50;

(Continued)

505

TABLE VIII-1

Category

Rank

IV

2

V

Position

(Continued)

Monthly Salary (Leb. Pounds)

No. of Steps

-Kateb (Junior Clerk)
-Typist
-Telephone Operator

205; 232.50; 260; 287.50; 315; 342.50

-Hajeb (Office Boy/
Messenger)

176; 205; 232.5; 260; 287.5; 315; 342.5;

375

2

-Guard

170; 187.5; 205; 232.5; 260; 287.5; 315;

342.5

8

3

-Janitor

117.5; 135; 152.5; 170; 187.5; 205; 232.5; 260

8

1

6

-

a
Law of May 7, 1957, art. 1 and Annex No. 1, as in Official Gazette. No. 21 (May 9, 1957),
pp. 468 and 474-476; the salary schedule was amended by Decree No. 6167 of February 21, 1961 as
in Ibid., No. 8 (February 22, 1961), pp. 137-140.
b
Categories I, II and III could be considered as Lebanon's "Higher Civil Service"
c
The Qa'immaqam (s) could be in Category III or II.
d
Both positions could be in category III or II.

8
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The use of position classification in the preparation of pay plans is
indispensable for guaranteeing equal pay for equal work, which is a basic
tenet of any merit system.

In Lebanon, there is no assurance that such

a principle is being applied because positions are not classified accord
ing to the nature of the work involved.

According to Culbertson, the

classification and pay plan is "too rigid and too general in its classi
fication to permit sufficient pay differentiation between positions.
The system forces you to pay people doing more responsible work the same
as those doing less responsible work,"^

Such inequities in pay, which

result from improper job classification, can be damaging to morale and
to efficiency of performance.

Some government employees in Lebanon have

repeatedly complained about this particular problem but to no avail.
The lack of an adequate classification plan and, conse
quently, of any job specifications or data about the requirements of
various positions has seriously undermined the recruitment and selection
systems in the country.

The preparation of valid and reliable examina

tions for the testing of candidates cannot be properly completed except
on the basis of a detailed description of the duties and responsibilities
of a position and of the knowledge, skills and experience required for
efficient performance in that position.

Such information is not avail

able in Lebanon and, as a result, candidates for the public service are.

4

Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the
Government of a Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration
Improvement," Unpublished report, Part I, p. 21, (n.d.).
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often given tests which are basically irrelevant to the particular job
for which they are being recruited.

It is this situation which has

given rise to the frequently voiced complaint that Lebanese civil servants,
in general, do not suffer from any lack of educational qualifications
but rather from personal inefficiency.

The improvement of the recruit

ment and the selection methods of the Lebanese civil service and, conse
quently, of the quality of public employees cannot be effected without
the development of a sound classification of positions.
Finally, the classification plan in Lebanon is very mislead
ing as far as titles are concerned.

To begin with, the title of a

government position, such as Chief of Service, does not give any indi
cation of the precise nature of the job.

There are hundreds, and possibly

thousands, of chiefs of services in different ministries of the government
performing work in totally different occupational fields, but all are
given the same title.

The same title is also given to a number of employees

who are performing quite different jobs in terms of difficulty and res
ponsibility.

The same is true of other general titles used in the plan.

Such ambiguities in titles are very confusing and in contradiction to
the principles of merit which dictate that employees performing similar
work should be treated equally in such matters as their official designation.
In stressing the weaknesses of the existing system of classi
fication one must not overlook some of its advantages.

One of the obvious

advantages is its relative simplicity when compared with the intricate
and complex pattern involved in a modern position classification plan.
The ease and simplicity with which such a plan can be developed and main-
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tained makes it all the more appealing to a country like Lebanon which
at present does not possess the necessary staff to initiate an elaborate
position classification system.

Needless to say, another important

consideration is the factor of cost which is negligible in the case of
the present system in Lebanon.

The number of staff needed to maintain

the plan is very small, and the skill and abilities required of them are
by no means hard to find among government employees in Lebanon.
Another obvious advantage of this system is the ease with
which it can be adjusted in response to certain changes, especially cost
of living fluctuations.

Such modifications can be introduced easily by

adding a certain percentage increase to the whole structure.
But such advantages do not Justify the continuation of
such a crude and rudimentary system in Lebanon.

There is no doubt that

its advantages are so gravely offset by its many serious disadvantages
that the existing ranking system in Lebanon should be relinquished in
favor of a new one based on the concept of classification.

One cannot

deny that the ranking plan in Lebanon served the needs of the country
reasonably well over a long period of time.

During this time Lebanon

had a small and uncomplicated civil service whose scope of activities
were limited.

The administration rarely interferred in the economic

and social sphere; and as a result, the civil service was basically
administrative with little technical functions.

But with the coming of

independence, the civil service has undergone many changes.

Although

the role of the government in Lebanon is still basically one of laissez
faire, there has been, nevertheless, a significant expansion in the civil
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service and in the activities which it is carrying out in several
economic and social spheres.

The civil service is a much more compli

cated enterprise than it used to be under the mandate system.

The

addition of many new specialized and technical jobs to the government
service poses a serious problem of classification.

Such new positions

cannot be easily fitted into a simple general ranking structure which
is essentially one for administrative and clerical operations.

This

is why in Lebanon the government was forced to establish a three man
committee to carry out a government-wide study for the purpose of
establishing job description for every position.

This committee was

charged with the task of "...directing and coordinating the works of
setting the civil servants' job descriptions and the application of
regulations issued to this effect in collaboration with the concerned
Idaras."3

Since 1962, this committee has been at work trying to devise

a position classification plan for Lebanon.
Compensation Plan
In a narrow and proper sense the compensation plan is defined
as an orderly system of salary payment to employees.

It consists of a

schedule of pay scales applicable to classes of positions previously
arranged in a classification plan.**

A compensation plan aims at
4

^Arrete No. 11, March 20, 1962, Art. 1.
^John M. Pfiffner, Public Administration (New York: The
Ronald Press, 1935), p. 205.
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(1) seeking equitable relationship between salaries and wages of public
employees and private employees who are carrying out the same responsi
bilities and duties, (2) establishing a fair relationship between the
salaries of individuals performing different kinds of work, (3) adjusting
salaries to changing price levels, and (4) providing reasonable opportu
nity for receiving claims and grievances.^
Adequate pay is a basic requirement for a public service
which desires to attract and retain human talent that can render essential
services to the people.

This problem becomes particularly acute in a

country like Lebanon, where the bureaucracy is in a transitional stage
accompanied by rapid changes and expansion in its activities.

These

conditions require the recruitment of large numbers of technical and
professional employees who are desperately needed for the implementation
of vital government projects.

In order to secure these new personnel,

the government should be in a position to compete with private firms
which are operating in a market with a limited supply of qualified
candidates.
The problem of pay is further complicated by public demand
and insistence on combined economy and efficiency.

In such a situation

...the administrator finds himself, therefore, confronted
with conflicting pressures, one from the public servants

^Leonard D. White, op. clt., p. 343.
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desirous of a liberal wage policy, and one from the
taxpayers eager to have running expenses reduced. Of
course, the problem is not even that simple. Tax
payers want economy, but they also want public services.
Economy of program, the reduction of activities to their
bare essentials is one thing; an attempt to secure a
wide variety of public services cheaply is something
else. Taxpayers should want the kind of pay policy and
levels that will secure and retain an able staff, public
employees who can give the brand of service the citizen
wants. To harmonize the interests of all groups and
to retain their confidence and support is a challenge to
the constructive ability of both legislator and adminis
trator.
The provisions of a rational classification of positions is
considered to be the best means for dealing with the salary problem
equitably.

In many underdeveloped countries, as a publication of the

United Nations points out:
Salaries are not commensurate with the degree of
responsibility and efficiency involved; indeed
they are in many cases too low to enable officials
to support themselves and their families...
Supplementary employment or other source of
^
income are the rule rather than the exception.
In Lebanon, there has been a complete absence of a compensa
tion plan based on position classification.
trarily.

Salaries are fixed arbi

No consideration has been given to the fact that salaries

should be paid on the basis of the quality and amount of work.
The first attempt to establish a more or less uniform salary
policy came in 1953 when the government issued legislative decree No. 13

g

Glenn 0. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York:
Harper, 1956, 4th ed.) p. 208.
q
^United Nations, Training and Administration of Personnel in
the Public Service (New York: 1953), p. 67.
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of December 7, 1953, setting forth, among other personnel rules and
regulations, a classification and salary schedule for all "Administra
tive" positions.

Besides this schedule, each ministry or governmental

agency has its individual cadre and, hence, a salary schedule for its
technical and specialized personnel.

This schedule established five

grades, with each of the lower ones broken down into two ranks with a
small number of very broad classes of positions.

Each rank and grade

has its own salary range providing for a minimum and a maximum level and
varying number of intermediate steps.^
According to this law, appointment could be made only to the
minimum step in every rank or grade.

Salary increases were granted

automatically every two years in an employee's grade.

Until 1957, this

was an unchanged process; there was no limit to the number of salary
increases that could be granted in the manner described.

But from then

onwards, salary increases without promotion were limited to an employee's
own grade and the one immediately above it.
In 1955,

the government issued a new schedule which intro

duced some minor changes

in the pay scale of civil servants.

Grade III

of the 1953 schedule, which included two ranks, was split into two sepa
rate grades (III and IV in the 1955 schedule), and grades IV and V of
1953 were numbered V and VI.

Grade II of the 1953 schedule consisted of

The pay scale was tied directly to rank.
pp.

See Table IX,
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seven grades and the salary ranged from L.L. 580 to L. L. 800

per month.

This was changed by increasing the nuinber ofsteps within the

grade

from 7 to 10 and the salary range from L.L. 580 to L.L. 920 per month.
The main reason behind this change was that promotion opportunities for
civil servants of grade II were by definition very limited.

Most of

them were unable to attain one of the few positions in grade I.

Hence,

internal pressure from this highly placed and powerful group was brought
to bear in order to acquire greater opportunities of financial advantage.
In 1957 and in 1961, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies passed
a new law
dule. ^

which introduced some important alterations to the 1955 sche
The main objective of these laws were to provide for over-all

increases throughout the entire salary scale.

Whereas in the 1953

schedules, the salary scale ranged from L.L. 95 at the bottom

to a maxi

mum of L.L. 1360 at the top, under the 1961 amendment, the minimum was
set at L.L. 117.50 and the maximum at L.L. 1,955 per month.
In addition to this general raise in salary levels, the
1957 lawreduced the total

number of steps in the whole scale to fifty-

nine in place of sixty-five in 1955 and sixty-two in 1953.

This actually

meant that increases in salary would take place at a faster rate owing
to the fact that the new scale included fewer steps.

^Decree Law No. 14, January 7, 1955 and Decree No. 6167
of February 21, 1961.
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Another feature of the 1957 law was that it discontinued the
system of unlimited automatic salary increases on the basis of length
of service alone and without promotion.

Prom then onwards, no increase

was permitted beyond the top step of the grade immediately above that
in which the employee was ranked.

The change actually produced no

hardship because of the number of years required to reach even this
maximum.

But it corrected an important deficiency in the system where

by a junior clerk, or even a driver, through mere seniority could attain
a salary higher than that of a chief of department who had been newly
appointed and who occupied a much more responsible position.

Such a

situation marked a clear violation of the basic principles of position
classification and merit.
It is worth mentioning that the 1957 law was adopted by
Parliament as a result of a threatened strike by the civil servants.

An

informal group of representatives of government employees (there is no
formally organized employee organization) met with government officials
to express their dissatisfaction and implicitly, if not overtly, threatened
a general strike unless salaries were raised.

The law of May 7, 1957,

was the direct result of this action.
The above general presentation of the salary policies of
the Lebanese government reveals certain serious discrepancies which
help to undermine the morale of civil servants and which should be
corrected as soon as possible.
The first and perhaps the most important weakness stems not
from salary policy as such but from the poor classification plan which
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is the very basis of the salary scale.

It has already been mentioned

that the salary scale of the government is not based on any detailed
and systematic analysis of the duties and responsibilities of each
position, but rather on rudimentary classification which arbitrarily
groups positions into very broad classes and assigns them to different
grades.

The salaries attached to each grade are based more on educa

tional qualifications than on the nature of the work and responsibility
called for in each position.

This, of course, is contrary to modern,

scientific principles of compensation and results in serious inequities
to civil servants.

But any improvements in salary practices must wait

for improvements in the classification system itself, without which one
cannot possibly develop and implement a rational and uniform pay scale.
Another important weakness in the salary system is repre
sented by the generally low level of government salaries as compared
with pay in private industry.

The low pay of government employees and

its failure to match that given workers by private firms has posed
several difficulties for the civil service.

The depressed morale of

government employees who continually complain about their inadequate
pay probably represents the most important problem.

Lebanese civil

servants feel that the government is not treating them fairly in paying
them less than employees in private business.

They are dissatisfied

and frustrated and such a situation is not conducive to a healthy
atmosphere in which the civil servant can perform at his best.

It is

difficult to assess the damage caused to the civil service by such a
situation, but anyone who has had occasion to contact government employees
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and work with them cannot help sensing their low morale.
The Inadequate pay of civil servants has alsoput the govern
ment at a disadvantage when trying to recruit badly needed talent of
which there is necessarily only a limited supply in the country.

The

government has found considerable difficulties in trying to induce
qualified candidates to join its ranks.
One should also admit that the reluctance to seek or join
government service is the result not only of low salaries but of the
generally low prestige of the civil service as a whole.

But there is no

doubt that the question of pay is one which has contributed greatly to
the widely-held view about government service.
One surprising fact about the whole situation is that the
government does not seem to lose a large number of its employees to
outside competitors.

Although no accurate figures relating to employee

turnover in the civil service are available, there are many indications
that it is very low.

It appears that the many benefits

ment provides to itsemployees, and especially

security

which the govern
of tenure which

is a major consideration in a country with a high degree of unemployment,
in addition to the indemnity laws

12

which discourage resignation by

employees, have helped to reduce the flow of government employees to

10

Any employee who resigns voluntarily loses his indemnity
or termination pay of one month's salary for every year of service.
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outside jobs.

Or it could be that private firms are dismayed by the

generally low quality of personnel which generally exists in the govern
ment and, as a result, attract their candidates from other sources.

Thus,

it can be seen that the government does not have much difficulty in
hanging on to its employees; its real problem lies in getting new men
for its growing bureaucracy.
Finally, the problem of inadequate salaries has greatly
contributed to the sadly low standards of morality and personal integrity
in the public service.

Government employees have been forced into

shameless graft and profiteering to compensate for the meager remunera
tion from their jobs.

The passive and indifferent attitude of the

people has provided a free license for the continuation of such practices.
A former Prime Minister described the situation of the Lebanese civil
servants thus:
The abundance of civil servants is matched by the
meagerness of their salaries and is definitely
related to the situation resultant in their
lack of competence, confusion of conduct and
ethical behavior. This makes it plausible to
consider the civil servant in Lebanon to be one
of three: either an honorable man relying for his
modest living on his inheritance, the number of these
is small; or the honorable man overburdened with debt,
these are also few in number; or the third man who
has descended to the lowest levels of anyone made
responsible for the welfare, money and ambitions of the
people by sacrificing the public good on the altar
of his desires, susceptible to and receiving bribes from
any source and completely disregarding the interests
of the people.

^Sa'ib Salam, "Hawl Bina ad-Dawlah al-Lubnaniyah" (On
Building the Lebanese State) Les Conferences du Cenacle, Vol. VIII,
(1954), p. 160.
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It is true that the government might have been able to check this moral
deterioration by providing for more stringent penalties and ruthlessly
enforcing them, but it cannot really eliminate these practices and
improve the ethical standards of the public service without basic adjust
ment in its pay policies.
One final observation to be made in this context is that
the problem of civil service pay has to be viewed and solved in con
junction with another problem: the overstaffing of the civil service.
There is general agreement that the number of government employees in
Lebanon has swollen beyond the needs of the civil service.

Some esti

mate the number of redundant employees at about five thousand employees,
which is about one fifth of the total number of permanent employees.

14

This is the result of a tendency to create new posts, usually minor ones,
in order to accommodate politicians and minimize the grave problem of
unemployment in the country.

Until recently when a noticeable industrial

expansion took place, there were only limited opportunities for employ
ment outside the government; hence, this tremendous pressure for the
creation of unnecessary posts.
An increase in civil service pay in Lebanon could be achieved
at the expense of releasing this large number of surplus employees.
this would create a tremendous economic and social problem, since the

^Interview with Dr. Charles Rizk of the Civil Service
Board, December 28, 1966.

But
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economy of Lebanon, with its present degree of unemployment, could not
possibly absorb such a wave of unskilled workers.

Because of this

situation, the government has shied away from dismissing them: and in
fact, there are hardly any politicians or legislators who would recommend
such a drastic step.

On the other hand, it would be ridiculous, as well

as unjustified, for the government to grant a general increase in sala
ries to all its employees, including this army of idlers who are not
contributing any genuine service to the public.

The government is caught

on the horns of a serious dilemma for which it is extremely difficult
to find a solution which is at once rational, fair, and humane.
A final but somewhat less important weakness of the salary
system in Lebanon is the system of automatic pay increases granted indis
criminately to all civil servants.

These salary increases are not

granted on the basis of merit but are given to every employee automati
cally every twenty-four months.

Such a practice does not differentiate

between the mediocre employee and the superior one.

It actually has the

effect of stifling initiative and encouraging mediocrity of performance,
since inefficient employees know that they will not be punished for their
inefficiency and superior employees know that they will not be rewarded
for their efficiency.

This policy, which ignores the simple and elemen

tary principle of reward and punishment can be very damaging to morale.
The government has not been able to develop and apply a system of per
formance evaluation which can be used as a basis, among other things, for
granting periodic salary Increases.

At present, it seeres that the current

practice of blind, automatic increases will have to continue until such
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time as the authorities are able to implement a system of performance
evaluation which can appraise and measure the relative merits of govern
ment employees and treat them according to their true worth as servants
of the people.
Allowances
It would be misleading to study the problem of civil service
salaries in Lebanon apart from that of allowances.

The Lebanese govern

ment grants a number of salary "differentials" and allowances which, in
many cases, add up to a significant percentage of the basic remuneration.
Again, these allowances and differentials, which are a feature of the
Lebanese system, are not related to the duties and responsibilities of
the position and represent a violation of the basic principles of posi
tion classification.

It is true that such allowances are necessary and

welcome supplements to low basic salaries; but, unfortunately, they
help to perpetuate pay inequities in the ranks of the civil service.
Sound pay practices dictate that all types of remunerations to employees
should be reflected in the basic salary which is determined in the light
of the difficulty and responsibility of the job to be done.
Family Allowance: This allowance is paid to married personnel
and varies with the number of dependents.

At present it is L.L. 15 per

month for each dependent with a maximum of L.L. 90 per family.

The

allowance for children continues until the age of eighteen for males
and until marriage for females.

It is worth noting that the family

allowance in Lebanon applies to employees in private as well as public
service.
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Allowances to Specialized and Professional Personnel: These
special allowances are granted to certain groups of civil servants
which exercise professional functions.

Engineers in the Ministries of

Public Works and Transport, Interior, Public Health, Planning, Post,
Telegraph and Telephone; and Doctors in the Ministry of Public Health
and Veterinarians in the Ministry of Agriculture are entitled to an
allowance of forty percent of their basic salary if they have served up
to eight years, and fifty percent if longer.

Chemical and Agricultural

engineers are entitled to an allowance of thirty percent for less than
eight years of service and forty percent for longer.

15

This allowance is, par excellence, the best example of the
general absurdity which characterizes the pay system.

It is granted, in

theory, in recognition of the professional and technical ability of
these civil servants and is based on their educational attainments.
Actually, this added remuneration represents a recognition of the specia
lized duties and responsibilities involved in the jobs of these employees
and, as such, should be included in their basic pay and should be reflected
in a higher classification of their positions.

Moreover, the various

engineers who benefit from this law and who work in different departments
often occupy widely dissimilar posts and carry out work of varying
responsibility.

Nevertheless, they are all paid the same allowance.

^Decree No. 15703, March 6, 1964.
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This stipulation in the law has, quite understandably,
aroused complaints from other civil servants who regard themselves as
professional people but who are denied the allowance.

The most important

and influential among them are the state-employed lawyers, who have been
pressing for a professional allowance similar to that granted to engineers
and doctors.
Special Allowances: These allowances are paid for special ser
vices on officially appointed committees studying specific problems.
The Lebanese have a fondness for committee work, and it is not uncommon
to find top civil servants serving as members of five or six such committees
in addition to doing their basic jobs.
work and is not subject to overtime pay,

This is not treated as overtime
The employee, however, receives

regular payment for his services on the committees, which, in certain
instances, may sit permanently.
It is difficult to determine the number of employees who
benefit from these usually generous allowances for what is often nothing
more than an imaginary service.

But they are, on the whole, higher level

civil servants -- of the first and second category -- and the report of
the Lebanese Court of Accounts in 1957 gives a clue as to the gross
amount of such allowances granted.

It revealed that in 1957 a total of

L.L. 4,000,000 was spent on special allowances to a small number of civil
servants.

Of this sum, one top civil servant received L.L. 132,000 and

another was given L.L. 87,000.^

This information was published in

^ L e b a n o n , Court of Accounts, "Yearly Report of the Court of
Accounts, 1957." (Unpublished)
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many newspapers, and the practice of granting special allowances was
severely criticized.

The government was prompted to revise its policy

and place a limit on this highly controversial practice.

The law of

May 7, 1957, specified that no civil servant should under any circum
stances receive allowances exceeding 50 percent of his basic salary.
Disability and Death Allowances: The law in Lebanon allows
a disability pension to any civil servant who is permanently disabled
in the course of duty.

The pension is equal to half his salary if he

has completed less than twenty years of service, and two-thirds if he
has served longer.^

Employees who become disabled outside the course

of their duty are entitled to pensions equal to one-third of their salaries
]Q

if they have completed more than five years of service.
In the case of the death of the civil servant in the course
of duty his family is given a financial grant equal to his annual salary
provided it is not less than L.L. 5,000 or more than L.L. 10,000,

Even

if the death of a civil servant does not occur in the course of duty, his
family is still entitled to a financial grant equivalent to his salary
for five months provided it is not less than L.L. 2,000 or more than
L.L. 4,000.19

^Decree Law No. 113, June 12, 1959, Art. 17.
18Ibid.
l9Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, Art. 30.
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In the event that a civil servant becomes ill in the course
of duty all expenses incurred for his mediaal and hospital treatment
are borne by the state.

Even if the illness is not the result of the

course of duty, the employee may receive a financial grant, the amount
of which is determined by the Minister concerned.

20

The same regulation

applies if any other member of the employer's immediate family is sick,
hospitalized, or dies.

21

In addition to all these allowances, a civil servant may,
in certain cases, be granted a cash bonus as a reward for some special
service rendered.

These bonuses are granted at the discretion of the

responsible Minister who is required by law to explain in writing the
justification for awarding them.

22

Although there is a limit placed

on the amount of such cash payments, there have been many complaints to
the effect that this prerogative has been abused by various Ministers.
One can easily see that the government is decidedly generous
in granting allowances and bonuses, and that their bestowal compensates,
at least in part, for the meager salaries given the civil servants.
But it is also evident that these practices are wanting in fairness and
uniformity and help to inject even more injustices into the salary and
pay system.

There is a definite need for a careful revision of these

20Ibid.. Art. 29.
21Ibid., Art. 26.
22Ibid.
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policies which will help to eliminate much of the existing confusion and
many of the current inequities.

The main problem of allowances can

neither be tackled nor solved separately from other classification and
pay complexities.

Without such a general and comprehensive approach,

any solution or adjustment is bound to be lacking in substance and may
create more problems than it can solve.
Fringe Benefits: In addition to allowances, the government
service in Lebanon provides many fringe benefits such as retirement,
leaves and holidays.

It is difficult to figure out the monetary value

of these benefits accurately; but compared with most practices prevail
ing in private industry, they are extremely generous and help at least
partially to bridge the gap in salaries between employees in the private
and public sectors.
Retirement and Termination Indemnities; All government
employees are subject to a retirement system and they will be retired
under the following conditions:

23

a. Reaching the compulsory age of retirement.

This age

varies from 60 to 64 or for those who have completed forty-two to fortysix years of service.
b. In some cases, civil servants can be retired at the age
of fifty-five provided they have completed thirty years of service.

23Ibid., Arts, 68-69.

%
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Upon retiring, a civil servant has the option of going on
pension or receiving an indemnity based on one month’s salary for each
year of service up to ten years, and two months' salary for every year
thereafter.

24

Any employee who voluntarily resigns is not entitled to

such an indemnity.

However, he must receive the amount deducted for

the Retirement System.
The retirement pension is figured on the basis of onesixtieth of the average of the last two years salary multiplied by the
years of service.

No retirement salary could exceed seventy-five percent

of the salary which the employee was receiving.

All retired civil servants

on pension are entitled to the family allowance granted to regular govern
ment employees.^
There have been some complaints recently that pensions paid
by the government are becoming too low because they have not been adjusted
to meet the rising cost of living.
Hours of Work and Leaves: The Lebanese government has one
of the most generous policies in the world in connection with the general
problem of hours of work and holidays.

The number of hours of work varies

according to the seasons of the year.

j?\irthermo re, it changes for Moslems

^^Legislative Decree No. 113, June 12, 1959, Art. 11
2^Ibid., Art. 10.
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during the month of Ramadan.

The official working hours for civil

servants are thirty-five hours a week during winter and spring and
thirty hours a week during summer and autumn.

The official work hour

starts at 8:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. in winter and from 8:00 a.m. until
1:00 p.m. during the summer with no break for lunch.
Besides this short working week, government employees are
allowed a total of twenty-two public holidays and twenty calendar days
of annual leave and one month of sick leave per year.
It is not easy to tell how much these generous fringe
benefits cost the government in terms of money or how much they mean
to the employees in terms of loyalty to their profession.

Some people

tend to think that they represent a justifiable compensation for the
low salaries paid to civil servants.

But a better arrangement would be

to increase the basic salaries of the employees and revise working hours
and leaves in order to bring them in line with standard practices in
more advanced countries.
Finally, the civil servants suffer from low salary levels;
but they suffer more from favoritism, injustice, and inequity.

The

personnel administration of Lebanon, faced with these difficulties, must
establish its salary system on the basis of:
1. Maintaining and attracting competent, well-trained and
experienced people.
2. Providing a program for retraining and the disposition
of surplus employees.
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3. The establishment of a compensation plan based on
position classification which will provide information on duties, res
ponsibilities, and qualification requirements, which make for effective
recruitment and promotion.

It will provide uniform titles for positions

by class and standards of terminology, the maintenance of personnel
records, the handling of personnel transactions, and the preparation
of personnel budget.
4. The consideration of a full-time government job as the
principal professional job of civil servants, requiring the devotion of
their full abilities and energies.
5. Implementing the principle of equal pay for equal work.
6. Accepting the principle of competence and other principles
of merit in promotion, and leaving some room for salary increase in case
of long tenure within the same grade.
Summary Statement
In a position classification system, positions are classified
on the basis of their duties and responsibilities and in a rank classifi
cation, the jobs are grouped together into broad categories in accordance
with the qualifications of those holding them.

The first concept centers

on the job while the latter centers on the individual.
The prevailing system in Lebanon is a rank system adopted
in 1957 and built on a fivefold classification which envisioned each
category recruiting its members from a specific educational level.

The

over-all system consisted of five categories, each of which was divided
into ranks and the ranks into grades.
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The present broad groupings of positions into categories
is an arbitrary one and has not been applied on the basis of any systematic
study of the duties and responsibilities of each position.
The rank of an individual civil

servant was a fundamental

factor throughout his career and his status

depended on his rank, not

the positLon which he happened to occupy.

Each position in the cadre

of the various ministries was specified as requiring an incumbent of
one or another rank.
The deficiencies of such a system are: a poor and inadequate
basis for determining salaries; and the undermining of the selection and
recruitment processes in the country.

Its advantages include its rela

tive simplicity which is important to Lebanon due to the lack of the
necessary staff to devise a position classification plan.
The problem of pay is one of the most important factors in
a public personnel program because of its direct relationship to morale
and to the government's ability to recruit and retain qualified employees.
The salary scale was tied directly to rank.

It was inade

quate and provided no basis for'equal pay for equal work*.

It does not

provide adequate compensation which has resulted in low morale and
dishonesty.
Allowances constituted one of the most important means by
which civil servants compensated for their inadequate salaries and the
Lebanese government is decidedly generous in granting various allowances
such as family, specialized and special types which amount to significant
sums.
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Government service in Lebanon provides many intangible
benefits which constitute important inducements to civil servants whose
salaries are low.

The most important of these benefits are retirement

pensions, termination indemnities, moderate hours of work, public holi
days and annual and sick leave.
The staffing procedures of a bureaucracy determine, to a
large extent, its basic characteristics.

Thus, recruitment and appoint

ment are the initial factors of paramount importance in the personnel
system and these features are the subject of the follbwing chapter.

CHAPTER IX
EMPLOYMENT PROCESS
During the mandate and early independence period, the
Lebanese administration operated without the benefit of a civil service
law.

There was instead a score of scattered decrees and arretes which

regulated the various aspects of personnel administration in the public
service.

The first attempt to enact a modern civil service law came in

1952 when the government was in the process of reorganizing the whole
administrative system.

The civil service law which was finally adopted

in 1953 was basically a codification of existing rules and regulations
in the field of personnel administration.
factory and had to be changed later.

This law was far from satis

It was not until 1955 that a

comprehensive personnel law was finally adopted; and this served the
country with certain slight modifications until 1959, the year in which
the government undertook an overall reorganization of the whole adminis
trative machinery of the state.
Some of the achievements of this 1959 reform lay in the
changes effected in the field of personnel administration.

A law^ was

adopted which provided for a central Civil Service Board which would
act a a guardian of the personnel law and play a dominant role in this
____

t

^Decree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader,
Collection of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964).
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respect.

This same law established in Lebanon a National Institute of

Administration and Development which assumed the responsibility for the
preparation of candidates for the public service and the training of
existing government personnel.

A separate law dealt with personnel.

2

It was felt that these two main laws would go a long way in filling an
important gap in the Lebanese system of personnel administration.
In attempting to deal with the problem of personnel adminis
tration in this and subsequent chapters, concentration will be on the
1959 laws.
The employment process is naturally one of the most important
aspects of personnel administration and plays a significant role in
determining the quality of personnel and, consequently, their performance
and the service which they can render to the public.

It is true that

Lebanon, even as early as the mandate days, had some arretes which regu
lated public employment, but these did not really constitute a purposeful
and systematic mechanism which could ensure the selection of competent
and qualified staff for the civil service.

As a result, the Lebanese

administration has been saddled with a large number of poorly qualified
personnel who cannot possibly serve the needs of a continuously growing
bureaucracy.

It is to be hoped that the new personnel policies embodied

in the 1959 law will help overcome this basic defect in the Lebanese
civil service.

^Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Ibid.

i
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Recruitment
Recruitment is the first important step in the employment
process and is the procedure by which the best talent can be attracted
to compete for jobs in the government.^

Recruitment to the Lebanese

civil service is subject to some serious limitations which greatly
hinder efforts to get well-trained and capable people into the public
serv Lee.
The first important consideration affecting recruitment in
Lebanon is the shortage of well-qualified candidates in certain fields.
This problem becomes more acute in view of the expanding activities of
the government and the growing need for the services of technical and
specialized personnel.

It must be admitted that educational and train

ing facilities in Lebanon have not kept up with the developing needs of
the country.

There has been no attempt on the part of the government to

establish necessary associations with educational institutions in order
to have their programs at least partly geared to governmental needs.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that the
government, especially lately, has been having trouble competing with
private industry for the very limited supply of such specialized per
sonnel that is available.

The prestige of the civil service job is not

very high, and most candidates would rather work for a private firm
than join the public service.

One of the influences of the West on

Glenn 0. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York:
Harper, 1956), pp. 59-60.
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Lebanese society is a growing respect for, and even glorification of
business activity and individual achievement and success in this field.
This typically American mental attitude has found fertile ground in
Lebanon which has one of the freest economic systems in the world.
Besides this, the government has not been able to match the
salaries paid by private enterprise.

There Is a general recognition that

government salaries are very low^ and need to be adjusted, and this has
been one of the main concerns of more than one Cabinet.

These two factors

--shortage of qualified candidates in certain fields, and the low salaries
and, consequently, low prestige of government service -- have seriously
affected the recruitment process in the Lebanese administration.
According to the new personnel law of 1959, recruitment
becomes the responsibility of the central Civil Service Board.
a decided improvement on the previous system

This is

under which individual

ministries handled their own recruitment and other personnel problems
independently of each other, thus producing an appalling lack of coordi
nation and simultaneous duplication of effort.
The Civil Service Board now undertakes to recruit candidates
for government jobs upon request from individual ministries.

The Civil

Service Board has no periodic program for recruitment but operates

^INAD, "Rapport sur l'Etude Comparative des Niveaux de
Salaire dans les Secteurs Publics et Prives de l’Economie Libanaise,"
(mimeographed) (n.d.).
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according to the developing day-to-day needs of the various ministries.
One important point should be made clear; namely, that the number of
staff allocated to each ministry, their grades and salaries are deter
mined by law
cadre.

and incorporated to what is

Noministry can alter

referred to as the ministry's

this cadrewithout legislative authority.

All it can do is determine the number of posts in its approved establish
ment that it still needs to fill and inform the Civil Service Board;
from then onwards, the matter is left in the Board's hands.
Recruitment can take place either through appointment or
through the passing of a competitive examination.

All candidates for

the civil service must fulfill four general requirements:^
1. Be a Lebanese citizen for at least ten years;
2. Have completed twenty years of age and have not
exceeded thirty-five for candidates in the
Categories IV and V. For candidates for Categories
I, II and III, the difference between the applicant's
age and the specified retirement age should not be
less than the minimum period which a government
employee must serve before being permitted to retire;
3. Be free from such diseases and defects as prevent
him from assuming the responsibilities of the post;
4. Be enjoying his civil rights, has not been sentenced
for a crime or attempt at a crime, or for a dis
honorable misdemeanor. These provisions shall apply
to such persons as have been rehabilitated or have
benefited by pardon.
Besides these general requirements, each ministry may specify
any other requirement which it considers desirable for certain special jobs.

^Decree Law No. 112, op. cit., Art. 4.
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The outstanding characteristic of recruitment in Lebanon
is the fact that the Lebanese have geared recruitment to the educational
system.

There is an overemphasis on academic degrees, especially the

Law degree (Licence en Droit).

Study in Law is still basic despite

recent introduction of the Social Sciences.

This has been one of

the weaknesses of the system in Lebanon because it has resulted in a
civil service well staffed with holders of academic degrees but inferior
in efficiency and performance.

Theoretical training, although essential

in any civil service, cannot replace practical knowledge and experience;
and the Lebanese administration should be re-oriented in order to allow
for a balanced compromise between these two approaches.
Table IX, below, presents the minimum educational require
ments for direct entry into the Lebanese Civil Service.
Applicants for positions in the fifth category, which is the
lowest, are not required to possess any academic degrees but have to
participate in an examination which is administed by the Civil Service
Board.

Positions in this category include those of janitors, drivers,

messengers, etc..
Applicants to the fourth category in the Lebanese civil
service, which includes clerical and sub-clerical positions, have to
pass an examination and should possess at least a Lebanese Baccalaureate
Degree - Part II or its equivalent.

Applicants for positions of postal

clerks, telephone operators, and typists within this group are exempted
£
from the degree requirement.

6Ibid., Art. 7.
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TABLE IX-1

MINIMUM EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT ENTRY INTO THE
LEBANESE CIVIL SERVICES

Category

Rank

V
IV (2)

Degree Requirements

Competitive Examinations

-janitors, drivers, messengers

No degree

Yes

-elementary teachers
-postal clerks, typists, mechanics

Brevet
No degree

Yes
Yes
K
D

-clerical and sub-clerical

Baccalaureat -Part II

Yes

III

-administrative positions

Licence in Law or equivalent0

Yes

II

-administrative positions

License in Law or equivalent

-High Administrative positions

Higher university degrees

IV (1)

I

c

Yes
No

Decree Law No. 112, Ibid.. Arts. 6-12.
b
Baccalaureat - Part 1 + 5 years’ experience in Rank 2 of Category IV or 10 years experience
in Rank 2 of Category IV regardless of degrees.
c
The Lebanese government recognizes the M.A. degree as the equivalent of the Licence in Law.
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Applicants for positions in the third category, which
embraces higher clerical and lower administrative positions, should
possess a License in Law or its equivalent university degree.

Any

employee who has spent ten years of service in the higher ranks of the
fourth category can apply for a position in the third regardless of
his academic qualifications.

Each ministry can also determine the

special qualifications required for applicants for technical positions.7
Appointments to the second category are made by selection
from employees in the top two grades in the third category, provided
they have successfully completed a training program at the National
Institute of Administration and Development.

In certain cases and with

the approval of the Civil Service Board, appointment to the second
category can be made through an examination in which employees of the
third category and outside persons with a university degree can participate.
Applicants to the first category are made by selection from
employees in the top three grades of the second category provided their
names have been included on the promotion list.

In certain exceptional

cases, candidates from outside who have the necessary experience and
higher university degrees can be appointed to the first category provided
the number of such appointments does not exceed one third of the vacant
Q

positions in this category.

7Ibid.
8Ibid., Art. 11.
9Ibid., Art. 12.

0
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Whenever there is a vacancy to be filled, the ministry
concerned

informs the Civil Service Board of the nature of the position

and applications are solicited from all qualified persons.

The law

specifies that such advertisements should be announced over the radio
and inserted in at least three daily newspapers, with a minimum period
of fifteen days for the filing of applications.

These are usually

brief statements, which include a reasonably detailed outline of the
required qualifications but practically no information about the job
to be filled.
Applications are made by means

of ordinary letters which

form asomewhat awkward medium for recording

information about prospec

tive government employees.
At the closing date of submitting applications, the Civil
Service Board examines all of these applications and the supporting
documents and weeds out candidates who do not possess the required
qualifications.

On the basis of this preliminary check, the Civil

Service Board prepares a list of candidates who are eligible to parti
cipate in the examination.

The decision of the Board on the eligibility

of applicants is a final one and cannot be appealed to a higher authority.
With the preparation of the list of eligible candidates, the
recruitment process comes to an end and the second stage of employment--

^ I b i d . , Art.

8.
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namely, examinations--starts.

But before proceeding to a discussion

of examinations, another important characteristic of recruitment practices
in the Lebanese administration should be pointed out.
Recruitment procedures as provided for in law seems to be
reasonable and adequate in scope.

But in applying these provisions,

the government has displayed a basic lack of awareness and understanding
of the real purposes and objectives of modern recruitment programs.
The attitude of the government is fundamentally a negative one and aims
mainly at the elimination of unqualified applicants through the simple
routine of going through submitted applications.

There is no positive

attempt to make a serious search for fully qualified candidates, much
less to encourage them to apply for civil service jobs.

The only

incentives employed are the simple, dull, and unattractive advertise
ments in the papers and over the radio.

There is no vigorous and

aggressive program of public relations keyed to attract candidates to
the service.

There is hardly any attempt by the government to contact

potential sources of applicants at regular intervals and to establish
friendly relationships with them.

All of these factors have greatly

undermined the usefulness of existing recruitment policies.

What the

government really needs is a change in its attitude and in its very
concept of recruitment rather than a mere change in the law which can
with the proper attitude and approach be put to effective use.^

Interview with a member of the Civil Service Board,
January 4, 1967.
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Examination
The present law in Lebanon provides that with very few
exceptions no appointments can be made to any positions in the civil
service except on the basis of examinations.

Until recently, examina

tions were prepared and administered by the individual ministries.

In

1959, the newly established Civil Service Board was entrusted with the
responsibility of preparing and conducting examinations for all vacancies
throughout the Lebanese administration.
Thus, following the preparation of the list of eligible
candidates, the Civil Service Board appoints an examining committee to
prepare examination questions, administer them to the applicants, and
correct them.

Such committees are normally composed of government

employees and some outside members usually drawn from educational insti
tutions.

After correcting the examination papers, the committee prepares

a list of eligible candidates ranked in the order in which they have
passed, from which appointments are made.
a period of one year.

This list remains valid for

The Civil Service Board reserves to itself the

right to treat any examination as null and void, provided such a decision
is made before the public announcement of the results.
A careful study of the examination process in Lebanon reveals
a serious gap between the provisions of the laws and their actual applications.

It Is true that the Lebanese government recognizes examination

as the best tool for the selection of government employees, but the way
they are used in Lebanon makes them ineffective in the evaluation of
the relative merit of candidates.

The proper and effective use of
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examinations for personnel selection presupposes certain conditions
which are still non-existent in the country.
The first observation to be made about this process in
Lebanon is the fact that the examining committees which prepare, adminis
ter, and mark examinations usually lack well-qualified and trained
experts.

It is true that they include experts in the various fields

of study concerned, but they rarely include any skilled members in the
preparation of examinations.

As a result, the examinations are apt

to be poorly constructed and to provide an unreliable basis for measuring
the relative knowledge and abilities of the candidates.
Another important consideration is the fact that examinations
in Lebanon are not properly related to the requirements of the positions
being filled.

No use is made of descriptions as a scientific basis for

the preparation of examinations.

Whenever a vacancy occurs, the committee

prepares an examination on the basis of its own understanding of the
requirements of the job rather than on the basis of a detailed and care
fully prepared description of the post in question.

Such an attitude

is fundamentally the result of a lack of awareness of the significance
of job descriptions, and it will have to be changed if the government
wants to prepare realistic and reliable examinations.
Examinations in Lebanon are very "theoretical" in nature and
tend to concentrate on assessing the general academic knowledge of the
applicants.

Such a type of examination cannot detect and measure the

specialized knowledge and experience which may be essential for efficient
performance in certain jobs.

What is more important is that there are

indications that the examination system for civil service jobs in
Lebanon is closely geared to the curriculum of one particular university
of the country.

This means that graduates of the other universities,

although allowed to compete for civil service jobs, are really at a
great disadvantage because of the way in which examinations are prepared.
This policy has seriously affected the composition of the public service
in which graduates of the St. Joseph University far outnumber those of
the American or Lebanese Universities.
Finally, one cannot fail to observe that the government is
unaware of many of the changes and improvements which have been affected
in this field.

It is known that research in the sphere of testing and

psychology has resulted in some significant developments which have
definitely enhanced the capacity to discover and measure human abilities.
The Lebanese government has not yet made use of such new developments.
There is hardly any use made of objective examinations which are very
useful devices for measuring certain specific abilities.

The interview,

which is a very effective method of selection and one which has been
greatly refined and perfected, is also rarely used.

Nor has the govern

ment bothered to recruit the necessary specialized staff to conduct
research and experiments in various fields of selection in order to
adopt the most suitable and effective means for its own use.

The whole

examination system is still in the handB of amateurs who possess neither
the knowledge nor the training required for coping with such a specialized
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All these factors combine to indicate that there are some
serious flaws in the program of civil service examination which makes
it far from valid and reliable.

It seems that examinations in Lebanon

have served mainly to reduce the influence of political interference
and nepotism in the choice of applicants rather than help ascertain
and measure the true abilities of civil service candidates.

The wide

spread criticisms of the public service and the numerous attempts at
administrative reform in the country are indications of a definite
dissatisfaction with the level of performance of the administration.
It seems that the selection methods, despite the good intentions of the
legislators, have somehow failed to bring into government service
sufficiently qualified and competent employees.

The Lebanese govern

ment, which is now so anxious to improve the quality of its personnel,
has taken one important step towards this goal by establishing a public
administration institute which provides specialized training for a
large number of civil servants.
In its first year of operation - 1960 - the Civil Service
Board conducted six competitive examinations for which 2060 candidates
applied.

Table IX -2 indicates the dates, number of applicants, number

and percentages of those who passed.

Table IX-3 shows the needed quali

fications and the subjects of the examinations.
In 1961, the CSB held 17 competitive examinations to which
2091 candidates participated and only 288 passed as in Table IX-4.

The

required qualifications and subjects of the examinations are shown in
Table IX-5 below.
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TABLE IX-2
DISTRIBUTION OF EXAMINATIONS GIVEN IN I9603

Examination

Date

No. of
Candidates

No. of
Participants

No. of those
Who passed

Percentage
of those passir

1. Typist

August 4

324

273

93

34.06

2. Assistant Custom
Supervisor

Augus t 4

182

157

13

8.28

3. Public School Teacher

August 16

1,496

1,305

602

46.20

4. Custom Supervisor

October 4

50

41

8

19.51

5. Statistician- Head of
Bureau

December 14

3

3

2

66.66

6. Statistician- Head of
Section

December 14

5

3

2

66.66

2.060

1.782

720

40.40

TOTAL

a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 30, 1961, p. 242.
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TABLE IX-3
C

POSITIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SUBJECTS OF EXAMINATIONS IN 1960

Positions

Qualifications Needed

Subjects of the Examination

Arabic dictation; Arabic composition,
Arabic typing.

1. Typist

2. Assistant Custom Supervisor

Baccalaureat-Part II

General Education, Translation to Arabic,
Translation from Arabic, Algebra and
Arithmetic, Economics, Geography.

3. Public School Teacher

4th. Secondary or
Brevet Certificate

Arabic Composition, English or French
composition; Science & Mathematics,
History & Geography, Reading in Arabic
plus explanation, Reading in French or
English plus explanation.

4. Custom Supervisor

Baccalureat-Part II +
5 years' experience

General Education, Customs Regulations,
Customs Transactions, Administrative and
Customs Problems.

5. Statistician -Head of Bureau

University degree in
Statistics + a Licence in
Law or its equivalent and
5 years experience

General Education and Statistics.

6. Statistician -Head of Service

Licence in Statistics +
General Education, Statistics.
Licence in Law or a degree
in Public Administration
or Baccalaureat-Part II
and 10 years service.

a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 30, 1961,pp. 243-244.
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TABLE IX-4
DISTRIBUTION OF EXAMINATIONS GIVEN IN 1961a

No. of
Candidates

No. of
Participants

No. of those
Who passed

Percentage
of passing.

Position

Date

1.

Public School Teacher

Jan. 13

764

747

19

2.54

2.

Asst. Real Estate
Secretary

Feb. 16

19

13

1

7.69

3.

Foreign Service Emp.

Mar. 27

57

41

7

17.07

4.

Public School Teacher

Apr. 1

663

631

128

20.38

5. Assistant Real Estate
Secretary

Aug. 1

15

9

1

11.11

6. Coder for General
Planning

Jul. 6

30

29

12

41.38

7. Head of Bureau in
General Planning

Aug. 8

35

21

3

14.28

8. Clerk for General
Planning

Aug. 8

67

63

4

6.35

9. Draftsmen for General
Planning

Aug. 8

29

28

6

21.43

(Continued)
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TABLE IX-4 (Continued)

Positions

No. of
Candidates

Date

No. of
Participants

No. of those
who passed

Percentage
of passing

10. Public School Teacher

Sept. 5

1,230

1,100

82

7.45

11. Assistant Bureau Chief
for Real Estate

Oct. 27

88

63

7

11.11

12.

Agricultural Engineer

Dec.

13

26

24

12

50.00

13.

Assistant Real Estate
Secretary

Dec.

20

14

11

5

45.45

14.

Secondary School Teacher

15.

General Inspector for
Health & Social Affairs

TOTAL

Dec. 18
Dec.

22

7

7

2

2

3.189

2.901

Ranking
Competition
1

288

Ranking
Competition
50.00

9.93

a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 28, 1962, pp. 518-519.

256

TABLE IX-5
EXAMINATIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SUBJECTS OF EXAMINATIONS, 1961a

Examination

Qualifications

Subjects of Examination

1. Public School Teacher

Brevet or its equivalent

Arabic composition, History & Geography,
Composition in a foreign language, Science
and Mathematics.

2. Assistsnt Real Estate
Secretary

License en droit, or a
Diploma of the Financial
& Economic Center

General Education, Translation from and
into Arabic, Civil Law, and Real Estate
Regulations.

3. Foreign Service
Employee

License en droit, orliterature or Science, or its
equivalent.

Oral Test; Direct translation from Arabic
in a general subject, direct translation
into Arabic from French or English.
Political Economy, International Relations,
Social and Cultural Problems, Financial Law
and Administrative Law.
Written Test; General Development of Politi
cal Thoughts (in Arabic and in a foreign
language); International Law; Political
Institutions in Modern Government; Transla
tion into and from Arabic.

4. Public School Teacher

The same as No. 1

5. Assistant Real Estate
Secretary

The same as No. 2

The Same as No. 1

The Same as No. 2

(Continued)
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TABLE IX-5 (Continued)

Examination

Qualifications

Subjects of Examination

6. Chief of Bureau in
General Planning

License en droit or its
equivalent or 10 years
service in Category IV

General Education, Translation from and
into Arabic, Public Administration.

7. Clerk

Baccalaureat -I Part

General Education, Translation from and
into Arabic, Administrative Transactions.

8. Draftsman

Diploma in Drafting or
two years' experience

General Education, Design.

9. Public School Teacher

The same as No. 1

The Same as No. 1

10. Assistant Bureau Chief
for Real Estate

Baccalaureat - II Part

General Education, Translation from and
into Arabic, Real Estate Laws, Arithmetic.

11. Agricultural Engineer

Agricultural Engineering
Degree plus permission to
practice in Lebanon

Varieties of subjects dealing with the
Science of Agriculture.

12. Assistant Real Estate
Secretary

The same as No. 2

The same as No. 2

13. Secondary School Teacher

Teaching Diploma or its
equivalnet

General Education, Translation, Conducting
a class, Oral Questions.

(Continued)
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TABLE IX-5

(Continued)

Examination

Qualifications

14.

1. The candidate should be an
inspector in the Health and Social
Inspection Service, who have had
10 years of experience or who should
have a License en droit plus 10 years
of experience in the Civil Service,
2. He should be at least 35 years old,
3. He should have an M.D. degree,
4. He should have a Public Health Degree

General Health and
Social Inspector
for the Central
Inspectoion Service

Subjects of Examination

Inspection Rules and
Regulations. Organization and
administration of Public
Health. Social and Health
Legislation. Administrative
Law.

a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 29, 1962, pp. 520-527.

259

In 1963, the Civil Service Board conducted an average of
four competitive examinations per week and a total of 5315 candidates
presented themselves and 2577 passed.
Following the preparation of a list of eligible candidates
on the basis of their performance in the examination, the next step
is the actual appointment of the required number of candidates.
The Personnel Law of 1959 provides that appointments to the
public service should be according to the order of success in passing
the examination; i.e., that the candidate who has scored the highest in
the examination should be appointed first.

13

This is the normal prac

tice in most countries which follow the system of competitive examina
tions and is in accordance with the merit system.

But despite the

legal code, such a practice is not applicable to Lebanon because of
Article 95 of the Constitution which takes precedence over any statu
tory provisions.

This constitutional provision specifies that in making

appointments to the Cabinet and the public service, the government must
ensure an equitable representation of the various religious communities
in the country.

This provision, strangely enough, is in contradiction

to Article 12 of the Constitution which states that in making appoint
ments to the public service no discrimination should be made between
candidates except on the basis of ability and merit.

13

Ibid., Art. 9.

But despite this,
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clear acceptance of the principle of merit in article 12, the policies
and practices in this context, have been, and continue to be, strictly
governed by Article 95.

This religious or sectarian factor, as was

explained earlier, has profoundly influenced the political and adminis
trative system and is still a determining social force in the country.
What this means in practice is that civil service jobs are
allocated to the various religious sects according to a certain pres
cribed ratio which has to be observed in making appointments regardless
of the results of the examinations.

Although such an arrangement is

an informal one and is not incorporated in law, yet it is strictly
adhered to by all Lebanese governments and does impose a serious limita
tion on the application of the merit system.

It is often impossible

for the government to appoint the best candidate, as revealed by the
examination, to a public office because of religious considerations.
For example, if five positions are to be filled by a Maronite, a Sunni
Moslem, a Shi'a Moslem, a Greek Orthodox and a Druze and if all those
who passed belong to one sect, they cannot be appointed to the positions.
The Civil Service Board has interpreted this article to mean the
appointment of those who rank highest in the competitive examination
among their sects.

Thus, it is possible to appoint a person who ranked

fiftieth in the competitive examination and refuse appointment to one
who ranked second.

This problem is further accentuated by the fact that

the rate of well-educated trained personnel varies considerably among
the different sects.^

^Interview with a member of the Civil Service Board,
January 5, 1967.
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Such a discriminatory practice is contrary to the merit
principles embodied in the civil service laws.

But, unfortunately,

it has been impossible to eliminate it, because religious loylaties and
considerations are deeply rooted in the Lebanese mentality and social
values.
Appointment
Appointments to positions in the fifth category are made
through a decision of the Minister concerned after the approval of
the Civil Service Board.

Appointments to positions in the upper four

categories need the signature of the President of the Republic.

The

Civil Service Board also has to approve the appointments to categories
four, three, and two.
One final point to be made about the appointing procedure is
that it is often an unduly lengthy operation; several months can pass
before a candidate actually takes up his duties.

The decree of appoint

ment, which has to be signed by the Minister, the President of the
Republic, the Civil Service Board and, in certain cases, by the Council
of Ministers has also to be referred to the Ministry of Finance and
the Court of Accounts for a pre-audit.

An appointed candidate has to

wait until his decree has gone through all these channels before he
can be officially put on the payroll.
Recruits appointed to the fifth, fourth, and third categories
are placed on probation for a period of one year.

Nev/comers to the
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first and second categories are exempted from this requirement.

1s

Each ministry is required by law to provide employees on probation
with some kind of introductory training which will help them to adjust
easily to their new work.

This training also affords the ministry an

opportunity to decide which employees should be retained or, alternatively,
dismissed at the end of their probationary period.

Such a probationary

period, if properly utilized can be of tremendous value to any organi
zation and can serve worthwhile purposes.

The Lebanese government,

however, has not shown any understanding of the importance of such a
system.

There is hardly any training for new employees, who are left

completely to their own devices.

Besides this, there is no systematic

observation of the work of such employees during this period in order
to determine whether they should be retained in office or not.

The

law provides that new employees can be dismissed, with the approval of
the Central Inspection Service, at any time during their probationary
period.

16

One would think that in Lebanon, where recruitment and

selection methods employed are unreliable, a high percentage of new
civil servants would be dismissed while still on probation.

Such is

not the case, however, because the various ministries do not go into the

15Ibid., Art. 10.
^Interview with a member of the Civil Service Board,
January 5, 1967.
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trouble of carefully observing their new employees while they are on
probation and reporting their performance.

According to the best

available records and information, there has not been a single case of
dismissal of a probationary employee.^

This certainly offers no

proof of the soundness and perfection of the selection methods but
rather points to laxity on the part of supervisors in taking advantage
of the probationary period.
Promotion
Promotion policy is, undoubtedly, one of the most important
aspects of any personnel system, and one which can exert a significant
effect on any agency's attempts to attract and retain properly qualified
employees.

A sound and positive system of promotion can serve as a

direct incentive to qualified and competent young people who are encouraged
by opportunities for advancement to make a career of government service.
Promotion is also a very effective means of rewarding good performance
and inducing employees to improve their personal standards.

In a civil

service similar to that of Lebanon where material remuneration and
benefits fall short of those offered by private industry, sound promotion
policies assume added significance and can be utilized as an effective
inducement in competing with outside firms for the limited supply of
well-trained candidates.

17 Ibid.
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On the other hand, an Inadequate and unfair system of pro
motion can seriously undermine the morale of employees and adversely
affect their performance.

Dissatisfaction with such policies can

result in the swift loss of valuable personnel who will seek advance
ment somewhere else.
The Lebanese system has three distinct aspects: salary
increases, advancement and promotion.
Salary increases are automatic increments which are granted
to every employee solely on the basis of seniority.

According to the

present law, every civil servant is entitled to such an increment every
twenty-four months unless he has been subjected to some kind of disci
plinary action.

One important aspect of this system is that employees

who have reached the top grade in their category continue to receive
these automatic increases until they reach the salary of the top grade
in the next and higher category.

This is a generous policy in comparison

with most other systems which impose a ceiling on such increases by
denying employees who have reached the top grade in their own category
and further automatic salary increments.

The previous personnel law

in Lebanon was even more generous and provided for unlimited automatic
salary increases, but this practice was abandoned because of the injustices
which it tended to inflict on government employees.

The change to the

present system has not really involved any serious hardship because of
the long number of years required to reach the newly imposed ceiling.
This policy of automatic salary increases, as applied in
Lebanon, suffers from two basic flaws.

The first is that automatic
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salary increases which continue beyond the category in which an employee
is ranked constitute a violation of the principle of equal pay for
equal work.

Under such a system, it is not uncommon to have a third

category employee, who through length of service and seniority, is paid
a salary which is equal to or even higher than that received by a
second category employee who is performing a more difficult and respon
sible job.

This, according to modern concepts of position classifica

tion and pay, is both unfair and unjust.
The second defect in such a practice is the fact that these
salary increments in Lebanon are granted automatically to all employees
regardless of merit or performance.

It is obvious that a merit system

pre-supposes a policy of salary increases which is based on the relative
performance of employees.

Salary increases which are granted indiscri

minately to all employees represent a violation of the merit principle
and offer encouragement for mediocre performance; on the other hand, a
system of performance evaluation which would serve as a sound basis
for granting salary increases could be devised by the government.
The second aspect of the promotion system in the Lebanese
Civil Service is what is referred to in the law as advancement.

This

is a system which enables the government to advance the bestowal of
automatic salary increases to some of its employees six months ahead
of time.

Thus, instead of receiving an increment every twenty-four

months, an employee would get It in eighteen months.

18Ibid., Art. 33.

18

In June of
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every year, each ministry submits to the Civil Service Board a list
of employees recommended for advancement (provided their number does
not exceed 10 percent of the total number of employees of that particular
ministry) who are eligible for a salary increase during the coming
fiscal year.

It is up to the Civil Service Board either to approve or

reject this recommendation.
This practice, which is somewhat similar to that by which
awards for merit are granted by some governments to their most efficient
employees, represents an attempt to recognize and reward good work.

If

it is properly handled, it can be an effective incentive to better
performance.

But if it is handled in an arbitrary manner, it can result

in serious dissatisfaction and resentment among government employees.
It is impossible to judge the effectiveness and success of such a
policy in Lebanon since it has been only in existence since June 1959,
but one cannot help quesf.ionning its feasibility in the absence of a
performance evaluation system.

Under such circumstances, any attempt

to reward good performance is bound to suffer from a certain degree of
arbitrariness.
The third and most important aspect of this problem is the
promotion of government employees to higher and more responsible jobs.
Promotion is defined by law as the transfer from a certain position in
one rank to another position in an immediately superior rank or
category.
rank .

19

The law provides that no employee can be promoted from one

In October each year, the various ministries prepare a list of

^Ibid. , Art. 34,
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candidates recommended for promotion to a higher rank and submit it to
the Civil Service Board with a supporting recommendation.
has either to approve or reject such a recommendation.

The Board

If it fails to

reach a decision before the first of December, the recommended promo
tions go into effect.
Promotions from the fifth to the fourth category and from the
fourth to the third are made through examinations.

Government employees

in these categories compete with outside candidates taking such tests.
The only privilege allowed to government employees in these examinations
is that those of them who have spent ten or more years in the service
are allowed some marks in excess of outside candidates.
A close examination of this system reveals certain weaknesses
which greatly undermine its usefulness.

One notable characteristic is

that promotions are made between ranks and between the top three cate
gories regardless of the existence of vacancies.

Each year a certain

number of promotions are effected despite the fact that no suitable
vacancies occur in the civil service.

What actually happens is that

these promoted employees are given new titles and new salaries although
in practice they are still occupying the same positions and performing
the same duties.

This is a peculiar concept of promotion but is hardly

strange in the light of the fact that the Lebanese administration has
nothing in the form of modern position classification plan.

Such a

promotion policy has some sense in it if we realize that vacancies in
the higher levels of the administration are very few.

The rate of

turnover in the Lebanese administration is very small and any vacancies
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which occur at this level are the result of either deaths or retire
ments.

If the government decides to limit promotion only to filling

these very few vacancies, it will be inflicting a hardship on some
deserving employees who have been waiting for opportunities of advance
ment.

By means of its present policy, it can provide added opportunity

and satisfaction for its personnel regardless of existing vacancies or
the true needs of the service.
Another important point to be made is that appointment to the
top two categories of the Lebanese Civil Service are almost exclusively
made through promotions from lower categories.

This is provided for

in the law, although in certain exceptional cases vacancies in the two
top categories can be filled by appointments from outside the service.
Such a policy has resulted in a certain degree of stagnation through
excluding from the service badly needed new blood.

This is particularly

bad in a civil service which has been recurited mostly through favori
tism and through inefficient selection methods which have brought into
its ranks personnel of mediocre quality and caliber.

A policy of exclu

sive promotion from within the higher ranks of the service helps to
bring into these top responsible positions people who are lacking in
skill and training.
Another important observation to be made in this connection
with the promotion system is that there is no guarantee that recommenda
tions for promotions will be made on the basis of merit and comparative
performance.

Again it should be stressed that, without a sound per

formance evaluation mechanism, the system yields itself to favoritism
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and prejudice. Promotions through examinations to the fourth and third
categories are not much better because of the way the examinations are
prepared and the lack of properly trained personnel in this field do
not enable us to measure reliably differences in the knowledge and
abilities of candidates.
The final point to be made in this respect is that there are
no government-wide opportunities of promotion in Lebanon. Promotion
is limited to employees of a single ministry who are normally discouraged
from moving to other ministries. Such rigid departmentalization is a
characteristic

feature of the Lebanese administration which was inherited

from the French and imposes severe limitations on employees and the
government alike.
Summary Statement
This chapter has dealt with the fundamental aspects of the
employment process: recruitment, examination, appointments and promotions.
Major reforms were enacted in 1959 and affected all the above processes.
Yet, while new personnel laws and procedures were adopted, culture
and traditional practices still dominated the effective implementation
of modern practices.
The factor of poorly-qualified civil servants is largely
the result of Inadequate recruitment procedures. Likewise, low salaries
and a shortage of qualified personnel have affected the recruitment
process. Then too, qualifications for governmental employment are
unsoundly based on academic degrees, preferably law degrees with less
regard for practical knowledge and experience. Finally, the recruitment
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process is a rather colorless campaign, with no positive attempts to
make a serious search for qualified candidates, much less to encourage
them to apply for civil service jobs. A change in attitude and in the
very concept of recruitment is needed by the government.
Few positions in Lebanon are filled that do not require
examinations. While it can be said that the government recognizes
examinations as the best tool for employee selection, this chapter has
demonstrated

that the use of examinations in Lebanon have been utili

zed in such a way as to render them ineffective in evaluating the merit
of candidates. Remarks made on the process included criticisms of
(1) the examining boards; (2) the relation of a particular examination
to the position applied for and (3) the "theoretical nature" of the
examination system and (4) the failure on the part of the government
to adopt any new devices such as objective tests. While the introduction
of an examination system has reduced the influence of political
interfernce and nepotism, improvements in the process are critically
needed to obtain competent and qualified employees.
Appointment follows examination and again it was primarily
the function of this chapter to make a critical examination of the
process. Sectarian influences were found to be a major factor of a
candidate's appointment to office. Article 95, which ensures equitable
representation of the religious communities, take precedence ever
any other statutory provision. Thus, it has been the case that it is
not the most qualified nor succesful persons in an examination who
will receive an appointment but rather the ones who rankxhighest from
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from the particular sect needed to achieve a balance In composition
within a ministry. Likewise, the rate of well-educated personnel varies
considerably among the different sects.
Other defects occuring in the appointment process were noted.
The lengthy time period before actual appointment is made , by nature,
is an inefficient routine. Furthermore, while the first year

of employ

ment is considered a probationary period, there is presently no syste
matic observation of employees. If properly utilized, an inspection
process of new personnel could act as a safeguard in a system where
recruitment and selection methods are unreliable. It was pointed out
that from records available; not a single case of dismissal existed
for a probationary employee.
Promotion policies were the final feature in the examina
tion of employment procedures. The three aspects of the Lebanese
system: salary increases, advancement and promotion were highlighted.
The most important observation to be made regarding the three practices
is the high degree of arbitrary judgment on any type of advancement and .
the lack of emphasis on merit and comparative performance.
The real challenge in personnel administration begins after
the employment process has been completed. To meet this challenge is
the function of training which will be discussed in the following
chapter.

CHAPTER X
TRAINING
The real challenge in personnel administration begins after
the selection process has been completed and the appointments of new
employees have been made.

In an administration characterized by corrup

tion and inefficiency, the role of civil servants is usually commensu
rate with lack of initiative, responsiveness and identification with
the broader goals of society.

The most important means of improving civil

service efficiency is proper training.
A close examination of the Lebanese Civil Service reveals
the existence of a large number of poorly qualified and untrained per
sonnel.

This overstaffing constitutes a major problem affecting many

aspects of civil service efficiency.

These surplus employees whose

productivity ranges downward to zero impede the effectiveness of the
remaining staff, interfere seriously with morale, raise civil service
costs and, most important, inevitably slow down the work of others.

These

employees have been hired as a result of sectarian and political pressures.
Although there is general agreement that the civil service is over
staffed, little can be done about it since any mass dismissal of employees
/

would be bound to have serious economic and social repercussions in
the country.
Another factor which has contributed to the low quality of
government employees in Lebanon is the unreliable selection methods used
by the government which has not been able to develop reliable and effective
testing devices, essential in discovering and measuring the abilities
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of the candidates for the public service.

The excessive emphasis on

academic degrees has resulted in the choice of candidates who are well
qualified academically, but who often prove to be inefficient public
servants.
A third factor responsible for the low quality of government
personnel is the shortage of educational and training facilities avail
able to government officials -- centers which could provide needed
professional and technical training in certain fields.

This problem

becomes more acute when viewed in the light of the continuously expanding
functions and growing specialization of government operations.

Lebanon

is, at present, undergoing a rapid economic and social change, and this
metamorphosis is thrusting new responsibilities upon the public service
which caii only be met by people with the required skill and training
in various specialized spheres ofactivity.
It is clear that there is a desperate need
ment of the quality of Lebanese government personnel.

for the improve
The solution to

such a serious problem lies in an aggressive and comprehensive training
program which would raise the level of efficiency of existing employees
and prepare a sufficient number of properly qualified candidates.

A

number of foreign experts called upon by the government to study the
administration pointed out the need for establishing training programs
in public administration.

Professor William A. Robson recommended to

the government in 1949 the need for establishing training facilities in
public administration.

Mr. Robert Culbertson, after conducting a compre

hensive study of the Lebanese civil service, wrote in his final report:
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The need for a concerted and aggressive program of techni
cal training for civil servants has been thoroughly
documented by each of the Ministers and DirectorsGeneral who helped prepare this report. These officials
can describe in great detail their constantly felt need
for personnel who are more fully trained in the technical
aspects of their jobs. Employees themselves desire
training that has not been available up to now in order
to equip them better to meet the full requirements of
good technical performance. Government is a complex
business. It contains many specialized fields, for many
of which training is not available prior to entering the
public service. It is the responsibility of government
to complete the training of employees necessary to give
them full technical qualifications.
Culbertson goes on to recommend the establishment of a
Training Service which would be responsible for:
1. Assisting each of the several Ministries to establish
its own training program.
2. Developing a program of training for jobs in fields
common to one ministry.
3. Securing the cooperation and use of the resources of
established educational institutions in Lebanon.
4. Developing, in cooperation with the Ministries, a
program of sending selected key officials abroad
for advanced study.^
The growing awareness in Lebanon of the need for training
culminated in the establishment of the National Institute of Adminis
tration and Development (Institut National d'Administration et de
Development) in 1959 which was entrusted with the responsibility of

■^Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the
Government of Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration Improve
ment," unpublished report, Par I, pp. 7-8. (n.d.)
^Ibid., p. 8.
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preparing outside candidates for service with the government, and
training existing government personnel.

3

Pre-Entry Training
By pre-entry training is meant the general education and
preparation which a candidate receives before joining government service.
Such education is not usually intended to prepare an applicant for a
specific job in the public service but rather provide him with a general
background and knowledge and information.

Very often this kind of

training enables a candidate to pass an examination for a government
job, but in Lebanon there has been no serious attempt to relate such
learning to the particular needs of the public service.
There are several educational institutions which provide
pre-entry training in various technical, professional, and other fields
including some which roughly coincide with the needs of the public
service.

Before we proceed any further in this discussion it might be

useful to enumerate the various universities and colleges in the country
and

to give an idea of

the types of courses and training offered

bythem.^

1. American University of Beirut
The American University of Beirut was founded in 1866 as the
Syrian

Protestant College and in 1920 its present name was adopted.

It-

^Oecree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Dader, Collection
of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964.)
^In writing this section about educational facilities, the
author greatly relied on Simon G. Siksek, Bashir J. Daouk and Sami E.
Baaklini, Preliminary Assessment of Manpower Resources and Requirements
in Lebanon (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, 1960).
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is the largest American University overseas and is composed of the
following faculties:
(a) Faculty of Arts and Sciences
(b) Faculty of Medical Sciences, including
1) School of Medicine
2) School of Pharmacy
3) School of Nursing
4) School of Public Health
(c) Faculty of Engineering
(d) Faculty of Agricultural Sciences
2. University of Saint Joseph
This university is also a private one founded in 1875 by the
Society of Jesus.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

It includes the following faculties:
Faculty of Medicine
Institute of Oriental Studies
Faculty of Law
School of Engineering
Faculty of Theology

3. Beirut College for Women
This college was founded in 1924 by the Board of Foreign
Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States and offers
courses leading to an Associate of Arts or Science Degree and a Bachelor
of Arts or Science Degree.
4. Lebanese Academy
This is also a private institution; it offers courses leading
to the License Degree and includes the following schools:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

School
School
School
School

of
of
of
of

Music
Architecture
Art
Literature and Social Sciences

Its school of Politics and Economics established in 1949 and
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that of Law established in 1953 have been incorporated in the Lebanese
University.
5. The Lebanese University
This is the national university founded in 1951 and, at
present, includes the following faculties:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Faculty of Law, Politics and Economics
Faculty of Arts
Faculty of Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences
Higher Teachers' Institute

This is a rapidly expanding university and is administered
by the government through the Ministry of National Education.
6. Arab University
The Arab University was founded in 1959 as a branch of the
University of Alexandria, United Arab Republic.

At present, it offers

courses leading to a License Degree in the Arts and Law.
Besides those studying at these universities and colleges,
a relatively large number of Lebanese students seek education and train
ing in educational institutions outside Lebanon.

During the 1966-67

academic year, there were 773 Lebanese students attending colleges and
universities in the United States.^

There are no figures relating to

Lebanese students attending other foreign universities although these

^Institute of International Education, Open Doors. 1967
(New York: I.I.E., 1967), 1967), p. 24
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definitely exceed those in the United States.
One of the first remarks to be made about the existing
facilities for pre-entry training in Lebanon is that, in spite of the
seemingly abundant number of colleges and universities, the total
enrollment is somewhat small.

In 1964, the total enrollment in all the

universities listed above was 12,608,

It should be borne in mind

that the non-Lebanese students account for quite a percentage of this
figure.

With the exception of the Lebanese University, which has been

expanding rapidly, the above-mentioned institutions have limited faci
lities and cannot hope to increase their enrollment to any significant
extent in the near future.
This situation has resulted in a serious gap and shortages
in certain occupations which are essential for the development of the
country.

Although no comprehensive study of the manpower resources

and requirements has been undertaken in Lebanon, a preliminary investi
gation of this problem points to certain shortages in specific occupa
tional fields; such as, agriculture, public health, education, and
others.^

One important and serious: shortage is that of technical and

vocational training, in which existing facilities, in terms of both
their quantity and quality, definitely fail to meet the needs of the
country.

a

^Charles Rizk, Le Regime Politique Libanais (Paris: Pichon
et Durand - Auzias,1966), pp. 80-81
^Siksek et al. op. cit., pp. 46-48.
8Ibld., p. 40.
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Another important fact about pre-entry training facilities
in Lebanon is that training is completely lacking in certain fields of
specialization which are essential for the public service and for the
general development of the country.

Anybody desiring to receive train

ing in these fields has to seek it in some foreign institution abroad.
For example, it is only recently that courses in public administration
were offered for the first time in Lebanon.

At present, such pre-entry

training in the field of public administration, despite its usefulness
for the public service, is available to a very limited number of students
at the Lebanese University.

A score of other and similar examples can

easily be cited.
Another significant characteristic of the educational system
in Lebanon is that university education tends to be very expensive and
there are a large number of students who cannot afford it.

There is no

free university education in Lebanon even at the national Lebanese
University.
One final remark to be made is that the system of university
education in Lebanon is essentially a private one.

It is a diverse and

heterogeneous system which, apart from the Lebanese University, is com
posed of private local and foreign schools representing different tradi
tions and cultures which are permitted almost complete freedom of action
in developing their program and curricula.

The government has refrained

from any interference in this domain and has not. even attempted to
cooperate with these universities in developing certain programs which
are deemed essential for the public service.

There is no doubt that
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the Lebanese government has failed properly to exploit the existing
educational institutions in the country which could, in many cases,
have modified their courses and programs to fit the needs of the govern
ment.
In conclusion, one might say that educational facilities
for pre-entry training are reasonably adequate in certain spheres but
definitely deficient in others.

Correction of this problem will not

be met independently by either institution.

It is dependent on a

proper and close cooperation between the government and the various
educational institutions in the country.

While the government could

make effective use of existing facilities, it must conduct a careful
study of
country.

its future needs and theavailable human resources in the
It is only on the basis of such a study that proper and pur

poseful steps can be taken to correct existing deficiencies and provide
for future requirements.
Post-Entry Training
The emphasis on post-entry training in the field of public
administration is relatively new.

Until recently there was a general

belief that proper recruitment and selection methods would insure the
appointment of qualified and well-equipped candidates who could be
trusted to perform efficiently in their jobs.

Such an assumption

according to Professor 0. Glenn Stahl, is "naive and short-sighted."^

^Glenn 0. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (4th Edition;
New York: Harper, 1956), p. 336.
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In the words of Professor Felix A. Nigro
...training represents a continuing necessity in the
same way that the education of a person never really
ends. There is always something more to learn. No
public employee can ever be considered perfectly
equipped for his job. The role of in-service or, as
it is sometimes called, post-entry training, is to
stimulate the worker to put forth his hest effort
and to help him improve his performance.
There has been a growing awareness and recognition of the
needfor such training in

the public service.

fieldsof administration,

private industry was the pioneer

training programs for its employees.

Here, as inmany other
in developing

Today, we find that private firms

invest substantial amounts of money in in-service training programs
which are intended to improve the performance and efficiency of their
employees.

Besides the example of private industry, there is now

sufficient evidence of the success of in-service training in public
agencies to justify its adoption and the costs involved in i t.^
Thus the lack of educational and training institutions for
specialized training in certain fields, the sectarian and political
pressures prevailing in the country, and the poor and unreliable
selection methods used by the Civil Service, have all combined to produce
a poorly trained and unskilled civil service which cannot adequately serve
the growing needs of the country.

l^Felix A. Nigro, Public Personnel Administration (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1959), p. 226.
^Stahl, op. cit., p. 337.
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Until 1959, there was very little serious work in this
direction.

The in-service training activities of the government were

limited to a handful of programs, often inadequate, provided for by
individual ministries for certain categories of their employees.

There

was no central agency responsible for the preparation of a comprehensive
and over-all training program throughout the public service.

Each

ministry acted independently and developed its own training programs.
The first attempt at systematic in-service training by the
Lebanese government was the establishment in 1952 of an Institute of
Administration and Finance attached to the Ministry of Finance.

It

was later incorporated in the Lebanese University and then abolished
in 1959 when all students attending the institute were transferred to
the newly-established National Institute of Administration and Develop
ment (INAD).^
This institute was mainly intended as an in-service training
program for employees of the Ministry of Finance, a key ministry in
Lebanon, in view of the central role which it plays in controlling
expenditures of the government.

Admission to the Institute was on the

basis of a certain minimum number of years of government service or a
rigorous written examination for outside candidates.

^Decree Law 114, June 12, 1959, op. cit.

The course of
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study covered a period of three years, after which the student graduated
with a certificate recognized by the government as the equivalent of a
Licence en Droit.

The institute offered courses in Lebanese History,

History of Art, Political History, Mathematics, Statistics, Political
Economy, Economic Geography, Constitutional Law, Civil Law, Commercial
Law and Administrative Law.

During its establishment, more than 150

graduated from the Institute and are now working in various Lebanese
ministries.
As may be inferred from this brief description of the academic
course work, the emphasis throughout the period of study was on theore
tical training.

The institute was not engaged in the type of education

intended to instruct government employees in the particular skills and
techniques of their jobs; it offered rather a variety of general train
ing similar to that provided by existing universities in the country,
but adapted to suit the particular needs of the government.
In evaluating the work of the institute, one cannot, despite
its obvious inadequacies, deny the contribution of such a modest under
taking in employee training.

It represented a conscious response to

a felt need on the part of the government.

It was a rational and

systematic attempt to deal with a basic problem affecting the country's
civil service.

The abolition of the institute was not by any means an

outcome of dissatisfaction with its work but was necessitated by the crea
tion of a central agency which had taken over responsibility for train
ing throughout the Lebanese civil service.
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INAD
The growing awareness in Lebanon of the need for training
culminated in the establishment of a National Institute for Adminis
tration and Development in 1959 and attached to the Civil Service Board.
It was entrusted with the following functions:

13

(1) To train prospective civil servants in areas of
administration and development;
(2) To provide in-service training sessions;
(3) To assess the needs for new employees;
(4) To conduct research on administration and development.
The Institute, which opened in November, 1960, was closely
patterned after the French National School of Administration and planned
mainly by a French expert specially recruited for this purpose.

The

Institute was made up of two services: The Preparation Service and the
Training Service.
The Preparation Service: This Service is divided into two
branches: the Higher and the Middle, al-Dara1a al-Ulia and al-Dara1a
al-Wusta.
The Higher Grade Branch prepares prospective employees for
Category m

employment.

It is divided into three fields of speciali

zation: Public Administration and Foreign Affairs; Economic and Financial
Affairs and Social and Cultural Affairs.

This program is open to all

candidates possessing a License or its equivalent, from within or outside

13
p. 36.

Decree No. 4800, July 25, 1960, in Adib Y. Sader, op. cit.,
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the service or those who have completed ten years of service in the
fourth Category, regardless of the degree they hold.

14

All candidates must pass an entrance examination and the
period of study is two years.

The first year consists of: (1) General

Studies for eight months; (2) A three-month in internship in a govern
ment department; (3) One month of administrative leave.

The second

year consists of: (1) General Studies for six months; (2) A two-month
internship in a private enterprise and; (3) The final study stage for
four months.^
Students are given examinations at the end of each stage
and are ranked in order of achievement.

Successful candidates, then,

fill the existing vacancies throughout the civil service.
The Middle Grade Branch prepares its applicants for place
ment in administrative positions at the first rank of Category IV.
The program for this Grade is for twelve months and is organized on the
same pattern as the previous one.
During the period of study of both programs the partici
pant receives a salary and before joining either, the applicant must
pledge that he will work for the government for a minimum period of
ten years if he passes the program of study.

14

Ibid., Art. 9.

^ I b i d . , Art. 26.
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Training Service: ^

This department is concerned with the

training of existing employees in order to develop and improve their
quality and performance.

This service is likewise divided into three

fields of specialization: Public Administration and Foreign Affairs;
Economic and Financial; and Social and Cultural Affairs.
The Training Service is divided into four branches: the
High Administrative Studies, the Higher Training Course, the Middle
Training and the Elementary Administrative Training.

Employees are not

allowed to attend more than one training session during a year.
17
1. High Administrative Studies:

The duration is for three

months and the training is open to Category II employees on a voluntary
basis.

Each session must have at least 15 participants and not more

than 30 and is held outside of regular working hours.
Training in this Branch includes 6 hours per week of general
and technical studies and 3 discussion seminars of 2 hours duration
each.
At the end of the training period the trainees are evaluated
and ranked.

Those ranking in the upper 25 percent can have their pro-

mations forwarded for a period of six months.

Subject to the approval

of the CSB, trainees in the upper 50 percent may receive an equivalent
of one month's salary as a reward from the INAD's budget.

16Ibid., Art. 72.
17Ibid., Arts. 76-87.
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18

2. Higher Training Course:

The duration is for six months

and the training is open to employees of Category III who are holders
of a university degree and for employees in the upper two grades of the
same category regardless of degree.
examination.

The trainees must pass a qualifying

Each session is limited to 30 trainees and a maximum of

30 participants is allowed.

The time is outside regular working hours.

The training consists of three stages: a three-month of
general introduction and orientation (12 hours per week); a 15-day
internship in a private organization and; a two-months stage of practi
cal methods of work simplification and procedure improvement and the
last stage of 15 days as field training.
Benefits to those ranking in the upper 25 and 50 percent are
similar to those in the previous branch.
19

3. The Middle Training Course:

The duration is for four

months and the training is open to employees from the lower steps of
Category III or from employees of Category IV who are holders of a
university degree and who have passed a competitive examination.
Graduates of this Branch enjoy similar benefLts as the
previous two.

18Ibid,. Arts. 88-99.

^ I b i d . , Arts. 100-108.
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4. Elementary Administrative Training Course:

20

The duration

is for four months and the training is open to employees in Category IV
who do not possess university degrees.
of a competitive examination.

They are selected on the basis

Renumeration to this group is similar

to the previous ones.
The Institute did not launch its regular in-service training
sessions until 1962.

During the period 1960-62 the Institute held five

special "rush" sessions for a group of higher civil servants who were
given special training in the principles and methods of administrative
reform.

The participants were not subjected to any entrance examina

tion requirements.
Table X-l presents the results of these training sessions.
Since 1962 the Institute has held twenty-five regular inservice training sessions which were attended by approximately six hundred
civil servants.

The type of training given to these participants was

of a very general nature and did not provide for any specialized training
in their own particular job.

The program included courses in general

Public Administration, Lebanese Administration, Economics, Public Finance
and Budgeting, Organization and Methods and Sociology.

21

Table X-2, below, presents the results of the training
sessions of 1962-63.

20Ibid., Arts. 109-119.
^Interview with a member of INAD, December 28, 1966.
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TABLE

X-l

RESULTS OF THE TRAINING SESSIONS AT INAD, 1960-1961*

No. of those
who Passed

Percentage
of Passing

Tour

For Head of Service
and Secretaries

1st.

2 months

11/21/60
1/21/61

16

10

62.50

1st.

3 months

11/21/60
2/21/61

59

54

91.00

2nd.

3 months

3/23/61
6/23/61

60

47

78.00

3rd.

3 months

9/18/61
12/18/61

64

53

88.00

1st.

3 months

11/21/60
2/21/61

43

34

85.00

2nd.

3 months

3/23/61
6/23/61

43

31

72.00

Admini strative
Cycle for
Category III

Financial Cycle
for Category
III

Duration

No. of
Participants

Training Cycle

Date

a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 28, 1962, pp. 545-46.

290

TABLE

X-2
a

RESULTS OF THE TRAINING SESSIONS AT INAD., 1962-1963

Percentage
of Passing

Elementary

1st.

4 months

10/15/62
2/15/62

21

14

66.66

2nd.

4 months

3/4/63
7/4/63

32

15

46.48

1st.

4 months

10/15/62
2/15/63

23

18

78.26

2nd.

4 months

3/4/63
7/4/63

22

14

63.63

98

61

62.24

Total

Date

No. of those
who Passed

Tour

Middle

Duration

No. of
Participants

Training Cycle

a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 30, 1964, p. 28.
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It is still too early to properly evaluate the in-service
training program, but nevertheless there are certain weaknesses which
are apparent and which should be remedied.
The first observation is that these sessions included a
heterogeneous group of civil servants with different backgrounds, jobs
and interests.

The nature of the group necessitated a very general

approach which detracted from the effectiveness of the program.
Secondly, the number of civil servants trained thus far is
very small.

If the Institute continues its present policy of limiting

the number of participants to approximately twenty-five per session it
will be a very long time before they can attend to the large number of
civil servants who need training.
Finally, the government has not provided sufficient incen
tives and rewards for the participants who successfully complete train
ing sessions.

As a result, most of them are indifferent and do not

display the necessary interest. 22
The Civil Service Board is aware of these shortcomings and
is seriously trying to overcome them.

23

However, many of the needed

changes and improvements in this program require statutory changes and
as a result cannot be speedily effected.

22

Ibid.

j

2 3 .

Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board,
1963, pp. 32-33.
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Recommendations
INAD must provide various kinds of instruction to meet the
training needs of different groups of civil servants at different levels.
The degree and method of instruction, together with the subjects of
instruction, must be consistent with the practical, day-to-day tasks
of the employees.

Complete coordination between the practical and

theoretical fields is vitally important.

A U.N. publication, Training

and Administration of Personnel in the Public Service states: "This
service (a training center) should arrange practical courses to meet
the requirements of actual work in the various aspects and duties of
the public service."

24

The study of class specifications, provided by a position
classification plan, would help a great deal in choosing suitable
training programs for different groups of employees.
also be provided with an incentive to learn.

Employees must

This incentive must be

strong enough to overcome the apathy of the ordinary civil servant, who
remains as yet unconvinced of the professional aspects of government
positions.

A definition of the responsibilities and duties of these

positions, and the necessary requirements entailed in carrying them out
may work as a personal incentive for the employee to improve his ability.
The establishment of a clear relationship between training and promotion,
tying in the competitive examinations with subjects covered in the
training courses, is useful in creating an incentive for learning in
employees.
ay

United Nations, Training and Administration of Personnel in
the Public Service (New York, 1956), p. 13.
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One of the first functions of the INAD should be to elevate
the level of the general understanding of civil servants.

Explanation

should be given in terms of the overall picture of the political struc
ture of the country, their position before the people, and the signi
ficant role of public employees in achieving national goals.

These

topics and some others concerning human relations could be taught by
lectures and pamphlets.

The organizational structures and major goals

and policies of each department could be covered in the same way.

To

improve professional ability, regular courses, backed up by lectures,
field work and seminars, must be established.
The problem of training public servants is related to
reducing the cost of public services by increasing efficiency in
handling public affairs. This cannot be achieved unless accompanied by
a more rational organizational structure, a better division of labor,
the redistribution of employees, and by cleaning out the untrained,
inefficient surplus employees.
Overstaffing constitutes a major problem affecting many
aspects of civil service efficiency.

Surplus employees who are clearly

disqualified due to their lack of skill and education must be dismissed.
All other surplus employees who are not clearly disqualified must be
evaluated in order to determine their present skills, abilities and
characteristics and their aptitude for learning.

Surplus employees

qualified for training will have to be placed in training programs
suited to their respective aptitudes and interests and the employment
needs of the government.
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The central objective of the Civil Service Board is to
develop into effect whatever changes are required to enable the adminis
trative organs of the government to execute public policies in an
effective and responsible manner. It is not sufficient to pass laws
designed to meet the essential needs of the people, for those needs
will not be met unless the system of administration can follow through
with prompt and efficient execution. Improvements in administration
help assure that the intentions of the government are actually trans
lated into action and that the citizen is in fact receiving the services
to which he is entitled. They also produce maximum benefits for the
money spent.
Summary Statement
Evaluation of the Lebanese civil service has continuously
evoked comment on the poor quality and lack of preparedness on the part
of the government employees. Problems of overstaffing and selection methods
have been discussed in previous chapters. This chapter illustrated yet
another aspect causing inefficiency, the shortage of educational and
training facilities. An aggressive and comprehensive training program
would be a partial solution to this serious problem; discussion therefore
centered on the reform attempts of the government in this area.
An Investigation was first made into the general education
and preparation a civil servant may bring to his initial position. An
examination of the various educational institutions demonstrated the
serious shortages in fields of specialization essential to the public
service. It was further noted that the government failed to cooperate
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with or encourage the various colleges to develop programs correspon
ding to administration needs.
The emphasis on post-entry training has been fairly recent.
The first attempt at systematic in-service training was the establish
ment in 1952 of the Institute of Administration and Finance attached to
the Ministry of Finance. The further evolution of this process was seen
in the creation of the National Institute for Administration and Develop
ment, a centralized body serving all ministries.
Modeled after the French National School of Administration,
the Institute serviced two basic areas: Preparation and Training. A
resume of the types of training and description of the coursework was out
lined. A number of shortcomings were also presented. Factors such as the
heterogeneity of personnel particularly with regard to positions, the
smallness of training class and the failure of rewarding personnel for
the succesful completion of agency coursework were mentioned as reasons
contributing to inadequacies in the post-entry process.
Recommendations made included the encouragement of training
instructions to be of a practical nature, in harmony with the actual tasks
and duties of civil servants; the establishment of a clear relationship
between training and promotion to create an incentive for learning; and
the presentation of the significant role of the civil servant, in an
attempt to develop a professionalized corps of employees.

CHAPTER XI
EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR AND DISCIPLINE
One of the most important problems facing modern bureaucra
cies is resolving the conflict between the duties of civil servants in
their official capacity and their rights as private citizens.

Civil

servants in Lebanon as well as in other countries have a dual status.
On the one hand, they are employees of the government and, as such,
are supposed to operate as impartial agents of the general interest
and servants of the people; on the other hand, they are private citizens
and human beings entitled to the rights and privileges accorded to
other citizens who are not employed by the state.
The essence of the problem is that a clear line of demarca
tion cannot be drawn between the official actions of a civil servant
while on duty and his actions as a private citizen outside the govern
ment office.

The conduct of civil servants in their private capacities

as citizens very often has direct or indirect repercussions on their
official duties and may impair their status as objective and impartial
agents of the government and guardians of the public interest.

As a

result, civil servants cannot be allowed to exercise and enjoy all the
rights which are guaranteed to other private citizens for fear of com
promising the neutrality and integrity of the civil service.

In trying

to resolve the conflict between the rights and duties of civil servants,
the latter has to take precedence and restrictions have to be imposed
on the exercise of private rights for the sake of preserving the public
interest.

Gerhard Anchutz, a noted student of the Weimar Constitution
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pointed out:
In the exercise of his civil and civic rights...
the civil servant, even outside the office, must
impose upon himself that degree of moderation
which derives from his position as an organ of
the public at large. This consideration...supports
the conclusion...that the personal freedom of the
civil servant, especially the freedom of speech,
of the press, of assembly, and of association, is
subject not only to such limitations as apply to
all citizens but also to those special restraints
which result from the duties of his office and of
his profession. As was the case under the earlier law,
the liberties of the civil servant are restricted
by those duties, not vice versa.^
Such restrictions on civil servants have been justified by
the theory of the sovereignty of the state.

The state as the sovereign

guardian of the public interest enjoys supreme authority and can impose
its will on all its members,

"Government insists that in order to

preserve the integrity of public authority, it must possess the right
of final determination in all employment relations."

2

The state thus

reserves for itself the right to impose on its civil servants any
restrictions which it deems necessary for safeguarding and promoting
the public interest.

^Gerhard Anschutz as quoted by Fritz Morstein Marx, The
Administrative State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957),
p. 147.
2
Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York:
R M s e n Press, 1948), p. 1.
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In practice, such a philosophy has introduced restrictions
on the right of civil servants to participate in political activity,
to join trade unions, and to use the strike as a means of collective
bargaining.

The degree and extent of such restrictions vary from one

country to another, but they do exist in one form or another in practi
cally all modern states.

At present, the civil servants in such

countries as the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany,
are subject to a variety of laws which provide for such restrictions.
It is true that the spread of democratic institutions and practices
has resulted in greater freedom for civil servants; yet, they still do
not enjoy all the rights guaranteed to the average citizen and are
subjected to strict penalties whenever they deviate from the provisions
of the law in this respect.

3

This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of how the
Lebanese administration has dealt with this important problem, the
limitations it has imposed on its civil servants, and the sanctions it
uses to ensure observance of such limitations.
Political Activity
In Lebanon, the regulations governing the outside activities
of civil servants are not basically different from those existing in

3
Marx, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
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other countries, although they are more severe and strict.

The

Lebanese constitution in article 13 provides that "the freedom to
express one's opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press,
the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association shall be
guaranteed within the limits established by law."

4

But, in spite of

this provision in the constitution, the Lebanese government has, in
its personnel law, instituted some significant limitations to the
freedom of the civil servants.

The main prohibitions included in the

personnel law of 1959 can be divided into three categories:
1. Prohibitions relating to the political activity of
civil servants, including the joining of political
parties and participation in political affairs.
2. Prohibitions relating to the joining of trade unions
or syndicates.
3. Prohibitions relating to the right to strike.
Article 15 of Decree Law No. 112 of June 12, 1959, prohibits
civil servants from taking any action which is contrary to existing
regulations.

But, in addition to this general provision, it also

prohibits civil servants from
...taking part in political activities, or joining
political parties, or carrying the sign of any political
party or publishing, without the written authorization
of their superiors, speeches, articles, declarations,
or publications, relating to all matters.
It is clear from the above mentioned provision that the

^The Lebanese Constitution (Beirut: Khayat's, 1960), p. 7.
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Lebanese civil servants are subject to a severe regime which even
denies them the basic right of joining a political party.

As was

mentioned earlier, restraints on the political activity of civil
servants are common in most Western countries.

But, on the whole,

democratic countries today do not go so far as to deny a large sector
of their citizens the right to join political parties.

One can argue

that such a regulation in Lebanon is in contradiction and violation
of the constitution which guarantees the right of association.
The Lebanese government has always argued that the country
still has not reached that advanced stage of democratic development
which allows the adoption of regulations applied in older and more
advanced democracies, such as England and the United States of America.
Some people feel that the restraints on joining parties in Lebanon is
not only intended as a guarantee of the neutrality and impartiality
of the public service, but also as a means of preserving national unity
and fostering in civil servants a loyalty to the state which transcends
their loyalties to individual groups.

It cannot be denied that many

of the political parties in Lebanon have their roots in sectarianism.
Some of these parties do not even believe in the independent existence
of a Lebanese state and look beyond the Lebanese borders for inspira
tion and support.

The religious and nationalist roots of Lebanese

political parties have helped to create a sharp and dangerous division
in Lebanese society.

This dichotomy led directly to the crisis of

1958 which almost resulted in the disintegration of Lebanon.
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As a result, some people in Lebanon argue that it is unwise
and dangerous to allow such a spirit of division to permeate the public
service.

The way to avoid it, they hold, is to impose a strict pro

hibition on the political activity of public officials, including the
right to join parties.
This argument may appear convincing in theory, but there is
a lot to be said about the actual results of its application.

It can

safely be asserted that a large number of Lebanese civil servants do,
in fact, belong to political parties and are active members of them.
This is admitted even by the government itself which for years has been
declaring its intention of purging the political elements from the
public service, but has never succeeded in doing so; despite the fact
that, after the attempt of a coup d*etat by the Syrian Nationalist
Party in December 1961, a number of employees who were allegedly active
members of this party were dismissed from office.

Politics cannot be

eradicated from the civil service by a simple provision barring civil
servants from political activity.

Even if a civil servant is actually

barred from joining a party, his actions and decisions cannot be devoid
of political partisanship and will reflect his political sympathies
and loyalties.
the law says so.

One does not refrain from political activity because
The problem is much more complex and deeper than this.

It is one of instilling new attitudes and values in the minds of civil
servants and citizens alike, and of changing some of the cultural
patterns of Lebanese society itself.

Obviously such a change cannot

be accomplished by the mere provision of laws and regulations.
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The following table illustrates the number of civil servants
who were investigated by the Central Inspection Service for political
activities.

One cannot help being surprised by these figures, especially

if one bears in mind that the Lebanese civil servants are not known for
their apolitical attitudes.
In addition to the ban on political activity, civil servants
in Lebanon are subject to certain restrictions with regard to running
for election.

Up to 1960, no government employee could become a candi

date for municipal or parliamentary elections unless he resigned his
job six months before the date of the poll.

This blanket prohibition

was amended and relaxed in the electoral law of April 26, I960.**

The

new law excluded civil servants in the third category and below from
this ban and allowed them to run for elections while still in the
government service.^

If they were elected, however, they were required

to resign from their posts.
Employees in the first and second categories are still
prohibited from becoming candidates for elections.

These two categories

constitute the executive and managerial group in the Lebanese civil
service and, as such, are not allowed to engage in political elections.

5S«1 im Abi-Nader (ed.), Collection of Lebanese Legislation
(Beirut: Sader Press, 1960-61), Vol. V.
6Ibid., Art. 30.
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TABLE XI-1
NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS INVESTIGATED BY THE C.I.S.
FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES3

Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

Number of Civil Servants

33
9
37
82
10

aAnnual Report of the Chairman of the Central Inspection
Service, 1964, in Official Gazette, No. 24, p. 48/2.
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In order to discourage employees of these two categories from resign
ing to become candidates for election, the law specifies that unless
they get at least 20 percent of the votes cast, they will forfeit all
their rights to indemnity or retirement annuity.7

This can represent

a serious financial loss to any employee who has spent a long period in
government service--a fact which must make them hesitate before embark
ing on any election venture.
The other sphere in which the Lebanese law imposes a serious
restraint on the rights of civil servants is that of trade unionism
and strikes.

The personnel law specifically prohibits government

employees from joining trade unions and from striking against the
government or instigating others to strike.

8

The prohibition against joining trade unions seems a rather
harsh restriction and one which involves the denial of a significant
right accorded to civil servants in most Western countries.

This may

be so in theory, but in practice it is not as serious a limitation
as one might imagine because the trade movement in Lebanon is still
in its infancy and, hence, of little significance.

Today, there are no

unions of government employees in Lebanon or in any Arab country.
the trade union movements in the W.st are taken as a guide, it is

7Ibid.
^Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader,
Collection of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964), Art. 15.

If
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doubtful whether any unions of government employees will be formed
before we have witnessed the further development and growth of industrail unions.
The situation with regard to the question of strikes is
somewhat different.

The strict ban against strikes in Lebanon has

not solved this problem.

In fact, it is a particularly knotty one,

which has not yet been resolved by more advanced countries than Lebanon.
Although some of these countries have recognized the right of their
employees to join unions, they have been reluctant to accord them the
right to strike against their own governments.

This is a very con

troversial issue, and there is much to be said both for and against
strikes by government employees.

The crux of the problem is pointed

out by Spero when he says:
Prohibitions against strikes have never of themselves
prevented strikes by employees who regarded their
grievances sufficiently great to lead them to assume
the risks. Illegal strikes damage the authority
of the sovereign which the very denial of the right
to strike seeks to preserve.^
The ban against strikes in Lebanon has not succeeded in
eliminating them.

There have been a score of strikes by government

employees, the most notable being the 1953 strike of telephone employees
------

- - -

-

9

Spero, o p . cit., p. 15.

t
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and the 1957 strike by engineers in the Ministry of Public Works and
Transport.

In 1959, a strike by the garbage collectors of the Munici

pality of Beirut, which lasted for over a month, created a serious
health threat to the population and clearly revealed the danger that
could result from the interruption of such essential services.

It is

claimed that, in 1957, the government agreed to increase the general
level of pay only after a strike threat by public servants.

It is

worthy of mention that, in all the above-mentioned strikes, the employees
were able to fulfill their demands, and the government failed to take
any action against them.
This all helps to illustrate the point that strikes can
best be eliminated not by prohibitions included in law, but by the
elimination of the causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the employees
and by giving consideration to their demands.
In any case, if the freedom of the workers is to
be restricted, justice and sound administration
demand that management accept responsibility for the
establishment of machinery for peaceful solution of
grievances and of more basic issues. 10
But just as civil servants have certain obligations towards
their government, the latter has, in the words of Professor Marx, a
duty of fidelity and care toward its employees.^

In Lebanon, the

^Wallace Sayre (ed.) The Federal Government Service: Its
Character, Prestige and Problems, final report of the Sixth American
Assembly (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 1954),
p. 145.
^Marx, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

K
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government has not, to say the least, shown any great awareness of
such obligations towards its civil servants.

Demands and grievances

advanced by them have often been ignored or shelved, producing feelings
of frustration and ■issatisfaction.

The strike or threat of strike thus

becomes the most effective means by which they can impress their demands
on their employer.

If the government in Lebanon is determined to

eliminate strikes or even reduce them, it should start to display a
more positive attitude and endeavor to devise a personnel system which
meets the interests of its employees.
Discipline
No organization is so perfect, no executive so ingenious,
no personnel system so infallible that any of them can
continuously avoid some measures of punishment for
wrongful behavior or poor performance of employees.^
Disciplinary action is something indispensable in all organi
zations.

By definition it means certain administrative and judicial

measures taken to rectify or prevent employees' misbehavior.

In other

words, disciplinary action refers to some penalties imposed upon the
members of an organization when they act against the established rules
and regulations.

The form and extent of unethical and illegal behavior

of the public servant are to a great extent a function of the ethical
standards and values of society.

1o

0.
Harper, 1956), p. 451.

Thus, a need is felt for controlling

Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New Yor
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or checking the misconduct of the members of an organization.
rationalebehind such a device is that penalties
people from

wrongdoing. Viewed from this

The

imposed tend to deter

angle, disciplinary action

is considered as a negative approach to prevent wrongdoing.
An important point to be taken into account is the fact
that self-discipline is the most effective means of control over
an employee's behavior.

This view holds that disciplinary action does

not remedy the situation fully and that employees should be developed
in such a way as to show a conscious respect to ethical rules of con
duct.

What is right or what is wrong is not the problem.

What is

desired is the development of a conscious will in the people to act
rightfully.

In the words of Fritz Morstein Marx:
The maturity of the civil service and hence its ultimate
efficiency depend primarily on the degree to which the
individual civil servant is guided by an appreciation
of the basic rules that must govern his conduct.
Self-discipline appears when an employee willingly behaves

in accordance with the code of ethics and established rules.
required "is a tradition rather than a law."^

What is

To develop such self-

control over employees, however, is not an easy task.
Recently, there has been a tendency toward a more positive
approach to discipline.

Based on psychological points of view, this

approach holds that discipline is a function of morale.

The higher

^■%arx, op. cit., p. 133.
^Norman J. Powell, Personnel Administration in Government
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 125.
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the morale the more disciplined the employee within an organization.
Leonard White has defined morale as:
Both as an index of sound employment and a positive
means of building an efficient organization. It
reflects a social-psychological situation, a state of
mind in which men and women voluntarily seek to develop
and apply their full powers to the task upon which
they are engaged, by reason of the intellectual or
moral satisfaction which they derive from their
own self-realization, their achievements in their
chosen field, and their pride in the service. ^
Alexander Leighton views morale as being dependent on (1) the
confidence of individuals in the purpose of the group; (2) the confi
dence in the leadership; (3) the confidence that the individuals have
in each other; (4) organizational efficiency and (5) mental, emotional
and physical health of the individual members of the group.^

High or

low morale depends on a complex combination of factors which make people
act or fail to act according to the expectations of the organization.
The factors that are conducive to high or low morale rest upon economic,
psychological and social incentives.

The importance of these incentives

and the extent to which an employee is motivated to work are closely
related to such factors as culture, environment, status, and social
atmosphere.

Furthermore, individuals within a culture vary in their

reaction and responsiveness to the incentive system.

Needless to say, -

^Leonard B. White, "Administration, Public," Encyclopedia
of Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1930), Vol. I, p. 446.
l^Alexander H. Leighton, "Improving Human Relations, Applied
Science of Human Relations," Personnel Administration, Vol. IX, July,
1947, pp. 5-6.
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that which will motivate one may not equally motivate another.
The building of high morale is directly related to the
nature of supervision exercised.

It is the responsibility of the

supervisor not only to seek the satisfaction of employees' economic
and socio-psychological needs but also to make the employees enthusiastic
about their work.

This means that supervisors should know the art of

supervision and leadership through training and long experience.
To come to the point, according to the positive approach to
discipline there is a direct relation between morale and discipline.
If the employees are satisfied and happy in their work, they will generally
be

efficient and loyal.

On the other hand, if they are not happy in

their working environment, they may fall into bad habits.
is not a curative measure.

Punishment

The real cause of misconduct should be

attacked.
In order to ensure that

the conduct of civil servants, both

within and outside the service, is always in accordance with the estab
lished norms and standards set by law, the Lebanese government has at
its disposal a number of sanctions and penalties which it can inflict
on its employees.

The Lebanese personnel law outlines in great detail

the various types of punishments and the procedure through which they
can be applied to secure the desired obedience from civil servants.
Here again the Lebanese law and practice have been influenced by the
French continental system which has succeeded in developing an elaborate
and comprehensive disciplinary code.
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The penalties to which the civil servants in Lebanon are
liable, and which vary from a simple reprimand to discharge from the
service, are divided into two braod categories: first degree and second
degree.

The first degree penalties, which are the lighter ones, are

the following:^
1. Reprimand,
2. Deduction of salary for a maximum period of 15 days.
3. Delayed advancement within the grade for a maximum
period of six months.
The second degree penalties, which embrace more serious
punishment, are as follows:
1. Delayed advancement within the grade for a maximum
period of thirty months.
2. Suspension without pay for u maximum period o ^ s i x
months.
3. Demotion within the grade.
4. Demotion of the grade.
5. Dismissal from the Service.
1P
6. Discharge from the service.
Disciplinary penalties of the first degree can be imposed
by ministers, directors-general, directors, chiefs of services, chiefs
of departments, and the Central Insepction Service.

The more serious

penalties can be imposed only by the Disciplinary Councils.

19

Here

again the law describes in great detail the procedure which should be
followed by the Disciplinary Council in conducting hearings and

l
^Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Sader, op. cit., Art. 55.
l^The difference between dismissal and discharge is that the
latter involves loss of indemnity and retirement privileges.
^ I b i d ., Art. 56.
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Inflicting punishment.
Reprimand is exercised by the immediate supervisor.

The

rationale for this procedure is that it provides the immediate super
visor with a means to direct the attention of his subordinates to
their responsibilities and duties.

Since the reprimand is recorded

in the personnel file of an employee it can, therefore, be employed
as an effective means to control the employee's behavior.
exists, however, in its misuse by the supervisor.

A fear

A more positive

approach could be that of a formal reprimand following an informal
one.

Personal contact occasioned by the informal oral reprimand

provides an opportunity for constructive influence over an employee's
behavior.
The Disciplinary Councils, a French innovation adopted
by Lebanon, are special judicial councils devised to judge the serious
infractions made by government employees and impose appropriate penalties
on them.

In Lebanon these are basically of three types.

One adjudi

cates in cases involving employees of the first and second categories
and of inspectors attached to the Central Inspection Service.

This

council is composed of the three members of the Civil Service Board,
a judge named by the Ministry of Justice, and a civil servant of the
same rank as the employee being judged, named by the Prime Minister.
The Chairman of the Central Inspection Service, or one of the inspectors,
acts as the government's representative on the council.
The second Disciplinary Council is one which judges employees
of the Foreign Service.

Its members are named by a special degree.

The third Disciplinary Council is one which judges cases
involving all other employees of the civil service-

Its members are

appointed for a period of one year, upon the recommendation of the
President of the Civil Service Board, and include a judge, three employees
from the second category, and an employee of the same rank as the one
being judged.

Again, the Chairman of the Central Inspection Service,

or one of his inspectors, acts as the government's representative on
the council.

90

As may be observed from their composition, these disciplinary
councils are intended to function as independent and objective bodies
which can guarantee to the civil servants a fair hearing and prosecution.
The moment a case is referred to them it becomes their complete respon
sibility to conduct hearings and render judgment without any interference
or pressures from superiors or outsiders.

Decisions of these councils

can be appealed to the Council of State which can in turn, either annul
or confirm them.
immediately.

Confirmed decisions become final and come into force

Decisions of the disciplinary councils are not subject

to a pardon, unlike sentences imposed by ordinary courts of law.

21

When a government employee is charged with some violation
of the regulations which justifies disciplinary punishment of the second
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degree, his immediate superior recommends that the case should be
heard by the Disciplinary Council.

However, the actual referral to the

Council can only be made by the appointing authority.

In the case of

employees of the higher categories in Lebanon, the Council of Ministers
has to decide in such issues, and secure the approval of the President
of the Republic.

The decree which refers an employee to the Discipli-

nary Council can also suspend him from his job pending a decision.

22

When a case reaches the Disciplinary Council, the government's
representative is responsible for conducting an inquiry and obtaining
all necessary information and documents relating to it.

Within a period

of one month, he is required to submit to the chairman of the council
a detailed report on the case, including his own recommendations.

After

receiving this report, the chairman should convene a secret meeting of
the council within one week.

23

The accused employee is supposed to attend the hearings in
person.

If he fails to do so, he is tried in absentia. The accused is

entitled to read the whole dossier relating to his case and to copy
any documents he may wish to use in his own defense.

He is also allowed
nt
to be defended by a lawyer or by a fellow employee of similar rank.
t

22Ibid., Art. 58.
2^Ibid., Art. 59.
24Ibid.
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The council is required to hold hearings and render a
decision in the case within a period of two months from the time the
report of the government's representative is received.

The decisions

of the council are reached by majority vote, but the minority is allowed
to record its dissenting opinion.

Decisions of the council are not

final because the employee can still appeal to the Council of State.
It should be noted that the Council of State can neither alter the
council's decision nor impose a different penalty.

It can only annul

the decision on the basis of irregularities in the proceedings and ask
for a retrial, or else confirm it, thus making it final.

The acceptance

of any case by the Disciplinary Council does not preclude the possibi
lity of criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts of law and vice
versa.25
In trying to evaluate the disciplinary system in Lebanon,
the main point to be made is that, from the standpoint of employees,
the disciplinary councils have helped to protect them against abuses
of power and arbitrary actions by the administration and have guaranteed
them some sort of fair and impartial trial by a neutral judicial body.
This, in itself, is a definite contribution to the Lebanese administra
tion.

But it should not be forgotten that in its present form the

system suffers from certain deficiencies which should be remedied

Ibid., A r t . 61
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immediately if it is to operate efficiently.
The first observation which strikes the researcher in this
respect is the wide gap between the theory behind the system and its
actual application in the Lebanese administration.

To begin with, the

number of disciplinary cases taken up by the councils each year and
the number of penalties inflicted are amazingly small.

Table XI-2

below throws some light on this point.
About forty percent of the decisions of the Disciplinary
Councils from 1960-1964 were sanctions of the first degree, although
the imposition of light sanctions were supposed to be imposed by higher
administrative officials without trial prodedure.

The number of disci

plinary cases taken up by the councils each year constitutes less than
1/10 of one percent of the civil servants.

If one bears in mind that

the Lebanese civil servants are not precisely known for their high
degree of integrity and adherence to moral standards, these figures
are surprising.
Another characteristic of the system is that it is exceed
ingly slow and cumbersome and cannot provide prompt and firm punishment
when it is needed.

Suffice it to say that it requires the approval of

the Council of Ministers and the personal authority of the President of
the Republic to refer a case to a Disciplinary Council.

In the past,

some cases dragged on for months and even years before a final verdict
was reached.

26

?A

The new law has tried to ameliorate this slow process

Interview with a member of the Civil Service Board,
January 5, 1967.
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TABLE XI-2
CASES DECIDED BY DICIPLINARY
COUNCILS8

Year

Number of
Employees

I Degree
Penalties

II Degree
Penalties

Acquittals

1960

148

50

57

29

1961

65

16

33

16

1962

118

46

37

34

1963

128

46

53

21

1964

52

13

20

6

aAnnual Report of the Chairman of the Central Inspection
Service,

1964 in Official Gazette, No. 26, March 25, 1965, p. 48/2.
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by setting deadlines for reaching decisions, but even these allow appro
ximately four months for the settlement of cases.

Since most cases

are ultimately referred to the Council of State, this period is
stretched to a minimum of six months.

27

This defect, of course, is typical of all committee systems
and cannot be easily avoided unless a change is made and disciplinary
authority vested in the hands of one person.

There are many advocates

of such a change in Lebanon, and this point of view has its merits.
Before such a drastic alteration is made, however, a careful weighing
of the merits and disadvantages of each approach should be made in the
light of the special conditions and needs of the Lebanese civil service.
Another comment, frequently made about the system, is that
the present arrangements for disciplining employee violate the principle
that authority should be commensurate with responsibility.

Top manage

ment cannot exercise its responsibility of internal control if discipli
nary authority is delegated to special disciplinary councils.

Employees

on the whole do not favor it because they are afraid of the possible
abuse of disciplinary powers by individual administrators and prefer to
be tried by a neutral board.
There is one variety of disciplinary action, introduced into
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the personnel law of June 12, 1959, which is outside the responsibility
of Disciplinary Councils; namely, dismissal on the grounds of ineffi
cient performance.

Until the year 1959, the personnel laws in Lebanon

did not provide for the dismissal of inefficient employees.

Employees

could be dismissed on disciplinary grounds, but there was no way of
eliminating those whose performance was consistently and clearly below
the minimum acceptable standards of efficiency.

This drawback was over

come in the law of 1959 which provided that the newly established Civil
Service Board should be responsible for ascertaining the efficiency of
government personnel and dismissing inefficient ones.

28

On September 8, 1964, the Chamber of Deputies granted special
powers to an er^ra-parliamentary cabinet to purge the Lebanese civil
service.

A combined board composed of the three members of the Central

Inspection Service and of the Civil Service Board went through the
mountains of civil service dossiers and compiled lists of those whose
guilt seemed established.

After cabinet agreement, 13 judges, 8 ambassa

dors, 3 director-generals, and 141 other civil servants were retired
or dismissed. 29?
In spite of the apparent arbitrariness of the procedures,
since no hearings were conducted, all of the dismissed civil servants
retired on large fortunes and did not even face social disapproval nor

OO

Ibid., Art. 71.
^ Al-Ahrar (Beirut), February 18, 1966.
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were they tried by the courts.

The London Financial Times stated: ^

The purge of the Lebanese civil service now being
so smoothly executed by President Helou has amazed
everyone, most of all the Lebanese themselves.
Corruption here has for long seemed less a disease than
a way of life. It has been almost a form of social
security, rooted in the Lebanese morality of family
before State, protected by habit, by lack of public
indignation and by the political set-up. Like Gibbon,
many Lebanese were inclined to regard corruption as an
"infallible symptom of constitutional liberty" the
price for the freedom which has attracted such a
large slice of Middle East business to Beirut.
The final comment to be made about the disciplinary system
in Lebanon is that it has a negative and a punitive rather than an
educative function.

As a result of borrowing from the French adminis

trative system, which was to a great extent shaped by lawyers laying
emphasis on the notion of sovereignty and the duties and obedience of
civilservants, Lebanon has developed
stration and

discipline.

an

The concept of

authoritarian concept of admini
discipline in Lebanon is based

on what employees should not do and on strict adherence to existing
laws and norms of behavior.
A more positive approach to discipline would treat it as the
development of skills, values, agreement and acceptance involved in
effective participation in institutional processes.

Discipline should

concentrate on education, participation, and consultation rather than

30

Financial Times (London), March 22, 1966.
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on authority and control.
The conduct of a civil servant while on duty should
be according to a generally accepted and clearly defined
code of ethics and behavior. Adherence to high standards,
however, is the result of all the forces which create
morale, self-discipline, and efficiency rather than
the formal techniques of compulsion. In the welldeveloped public service, men and women are led-not driven.
The Lebanese government has yet to catch up with these new
ideas and attitudes.

A system of disciplinary penalties, no matter

how elaborate and comprehensive, cannot by itself ensure proper conduct
by civil servants.

This is not to say that the principle of punish

ment and discipline should be discarded.

In addition to maintaining

such a system, however, the government should concentrate its efforts
on instilling and developing in its employees an appreciation of pro
fessional ethics which will dictate to them, in the last analysis,
standards of conduct that will be observed without any need to resort
to compulsion.
Summary Statement
This chapter has dealt with the relationship between the
public servant and his government in the areas of political rights and
duties and the limitations imposed on the bureaucrat with regard to
fundamental privileges guaranteed to citizens of a democratic state.
Discussion has centered on political activity, trade unionism and strikes.

31stahl, op. cit., p. 460.
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In theory, the restrictions on all three kinds of activity have been
strict and called for severe penalties when and if infractions are made.
In practice, however, it has been shown that civil servants not only join
political parties but are also active members of these associations.
people have been investigated by the Central Inspection Service.

Few

Strict

bans on strikes have been formulated yet disruptive strikes were held by
various public employees in 1953, 1957 and 1959.

In these demonstrations,

it was noted that the employees were able to fulfill their demands, and
that the government failed to take any action against them.

The ban

against joining trade unions has been of little significance since the
movement itself is still in its infancy.
Disciplinary action was also discussed in this chapter.

It

was discovered that new ideas and approach toward personnel administra
tion namely that of the infusion of self-discipline or emphasis on morale
through effective supervision or leadership, have not yet been incorpora
ted within the bureaucracy.

The Lebanese system, a result of the French

administrative tradition, serves instead as a negative and punitive rather
than an educative approach.

It is characterized by an elaborate and com

prehensive disciplinary code which outlines the various types of punish
ment and the procedures through which they can be applied to secure the
desired obedience from civil servants.
The penalties for infractions were discussed as well as the
personnel and bodies, the Disciplinary Councils, authorized to judge
such conduct and impose penalties.

The evaluation of such procedures led
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to three basic conclusions: 1) For all the impressive organization of
Councils - few cases were tried and the penalties inflicted were snail;
2) The system was slow, cumbersome and denied prompt and firm punish
ment when it was needed; and 3) The system violated the principle that
authority should be commensurate with responsibility.

PART IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A close examination of the development of the civil service
in Lebanon reveals a certain familiar pattern which is typical, to a
varying degree, of many developing countries which have recently emerged
from foreign rule and domination to a status of independence. Having
been subjected to Ottoman and French rule for a long period of time,
Lebanon naturally has not been able to develop its own institutions of
government and administration but accepted whatever patterns were
introduced or imposed by these powers.
The transition from dependence to independence is a basic
and fundamental change, in fact a qualitative change, which entails a
change in the needs and objectives of the nation and which inevitably
requires a re-examination of the existing institutions of government
and administration in order to re-orient them to the new goals and
objectives of a young and developing nation. For some time Lebanon
seemed to be somewhat unaware of the significance of this basic and
fundamental change and of the need to reform its administration and
prepare it for the new tasks and responsibilities thrown upon it. This,
to be sure, is not an uncommon failure in newly independent countries.
For it is well known that in Lebanon, as well as in other countries which
have been through a similar stage of development, the struggle for
independence unavoidably developed into an all pervasive end in itself,
to which all efforts were devoted and, compared to which all other
considerations seemed to be matters of trivia. This neglect of the
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administrative aspect of government carried over through the early years
of independence when the country was still beset by a multitude of
foreign and domestic issues which took precedence over administrative
problems and diverted attention from them. Once this stage was over,
Lebanon began to turn its attention to the all-important

objective of

economic and social development. It is precisely at this stage that the
deficiencies of the Lebanese administration were highlighted and the
need

for its improvement became an urgent problem. It was clearly realized

that the inherited administrative machinery, which might have been doing
a satisfactory job during the mandate period, was not properly equipped
to deal effectively with the new problems of this vigorous nation. It was
becoming clear that all attempts at social and economic development
would be futile without the essential prerequisiste of a modernized,
technical, and efficient administrative machinery capable of shouldering
these new and growing responsibilities.
In 1952, as a result of growing popular resentment and
dissatisfaction with the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the
government service, a general strike led to the resignation of President
Bisharat al-Khouri, His successor, President Camille Chamoun, showed more
concern with administrative problems and sponsored few abortive attempts
to reform the public service. But these were superficial and unsuccesful
attempts which did not result in over-all significant changes in the
administrative machinery. The Lebanese government, although aware of the
need for administrative reform was not, however, aware of the proper
approaches and methods to be used in bringing about the desired changes.
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These unsuccesful attempts, however, served a very important purpose by
intensifying the existing awareness of the need for reform and throwing
some light on the kind of problems faced and the ineffectiveness of
methods and techniques used in coping with them.
This growing awareness for reform finally culminated in the
1958 reform movement which is probably the most ambitious and serious
attempt at administrative improvement in the history of Lebanon, The
crisis of 1958, which among other things was the result of the poor
and ineffective administrative system, revealed a pressing need for
basic and fundamental change in this system.
The reform movement of 1958, although more ambitious in
its scope and objectives and more sophisticated in its approaches and
techniques, did not, by any means, bring about drastic changes in the
administrative system but resulted in certain important changes which
were expected to improve the functioning of the system in certain areas.
But this reform undertaking, together with earlier ones, contributed
to a much better understanding of the various administrative problems
faced by the country and of the tremendous difficulties which stand in
the way of possible remedies. It helped to emphasize the fact, which
hitherto had not been clear in the minds of those concerned with adminis
trative reform, that there were many administrative problems which are
closely and directly linked to the cultural and social environment of
the country, and for which no easy solution could be offered unless
there was a prior change in some of the social and cultural patterns
of Lebanese society. It was realized then that administrative reform
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cannot be viewed separately from improvements in other spheres of
society. In Lebanon, where society is still in a transitional stage of
development from the traditional to the modern pattern with accompanying
changes in social values and customs, many improvements in the public
cannot be accomplished until such a transition has been completed and
new attitudes and values imparted to the people and civil servants. This
is, however, a slow and difficult process and, as the late SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, has remarked:
The Asian admires the material achievements of the
West but he is not willing to pay for the improvement
by changing his life in a manner which may seem to
him as an unavoidable concomitant of technical progress
but as incompatible with the spirit and traditions of
his own people.1
Before any basic changes can be effected in the administrative system,
Lebanese society will have to display the necessary moral, intellectual
and cultural prerequisites for such changes and transformation.
The author would like to isolate, further, what may be
considered as being the basic features of the Lebanese administration.
They are the following:
1.

The existence of excessive centralization and authority

resulting in undue concentration of work and decision-making at the
senior levels of the administrative hierarchy, and an undue concentra
tion of authority At the center of government in Beirut. There is a
limited deconcentration and devolution of administrative work and
authority within the ministries and between these ministries and

1
As quoted by William F. Larsen, "Government Administration
in the Republic of Korea," International Review of Administrative
Sciences. Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 1961, p. 312.
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their regional offices in the Muhafazah, The field's chief administrator,
the Muhafez, continuously refers to Beirut for Instructions and guidance
in the discharge of his functions. The ministries tend to be overstaffed
at the lower levels and understaffed at the top. This situation generates
congestion of work in the offices of the Director-General and the Minister.
This, plus.the fact that decisions on routine work and, sometimes, trivial
operations have to be made at the highest levels, creates the dysfunction
of overburdening top civil servants with unecessary details, and leaving
them with little time to deal with major policy.
High concentration is due, perhaps, to the smallness of the
country and the advantages of focusing authority in one place. This is
coupled by the thought that it is neither very efficient nor administra
tively reassuring to delegate authority. As such, government wheels move
slowly, heavily and, in many Instances, inefficiently.
Inregard, Riggs' following remarks may be very true of the
situation in Lebanon:
Because of overconcentration and lack of delegation,
those close to the goals of action cannot easily
cooperate with their colleagues in other agencies
whose work directly affects the success of their own
efforts. Characteristically, we find lack of
coordination and cooperation. Moreover, to overcome
this stagnation, new agencies are often set up in
the hope that, outside the bog of established
structures, action may be possible. But the new
agencies simply add to the intrabureaucratic conflict
and competition, increasing the burden on the top
of the hierarchy to Impose coordination.2

2
Frederick W. Riggs, "Public Administration: A Neglected
Factor in Economic Development," The Annals. Vol. CCCV (May, 1956), p. 77.
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2. The existence of a high degree of "legalistic" orientation,
mainly the application of the law in its narrowest sense with relatively
little attention to the long term objectives of the law and'the social
objectives of the ministry or agency.
Regarding administrative procedures, per se. little
recognition has been given to the role that might,
be played by positive mangament and personnel
practices. As an example, the Personnel Law itself
gives greatest emphasis to the legal responsibilities
of the civil servant and the sanctions and penalties
to which he is subject should he fail to 'observe
its regulations.13
3. The existence of excessive departmentalization whereby every
ministry is to a great extent a self-contained unit acting independently
of other ministries and with minimum coordination and lateral communica
tion— except through the Director-General. Although the Law^ provides
that the Directors or Chiefs of Services can communicate directly across
ministerial lines provided that they are not dealing with matters invol
ving a general policy, these officials seldom use this authorization or,
if they do, they use it with reserve.
4. The influence of and emphasis on academic and theoretical
background in the recruitment and selection of civil servants. Candidates

3
Ralph Crow and Adnan Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in
Lebanon, 1958-1959," International Review of Administrative Sciences.
Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 1961, p. 294.
4
Legislative Decree No. Ill, June 12, 1959, Art. 9.
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for the four higher categories of the general administrative cadre are
required by law^ to have certain specified academic diplomas or degrees
as an essential condition, besides others, for entrance into the service.
Most notable is the minimum of a Baccalaureat - Part II (or its equivalent:
the Sophomore diploma) for category IV,

the minimum of a Licence en Droit

(or its equivalent: the Master's Degree) for Categories III and II and
higher specialized degrees for Category I. In general, degree-holding
civil servants have them in Law and the Liberal Arts.
5.

The premises of decision-making tend to be extended less

by public pressure and more by high officials and administrators; these
latter are pressured by ministers or politicians, helped by local or
imported experts and specialists and coaxed, if and whenever it wishes,
by higher authorities. The civil servants have developed considerable
lack of responsiveness and sensitivity towards the public. This was,
perhaps, the deep influence of the Ottoman rulers and later the French
who were more anxious that the Lebanese administration and civil servants
be more sensitive to them as masters rather than to the people, their
needs and expectations. Also, the government appears at present to some
Lebanese (i.e., the former population of the southernmost and northeasternmost regions) as something distant, an abstraction, with no relations with
them in what concerns their problems and their means and conditions of liveli
hood. In these remote areas the government's ability to deal and serve its
public tends to be limited. Reciprocally, the people's expectations, in
spite of their needs, toward the government tend to be likewise limited.

5
Legislative Decree No. 112, June 12, 1959, Arts.4, 6-7, 11-12.
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6. The presence and use of personal relationships and contacts
rather than the official channels in the administrative process. This
grew
...out of the fact that primary loyalties tend
to be given to the family, clan, village or
religious community, which has broad ramifications
for the entire administration. It is axiomatic
that when any Lebanese citizen finds it necessary
to approach the government, he first seeks out
"some one he knows" or "some one who knows some
one he knows," that is, some one with whom he ..
shares at least one of the above relationships.
Civil servants respond to this type of relation
ship willingly and quickly and occasionally
just as quickly when induced by some material
reward even when no such relationship exists.**
7. Lack of qualified and specialized civil servants, generally
speaking. Qualified human resources, the most essential factor in any
organization, are still badly needed to play a vital complimentary role
to the efficient functioning of m o d e m organization and modern laws.
An abundance
mentioned

of unqualified personnel, due to many causes which were

in earlier chapters, forming a veritable Old Guard majority,

has yet to be drained out out of the administration and replaced by the
qualified and the specialized. This is the main responsibility of the
Civil Service Board and its National Institute of Administration and
Development which must provide a more positive and sound personnel
policy and an active pre-entry training program which is more pragmatic
and less imbued with a rigid legal orientation. Unless this is done no
significant change may be expected in the productivity and efficiency
of the Lebanese administration.

6

Crow and Iskandar, op. cit.. pp. 294-295.

I
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8.

Lastly, Is the presence of religious sectarianism, which

is recognized by law and in practice, and its manifestation in the
public administration and composition of the State's political posts,
in the electoral laws and in the personal status law. As regards the
administration, a scrupulous distribution of administrative posts
among civil servants from the various sects, in an equitable manner,
is followed; also, this 'sectarian equation' is strictly observed in
appointments to the various categories of the service. This policy
constitutes a barrier to the ingress of the "best qualified"

to the

public service. The absence of a more positive recruitment and appoint
ment policy, on account of sectarianism, may be —

and in fact is —

very disadvantageous as far as better efficiency and morale in the
service are concerned.
The obstacles posed by such social and cultural barriers do
not and should not dispel any hopes of administrative progress in
Lebanon. Overemphasis and exaggeration of these barriers might lead
to a fatalistic attitude which in Itself can be a most serious obstacle
to progress. In Lebanon, the government can and should play a more posi
tive role in speeding up the process of transition in the different
spheres of society and in developing some of the preconditions of
administrative change.
But, aside from these social and cultural considerations and
in spite of them, there are many technical problems in the Lebanese
administration which can be treated separately and where improvements
can be brought about by the application of new devices and techniques.
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It is these problems

which should receive immediate concern and whose

treatment can result

in tangible and important improvements in various

spheres of the public service. These probems were discussed in the
course of this study but reference will be made only to the most
important ones which deserve priority attention.
One of the most important problems in this connection is the
quality of civil servants In general, which is below the desirable
standards. This is the result of recruitment through political and secta
rian pressures, the lack of educational and training Institutions in
public administration, and the poor tests which are used in making
appointments to the civil service. The establishment of an independent
Civil Service Board to take charge of recruitment and selection through
out the civil service has contributed significantly to reducing political
interference. The Civil Service Board has not yet been able, however, to
improve the techniques of testing in order to ensure the selection of •
competent personnel. Civil service tests are still highly theoretical and,
to a great extent, unrelated to job requirements. The Civil Service
Board does not realize that this is one of the more specialized fields
in personnel administration and that significant benefits can be reaped
by securing the help of experts in this field. The introduction of
objective tests, which are still a complete novelty in the civil service,
will greatly help in this respect provided they are handled by properly
trained staff.
On the other hand, the in-service training activities of the
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newly established National Institute of Administration and Development,
will, in the long run, help to raise the standard of existing civil
servants. Aside from improving the skills and knowledges of these civil
servants, this institute will play a significant role in changing the
attitudes and approaches of these civil servants and in instilling in
them a better awareness and understanding of the problem of administra
tion.
Another equally important problem of the Lebanese administra
tion is the complex and cumbersome work methods and procedures which
result in excessive and frustrating delays in the transaction of offi
cial business. Citizens often have to wait for weeks and even months
before completing a simple and routine transaction. The author was
personally told by one Director-General that he knew of few transactions
which required over one hundred signatures before completion. Although
these are definitely an exception, they are nevertheless indicative of
the type of procedures with which the administration is afflicted.
It is often claimed that such excessive formalism is intended
as a safeguard against arbitrary actions and abuses by civil servants.
Although this might be the case in several instances, there are many
more instances when it is the result of useless and outmoded procedures.
Simplification of procedures in Lebanon will be in the public interest
even if it is done with the risk of violations and abuses. One of the
most important features of any modern administration is a proper

335

balance between safeguards and administrative action. In Lebanon, the
balance is decidedly titled in favor of control and safeguards.
One of the important deficiencies of the Lebanese civil
service lies in the fields of position classification and salary
administration. The lack of an adequate position classification
plan is a serious hindrance to the application to the application
of a m o d e m personnel policy. In Lebanon, however, the government
is still unaware of the significance of such a tool in providing
a

sound basis for personnel administration, and equally Important,

a sound pay policy. Those concerned with the problems of administration
in Lebanon can contribute by impressing upon the government the serious
ness of this gap and the need to devise a proper classification plan as
soon as possible.

A closely realted problem is that of the renumeration of
civil servants in Lebanon. This problem has two aspects: the low
rates paid to civil servants compared to rates outside the service,
and the internal differences which exist within the service itself.
Some students of public administration in Lebanon claim that,
although salaries of the civil service are low when comapred to
salaries which outside firms pay for comparable jobs, they are not
by any means low when compared tc the productivity of the civil
servants. There is much truth in this argument, but it cannot be
accepted

as a basis for treating all civil servants because it

constitutes a very unfair treatment to the qualified and competent
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civil servants who are devoted to their jobs. Also, the low pay of
civil servants which does not, in many cases, enable them to meet their
financial needs has driven them to bribery and corruption. The fact that
the Lebanese government is presently subsidizing a larger number of civil
servants than it needs should not deter it from considering immediate
steps to ameloriate the general level of pay. Any improvement in the level
of pay should, however, be accompanied by a system of incentives to reward
the good employees who need every possible encouragement and who should
not be treated in the same manner as the mediocre ones.
The internal inequities and discrepancies in the salaries of
civil servants have been perpetuated by the lack of a modern position
classification plan and by a complex system of allowances which is
arousing much complaint among civil servants. If no adequate classifica
tion plan can be installed in the immediate future, the government
should at least carefully revise its allowance policy in order to bring
to it some uniformity and rationality.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the ills which afflict
the Lebanese civil service, but merely an enumeration of the more pres
sing technical problems for which a total or partial solution is possible
within the existing social and cultural setting. A number of equally, or
possibly more important problems can be singled out; such as, sectarianism
which should be solved but which cannot be dealt with without effecting
certain basic changes in the social and cultural patterns of the country.
It should always be kept in mind that a basic and a fundamental transfor
mation of the administrative system can only come as a part of a more
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s
general and comprehensive transformation In the economic, social and
political spheres.
Finally, due stress should be made of one very Important consi
deration in connection with administrative change and Improvement in
Lebanon. During the past decade or so, the concept of and belief in
freedom suffered several serious setbacks throughout the Middle East.
The drift to military and authoritarian regimes throughout this part
of the world was, in several instances, justified by the corruption
and ineffectiveness of existing governmental and administrative insti
tutions which could not serve the growing needs of the new nations.
Unfortunately there was much truth in these justifications, and this
has given support to the growing myth among the people of the Middle
East that demdcracy and efficiency are incompatible. Lebanon, which
is one of the few outposts of democracy in this part of the world, can
render a significant service by helping to dispel this myth. If Lebanon
can succeed in malntaing its democratic institutions and developing an
efficient administrative machinery, it would fulfill a most important
mission, not only for itself but for the rest of the Middle East.
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